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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the relationship between religion and politics in Israel and Iran through 
examining the development of Revolutionary Messianism as the founding philosophy of these 
contemporary states. These states differ in their political history and structure. In both cases, however, 
Messianism has been the core religious ideology in their understanding of revolution and their religio- 
political identity in the contemporary Middle East. Revolutionary Messianism negates the existence of 
apolitical and apocalyptic messianic theologies and gives rise to the emergence of new state actors: 
theological politicians and political theologians. This thesis examines the transformation of messianic 
ideology in the context of Israel’s and Iran’s security politics, their political structures, their legal 
systems, and their social environment. In doing so, it demonstrates the lasting impact of the messianic 
ideas on religion and politics in these states. It argues that the transformation of messianism has resulted 
in political elitism, the rise of new forms of fundamentalism, and the de-sacralisation of theology. 
 
This thesis offers a new analytical model for studying the relationship between religion and politics in 
Israel and Iran by identifying three phases: Revolutionary Messianism, State Building Messianism and 
State Maintenance Messianism. This model allows us to not only analyse the development of 
Revolutionary Messianism during the Revolutionary Phase but it crystallises the relationship between 
religion and politics after the establishment of the post-revolutionary states. In addition, it explains how 
these states define secularism, secularity, and secularization. It clarifies the boundaries that each state 
determines between religion and politics and the impacts of the development of Revolutionary 
Messianism on societies. It argues that in both cases politics is not subordinate to theology, but in fact it 
changes theology, and consequently religion. 
4  
Acknowledgments 
 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to Victoria University of Wellington for giving me the opportunity 
to write this dissertation in a secular and politically safe environment. I specifically thank all the 
members of the Religious Studies Programme for further encouraging me to take on the task of 
completing this thesis. I am grateful for their stimulating support. 
 
This dissertation could not have been written without Professor Paul Morris who not only agreed to 
supervise my thesis but also encouraged and challenged my ideas throughout the process of writing this 
dissertation. I thank Professor Morris and Dr Geoff Troughton, who have guided me through the stages 
of writing and editing this dissertation. 
 
I would like to acknowledge and extend my gratitude to Aliki Kalliabetsos for her vital encouragement, 
support, and understanding. I wish to thank Dr Chris Marshall and Dr Marion Maddox for the constant 
reminders and much needed motivation. 
 
Most especially I thank my family, specifically my my partner, Arron Jones, my mother Zarintaj 
Etemadi, my sister Bahar Partow, my uncle R. Etemadi, my aunt Sima Etemadi, and my cousins Dr Ali 
Rafie and Dr Marjan Makki. I thank my friends, William Hoverd, Rebecca Frost, Charlotte Boyer, and 
the post grad students in Religious Studies for their patient love that enabled me to complete this 
dissertation. A special thanks to Jonette Crysell, Daniel Dowling, and Tim McVicar for their editing 
skills, their encouragement and friendship. 
5  
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
Abbreviations and chronological chart 
 
 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...6 
 
 
Chapter One: The Rise of Revolutionary Messianism ………………………………………...24 
 
 
Chapter two: Hermeneutics of Sacred Texts and Political Legitimacy…………………………59 
 
 
Chapter Three: From an Imaginary State to a Political State: Securitization of Revolutionary 
 
Messianism …………………………………………………………………………………81 
 
 
Chapter Four: Land, State, Law, and the Messiah: Rethinking Divine Law and State…………….110 
 
 
Chapter Five: Politicization of Messianism: State Messianism ………………………………….139 
 
 
Chapter Six: Politicized Messianism and Society………………………………………………172 
 
 
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………209 
 
 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..216 
 Abbreviations 
 
 
USA United State of America 
 
 
USSR United Soviet Socialist Republics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
6  
Introduction 
 
 
I am a child of the 1979 revolution in Iran. I was eight years old when I watched from the pavements of 
Tehran’s streets waves of people walking together chanting against the Shah. During the first year after 
the revolution Tehran erupted into a political rainbow but soon the sweet taste of victory turned into 
the bitter taste of violence. Throughout the primary and intermediate years of school until Khomeini’s 
death in the last year of my high school, every day, in the morning ceremony, our principal made us 
repeat after her the slogan “Oh God, Oh God, Keep Khomeini [alive] until the Mahdi’s revolution/ take 
years from our lives and add them to his life!” The slogan was intentionally designed to closely connect 
the Islamic Republic to the messianic promise of Shi’a theology for us who were the first generation of 
the revolution. The turning of the revolution into a dictatorship raised many questions for my 
generation, who were not old enough to participate in the revolution but old enough to understand the 
failure of its messianic promises. 
 
The exaggerated patriarchal ideology and obsessive attempts to form us into a revolutionary generation 
was not limited solely to undermining the Shah and his modernization efforts. The Islamic Republic 
highly publicized Iran’s radical shift of policy towards Israel and made the country a mystery for my 
generation. Every night we watched video clips of conflict between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians but 
never received any honest information either about that conflict, or Israel. What made accepting the 
Islamic Republic’s stance on the conflict more problematic was that over the years its position had not 
helped to resolve the conflict. On the contrary, it worsened the situation. In order to understand the 
revolution, the change of Iran’s political map and its ineffective regional policies I continued my studies 
in the Humanities after high school. During my Bachelor and Masters degrees in Iran, I studied the 
historical, linguistic, and cultural roots of Iran’s revolution in order to understand the reasons for the 
revolution and the development of the post-revolutionary state in the country. In 2002, I left Iran for 
New Zealand to continue my education in a democratic academic environment where I could have 
access to materials and freely conduct my research. 
 
I pursued my studies at Victoria University of Wellington writing my second Masters’ degree on 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary discourse on martyrdom and the construction of a revolutionary 
identity for the state during the eight years of war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1989). In my research for 
this degree I studied Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem and found striking similarities between 
some of the revolutionary ideas of Zionism and those of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Both revolutionary 
discourses understood the integration of politics and theology as the only solution for ending injustice 
and preparing for a messianic age. Prior to conducting this research I tutored a course on Judaism and 
Zionism that Professor Paul Morris offered in the Religious Studies Programme. He explored these 
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areas through the lens of the integration of religious and political ideas which directly related to my 
questions about the development of the concept of messianism in the post-revolutionary states of Israel 
and Iran. Tutoring the course encouraged me to study Hebrew under the supervision of Professor 
Morris for over a year in order to expand my knowledge of Jewish sources. 
 
Thesis Statement 
 
 
Similarities between Jewish and Shi’a messianic theology and the influence of Marxism on the Zionist 
and the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary and messianic discourses led me to the main question of this 
comparative study: what is the role of revolutionary messianism in the development of the state in post- 
1948 Israel and post-1979 Iran? 
 
 
During the first two years of this study I worked separately on Iran and Israel. However, I found that 
dividing the thesis into two separate parts failed to highlight adequately the parallel developments of 
revolutionary messianism in these states, and provided an inadequate structure for testing the 
comparative model I aimed to present. Therefore, I reshaped the argument on the development of 
messianism thematically and divided the thesis into three phases: Revolutionary Messianism, State 
Building Messianism, and State Maintenance Messianism. In this way, I could trace the development of 
revolutionary messianism into state politics in both states, across different chronologies, and present an 
analytical model that could explicate religion and politics in Israel and Iran. In the analysis that follows I 
compare the foundational histories of these two states to explain the parallels between the two systems, 
and analyse recent elections in Israel and Iran to focus on the challenges that these states face in the 
transition of revolutionary messianism into state politics. 
 
Methodology 
 
 
In the dominant scholarly literature the development of revolutionary ideologies, what I understand to 
be revolutionary messianism, in Iran and Israel is analysed in only two phases; revolution and post- 
revolutionary. This thesis argues that a three phase model makes better sense of the development of 
messianism in these states. It expounds upon this three phase model in order to shed further light on the 
development of the relationship between religion and politics in the post-revolutionary states. The 
proposed analytical model in this thesis allows us to understand the reasons behind Israel’s and Iran’s 
pragmatic or idealist policies and assess the role of revolutionary messianism in the political decisions of 
the states concerning domestic and international issues.1 Each phase is addressed in two chapters, which 
 
 
1 Some scholars like Mehdi Moslem view the reformist faction in Iran to be a progressively pragmatic force and the 
fundamentalists as an idealist one. See: Mehdi Moslem, ‘The State and Factional Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, in, , 
Twenty Years of Islamic Revolution: Political and Social Transition in Iran Since 1979, ed. Eric Hooglund (NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 2007), 19-36. Also see: H. Amirahmadi, Revolution and Economic Transition: the Iranian Experience (NY: SUNY Press, 
1990), 256-258. M. Mahmood, The Political System of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Maharashtra, India: Gyan Publishing House, 
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facilitates the examination of various dimensions of revolutionary messianism and the characteristics of 
the transformed form in each phase. 
 
This study investigates the changing of messianic theology from a largely apolitical theology to a political 
doctrine in the Revolutionary Phase. The core concept that distinguishes traditional from revolutionary 
messianism is the role of human agency in bringing about the messianic age. While in the pre-modern 
period, in both traditions, salvation was awaited with patience and trust in divine intervention, the 
modern narrative is active. Revolutionary Messianism is different from the pre-modern form in three 
ways. First, elements of self determination and nationalism are pivotal concepts in the modern 
messianic narrative. Secondly, contrary to the traditional version in which the divine is the sole 
responsible agent in any historical change, the modern narrative systematically institutionalises 
messianic hopes in a human bureaucratic system of a state. Thirdly, Revolutionary Messianism in its 
nationalistic form as a political ideology has played a pivotal role in the construction of state identity in 
contemporary Iran and Israel. It is in this context that the first two chapters of this study trace the 
process of the development of traditional messianism into a political idealism. The claim is that in both 
cases the revolutionary narrative of messianism is inherently unstable and its instability is imbedded in 
both concepts of revolution and messianism. In Israel the Rrevolutionary Phase began in the 1890s and 
ended in 1949 with the establishment of the state of Israel. In the case of Iran it began in the 1890s and 
ended in 1979 with the establishment of the Islamic Republic. 
 
Iranians and Jewry had different encounters with modernity. While Iran’s history as a nation in specific 
geographical boundaries is continuous, Jewry preserved and practiced their cultural and religious 
identity in the Diaspora. For both, the French and Russian revolutions played a determining role in 
organizing their demands for the establishment of a nation state. In Iran, the Constitutional Revolution 
followed only years after the Russian revolution. Nationalists demanded the limiting of monarchical 
power, the end of economic oppression, and the establishment of national legislative and judiciary 
systems. For Jewry the wish for a national identity mobilized European Jewish intellectuals in the late 
nineteenth century to unite communities and form a nation state, and to re-define communal identity in 
national terms, within geographic borders. The continuation of communal history was then bound to 
the understanding of religion in relation to territorial nationalism. In both cases debates on messianism 
between secular and religious forces shaped their understandings of the foundations of the nation state. 
These debates are recorded in the Constitutional arguments of the early twentieth century in Iran when 
 
 
 
2006), 109. Debates over the pragmatic and idealistic nature of the state of Israel are located in debates over the future of 
the territories, one-state or two states solution for the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and Israel’s political ties with the USA. For 
these debates see: Y. Ginzburg, Rectifying the State of Israel: a Political Platform Based on Kabbalah  (Liverpool: GalEinai 
Publication Society, 2002), 162.R. Cohen-Almagor, Israeli Democracy at the Crossroads (London: Routledge, 2005), 13-16. A. 
M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel: Myths and Realities (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 139-145. 
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the superiority of religious establishments over legal institutions was challenged by secular forces and 
fiercely debated between conservative and reformist religious figures. In the case of Israel, these debates 
are recorded in the history of Zionism between secular and religious Zionists and between pro-Zionists 
and anti-Zionists religious factions. 
 
One of the significant political implications of different understandings of revolutionary messianism in 
Israel and Iran is the model of their post-revolutionary statehood. The Iranian republic and Israeli 
parliamentary systems are both Westphalian in terms of its three main constructing factors of centrality 
of a political body called the state, economic and human resources that enables a state to implement its 
policy, and centrality of military and political powers within a territorial border. Israel and Iran, 
however, differ in the model of government. In Israel’s case, the new understanding of messianism was 
based on an institutional rather than an agent-based system. This narrative has made the adaptation of a 
representative democracy in which the political power is centred in the body of a parliament (Knesset) 
but the state is obligated to maintain its Jewish identity. In Iran’s case the preferred model based on 
French republicanism is limited by monarchical dictatorship. The state claims to be a republic where the 
majority are the ultimate political decision-makers. 
 
In the State-Building Phase, this study examines how Revolutionary Messianism produces an 
extraordinary impact on the role of security in these states. The core concept of this section is that the 
establishment of post-revolutionary states in Iran and Israel and the involvement of these states in 
military conflicts offer a political environment in which Revolutionary Messianism becomes securitized. 
Although both Iran and Israel share a common political foundation with other secular states like France 
in that institutionalization and state bureaucracy are inseparable parts of state structure, the messianic 
doctrine creates a specific form of state identity that focuses on resisting oppression and preventing 
destruction by using previously theological messianism. Since in both cases their histories were 
dominated by oppression, the State Building Phase was the advent of a new era in which protecting the 
post-revolutionary state becomes a vital necessity. This process of securitization opens a new chapter in 
the political history of these countries and transforms Revolutionary Messianism into the source of 
legitimacy for the security doctrines of the post-revolutionary states. As the result of securitization, 
messianism becomes a premise for justifying the authority of these religio-political states, an indicator of 
 
the religious adherence of political factions, and the understanding of nationalism. Chapters Three and 
Four of this study investigate this process of securitization of Revolutionary Messianism and its impact 
on the legal systems in Israel and Iran. In Israel the State-Building Phase began in the 1950s, while in 
Iran it began in 1980. It concluded for both states in 1989 with the ending of the Cold War. 
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Although neither Israel nor Iran became a French style secular state, securitization enabled them to 
understand their post-revolutionary national identity as, in part, a continuation of their historical 
political identities. The securitization of messianism, though romanticised and at times idealistic, 
generated basic rules for the states’ legal system. These rules have been contested or supported 
passionately by secular and religious groups, thus the states’ legal systems become the best case study 
for examining the challenges that the securitization of messianism creates in these states. These chapters 
argue that studying the securitization of messianism is the key to understanding the dynamics of the 
relationship of religion and politics in these states. As Securitized Messianism becomes the underlying 
philosophy of the states’ security doctrines it creates tension at institutional and bureaucratic levels. It 
adapts the state to a solely security orientated entity, which, for its continuity, needs an enemy. 
 
This thesis investigates the ways in which Securitized Messianism is imbedded in Iran’s and Israel’s 
domestic and regional policies in the State Maintenance Phase. It argues that in these states the 
transformation of Securitized Messianism into Politicized Messianism in the post-Cold War era is the 
main decisive factor that directs debates between the secular and the religious groups; determines the 
level of the states’ secularity and religious identity; and, explains their understandings of political 
legitimacy and state responsibilities. This section explains how the structure of political factionalism in 
these religio political states is radically different from a secular state like France as the result of the 
inclusion of the religious institutions in political decision making. It examines how the involvement of 
religious institutions in state politics determines the limits of state authority in relation to individual 
rights and the states’ policies on religious institutions. The goals of Politicized Messianism which are 
expressed in state policies, whether publically announced in Iran or indicated in both secular and 
religious parties’ plans in Israel, are an indicator of Israel’s and Iran’s understanding of the secular. 
 
The politicization of messianism requires de-securitization and the incorporation of the states’ security 
doctrine into pragmatic politics. De-securitization transforms the concepts of secularism and religion in 
these states, thus modern politics, as well as theological developments, becomes a main influential 
factor in religious transformations in Iran and Israel. During the process of de-securitization, messianism 
is institutionalised and secularised. Chapters Five and Six of this study examine this process and its 
impacts on the states’ political factionalism and society. They argue that the concept of authority as the 
fundamental theme in Securitized Messianism is transformed in the process of de-securitization. While 
securitization extends the states’ responsibilities from those of a secular state to a state with some 
“sacred” goals, the politicization contains this sacred responsibility by pragmatic politics and causes 
further challenges to the legitimacy of the actors of the securitization period. 
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The development of the notion of Revolutionary Messianism in the post-revolutionary stages in these 
countries is the focus of this comparative study. The benefit of such comparative study is that only 
through the comparative method specific factors of the development of secularisation in each case can be 
identified. Comparatively studying the development of revolutionary messianism in Iran and Israel 
signifies the importance of rethinking the understandings of the dynamics between religion and politics, 
and the simultaneous processes of securitization and secularisation of religion. This comparative study 
facilitates identifying theological factors that determine Israel and Iran’s political decisions on regional 
and international issues and encourages rethinking the role of state security in the development of a 
theological notion such as messianism. By using a comparative method this study can describe how the 
understanding of legitimacy in a religion-political state is constructed through re-defining messianism in 
the state security context. 
 
Although the focus of this study is to identify the understanding of secularisation in these states by 
highlighting their differences, their similarities can shed light on their understanding of the secular and 
some other areas for further studies in secularisation theories. First, in both cases, during the 
revolutionary stage the theology legitimizes the revolutionary goals. In the case of Zionism, the 
theological understanding of territorial sovereignty gave momentum to the growth of Zionism. In the 
case of Iran the notion of ending the tyranny in the time of occultation legitimized the revolution. In 
both cases, this legitimization project changed direction in the post-revolutionary state and the existence 
and the success of the post-revolutionary state legitimizes the validity of messianic doctrine. This 
rotation in the sources of legitimacy further confirms the role of the state in defining religion and 
theology and exposes a clear gap in secularisation theories. Secondly, they demonstrate that a neo- 
fundamentalist approach towards messianism could only rise as an organized political structure in a 
nation state and in a securitized context. As this study will demonstration in Iran the rise of neo- 
fundamentalists is the direct outcome of the conflict atmosphere during the Iran-Iraq war. In the case of 
Israel, the Shas party could not develop into a main political player without their involvement in the 
settlements negotiations, debates over Jerusalem and, Israel’s political ties with the Unites States. 
Thirdly, it demonstrates that regardless of the political structure of the states, the integration of politics 
and religion at the institutional level secularises religion at the institutional level. 
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Rationale 
 
 
Messianism in religious and political context 
 
 
This thesis offers a new understanding of the religio-political states of Israel and Iran based on a 
Benjaminian understanding of the integration between politics and theology in a nationalist revolution. 
It suggests that while the traditional political theories, such as Marxism, can define aspects of the 
political cultures of Zionism and the Iranian revolution of 1979, they fail to define the relationship 
between messianism, theology, and politics in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary stages. This 
thesis argues that studying the meaning of these terms in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary stages 
 
in Israel and Iran sheds light on the understanding of secularity and religion in these states.2 I have 
chosen messianism as the central theme for this study because revolutionary messianism is a founding 
philosophy of the contemporary states of Iran and Israel. Messianism has inspired the political structure 
of these states and legitimized their authority. It has been the core religious ideology in their 
understanding of nation state and in situating these in the contemporary religio-political map of the 
Middle East. 
 
Messianism limits the definition of theology in political context, justifies the institutional integration of 
religion and politics, and attributes religious legitimacy to these states. By messianism this thesis refers 
to a central theological theme in Jewish and Shi’a religious traditions: waiting for a redeemer. In both 
traditions, messianism is the belief in the coming of a saviour. Although Jewish and Shi’a messianism 
were developed in different communities and contexts, both place emphasize on global justice. 
According to the Shi’a narratives Mahdi is the same as the Jewish messiah. 
 
In Judaism, this belief is one of the thirteen principles of Faith that is recited daily. In Shi’a Islam, it is 
the core philosophy of divine guidance (Imamat). In both traditions, prayers for the fulfilment of the 
conditions for the coming of the messiah are recited daily.3 In neither of the traditions is the idea of 
messianism explicitly addressed in their sacred books. There is no direct reference about a messiah in 
the Qura’n or in the first five books of the Torah. In both traditions, however, scholars argue that the 
concept was implicitly indicated in the sacred books and explicitly explained by prominent religious 
figures and clergy. In addition, both Judaism and Shi’ism view the concept of messianism as an 
integrated part of their understanding of the day of justice, which both believe to be the final episode of 
 
 
 
 
2 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2007), 44-50. 
3 In Judaism the Shemoneh-Esrei daily prayer specifically addresses the three conditions of the coming of the messiah; the 
ending of the exile, the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, restoration of a Torah-based justice system, the restoration of 
the kingdom of Israel (king David), the ending of the heretics and apostates, rewarding the righteous, and restoration of 
Jerusalem. In Shi’a Islam, the Faraj prayer is recited daily for the ending of the occultation and the coming of the Mahdi; for 
bringing the rule of Shariah and ending the time of injustice. 
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human history. The significant difference between these messianic doctrines is the human nature of the 
messiah. 
 
In both traditions, there is a wide variety of ideas about the conditions and time of the coming of the 
messiah. In Judaism, the term Mashiach (Messiah) means the anointed one; one who is anointed to be a 
king in the latter days (the day of justice) but the term does not refer to any particular person. 
Therefore, in every generation a person could be born with the potential to be a messiah. These 
potentials in an individual become possibilities only if the conditions are right. The messiah inspires the 
community by being an example. He is a true believer, making righteous decisions, and freeing Jewish 
community from the rule of others. He is a person rather than a god or a semi-god, and it is his 
commitment to the Torah rather than his supernatural characteristics that makes him the final 
redeemer. 
 
In Shi’ism the term refers to the son of the eleventh Imam (Hassan ibn Ali- Askari) who was born in 
 
869CE.4 While according to Shi’a sources the title Mahdi was used by Shi’a followers in the first fifty 
years after the death of Imam Askari, to some of Mohammad’s descendants, neither was able to fulfil the 
demands of Shi’a followers.5 Shi’ites believe that the time of the occultation is divided into two periods of 
lesser and greater occultation. The lesser occultation period began in 874 and ended in 941. During this 
time, Mahdi communicated with his followers via his four deputies.6 The time of great occultation began 
in 941CE when the last of the four deputies died and the communication channel between the Imam and 
his followers ended. During the time of the occultation, the Shi’ites believe, the Mahdi is 
alive and present amongst people. They usually refer to him as the “sun behind clouds”.7 In both 
 
traditions predicting the time of the coming of the messiah is strongly forbidden, as it could result in the 
loss of faith of the faithful and aversion from religion in its totality. 
 
Walter Benjamin 
 
 
There are three reasons for choosing Walter Benjamin as the main theorist for explaining the 
characteristics of revolutionary messianism in Iran and Israel in this thesis. First, Benjamin equated 
messianism with longing for redemption that could bring about an ideal time. He argued that theology 
was the missing component in understanding historical development and considered the companionship 
of the “dwarf of theology” a vital component for any revolution. To Benjamin secularisation was an 
 
4 According to Shi’a narratives, he was born in Madina on (6.12.846 AD) and died in Samarrah Iraq when he was 28 years 
old. He was the Imam of the Shi’ites for 6 years after his father died. The Shi’ites refer to him by the title of Askari (on who 
belongs to an army) because, they believe, he spent most of his life in the military town of Sammara (about 60KM south of 
today’s Baghdad) because his father was under house arrest by the Caliphs al-Muktadi and al-Mu’tamid. 
5 W. Madelung, “Al-Mahdī,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam. (Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1986), vol. 2, 1231–8. 
6 V. Klemm, “Islam in Iran ix; The Deputies of Mahdi”, in Encyclopaedia Iranica. http://www.iranica.com/articles/islam-in- 
iran-ix-the-deputies-of-mahdi December 28, 2011. 
7 M. A. Amir-Moezzi, The Divine Guide in Early Shi’ism: The Sources of Esotericism in Islam (NY: SUNY Press, 1994), 116. 
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inevitable outcome of historical development that he explained in the “wreckage upon wreckage” that 
the angel of history helplessly witnesses. In both Iran’s and Israel’s cases, revolutionary narrative of 
messianism strongly relied on theology for justifying their causes and emphasized revolting against the 
process of secularization. Secondly, Contrary to Carl Schmitt, Benjamin did not understood theology as 
sets of religious rules and legal discourses that defined authority and order in a society. To Benjamin, 
redemption was the most significant aspect of theology for politics which was expressed in messianic 
hope. In both the case of Israel and Iran, the issue of redemption was the central theme of the 
revolutionary stage that connected a theological concept to a modern political goal. More significantly, 
Benjamin emphasised the global characteristics of messianism, which was also a central theme in the 
revolutionary discourses of Zionism and the Iranian republics. Thirdly, he articulated messianism in the 
relationship between suffering and remembrance.8 This understanding of theology clearly defines 
Iranian and Israeli revolutionary messianism. Neither early Zionists nor Iranian revolutionaries claimed 
 
their goal to be the establishment of an absolute theocracy. Rather they articulated their messianic ideals 
in their attempts for political independence, remembering, and ending of political suffering. 
 
Benjamin correctly indentified the potential dangers of the integration of redemption theology into 
politics in the age of mass production. Benjamin wrote about the loss of the aura of a work of art in the 
time of mechanical reproduction. His emphasis on the dangers of capitalism impeded him from 
considering that while the integration of politics and theology to form a state could be redemptive, the 
secularisation of theology following its involvement is inevitable. Therefore, the Benjaminian model 
clearly explains the relationship between theology, messianism and politics in the revolutionary stage 
but fails to explain the consequences of this relationship in the post-revolutionary stages on both politics 
and religion. By drawing on Benjamin’s understanding of theology, messianism and revolution this 
thesis develops a post-Benjaminesque definition of this relationship where it is neither religion nor 
 
politics but state security that relates messianism to political legitimacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Benjamin, however, was not the first philosopher who acknowledged the importance of theology in politics. Carl Schmitt 
was a German legal theorist who began writing about the relationship between politics and theology since the World War I. 
He was a critique of liberalism and argued that democracy is based on sets of ideas rather than an ideology. Schmitt was a 
practicing Catholic during the early stage of his writing career and believed in a supernatural political union that embodied 
Roman Catholicism in political form and could further the boundaries of our understanding of a nation state. For Schmitt, 
liberal democratic constitutional systems were unstable as they lacked a basis for their legitimacy and are thus inherently 
destructive. He argued that authority is the central element that defines a low. The ordering role of a state obligates 
individuals to its politics. Authority, Schmitt wrote, creates the foundation of civilizations, allows a culture to develop and 
protects individuals. Accordingly, for Schmitt, the central concepts of modern politics were the secularised version of older 
theological concepts of social order and authority. As in the pre-state time theology was a tool to legitimize the sovereignty 
and authority of God, constitutions and laws legitimize the authority of a state. Although Benjamin cited Schmitt, it was 
Adorno in the Frankfurt school who was interested in Schmitt’s work. During the World War II Schmitt formally joined that 
the Nazi party and his preeminent status in the German intellectual environment made him a propaganda tool for the Nazis. 
See: C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 44-50. 
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Amongst many political characteristics that Benjamin identified in messianism, three are central to the 
understanding of the relationship between politics and theology in Iran and Israel. To Benjamin the 
central theme in political messianism is its elusiveness. Benjamin was clearly aware of this elusiveness. 
While he recognized the centrality of political messianism in Jewish theology he rejected the idea of the 
establishment of a practical and successful theocracy. This elusiveness of messianism is clearly evident in 
the Israeli and Iranian politics where the foundations of states politics are neither purely theological nor 
purely political. The politics of Iran and Israel should be discussed in terms of the tension between the 
pragmatism of realpolitik and the idealism of revolutionary messianism. Therefore while their 
understanding of messianism heavily relies on their theological history it does not address any issue in the 
context of the present time. As Benjamin rightly wrote, Messianic history is a battle between the past 
and the future. In political terms the pragmatism of the state in both Israel and Iran is discussed in the 
glory of the past and the hope for a messianic future. Therefore, as Benjamin noted, the only way to 
explain a messianic history is by understanding the notion of hope. Both the elusiveness of political 
messianism and its paradoxical view of history make political messianism an intrinsically unstable 
political notion. It gains momentum in a revolutionary context but is radically unstable as a ruling 
ideology for a state. In “Theological and Political Fragment” he developed these ideas as he wrote: 
 
“First the Messiah completes all historical occurrence, whose relation to the messianic he himself 
first redeems, completes, and creates. Therefore nothing historical can intend to refer to the 
messianic from itself out of itself. For this reason, the kingdom of God is not the telos of the 
historical dynamic; it cannot be set towards a goal. Historically seen, it is not a goal but an end. 
Thus the order of the profane cannot be built on the idea of the kingdom of God; theocracy, 
therefore, has not political only religious significance.”9 
 
Modernity 
 
 
Modernity is a matrix of political and social regimes that have transformed Europe since the seventeenth 
century.10 Industrialization, urbanization, differentiation, and rationalization are the dominant factors in 
the European experience of modernity.11 The combination of these factors, radical alteration in modes 
of education, and the colonization of the Middle East attracted many Iranian and Jewish intellectuals to 
modernity.12 Many of these viewed nationalism as an alternative unifying force in their societies and 
considered revolution to be the only path to liberation from political oppressions. Specifically they were 
 
 
 
9 E. Jacobson, Metaphysics of the profane: the political theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem (Colombia: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), 20. 
10 Ch. Turner, Modernity and Politics in the Work of Max Weber (London: Routledge, 2002), 105-110. 
11 B. S. Turner, The New Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion (NY: John Wiley and Sons, 2010), 136-140. 
12 For Iran see: V. Martin, The Qajar Pact: Bargaining,  Protest and the State in Nineteenth-century Persia (London: I.B.Tauris, 
2005), 66-71. 
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attracted to the political changes that modernity instigated in the European ruling systems and the 
transformation of the old feudal and monarchical ruling systems into national and secular states. In 
Europe nationalism limited the power of religious institutions over states and opposed pre-modern 
elitism in state politics. The separation of political institutions from religious establishments 
institutionalised the concept of differentiation in the body of the new states. 
 
A nation state is an institutional form of modern politics and it is in the process of nation building that 
many concepts of nationalism were translated into practical institutional form in Europe. 
Acknowledging territorial borders, unifying local military forces under a national structure, identifying 
a national flag, and the formation of a sovereign central political body are examples of this 
institutionalization process. Such a process was premised upon the categorization of knowledge, another 
transformation in modern politics, and resulted in the formation of European national administrations, 
legislation and judicial institutions. Decision-makers in the new states pledged loyalty to the ruling 
power by association, which were theoretically based on an elective system. It promoted an open 
economy and revolutionised the concept of citizenship. The French revolution in the eighteenth century 
(1789–1799) and the Russian revolution in the early twentieth century (1917-1918) had momentous 
effects on the understanding of nationalism amongst Jewish and Iranian intellectuals. 
 
In addition, limiting the power of religious institutions in Europe was set off and strongly supported by 
new businesses and trades that had emerged as a result of industrialization and new modes of production 
and distribution. This drastic change in the socio-economic fabric of European societies demanded radical 
changes in the political system and under the influence of these factors secular nation states emerged. 
Therefore, modern nation states in Europe, powered by the economic demands of industrialization and 
territorial expansion, spread out of geographical borders and rapidly conquered trade routes and natural 
resources. Numerous countries in the Middle East were directly colonized by these newly formed nation 
states and many responded to this change in regional politics by accommodating modernity in one way or 
another. 
 
Prior to the radical political changes in Europe, messianism in Shi’a and Jewish theology was a 
theological doctrine that enabled these communities to live under the political sovereignty of others 
while preserving their communal political identity. After the destruction of Jerusalem (70 CE) and the 
Islamic conquest of Persia (637-651 CE) neither Persians nor Jewry had an autonomous state for 
centuries. Persia until the sixteen century was ruled under the mandate of the caliphates and Jewry 
were obliged to live in exile until the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. During this time some 
messianic figures appeared amongst Iranians and Jews, who revolted against the existing political system, 
but they failed in changing the political situation with their pre-modern active messianism. During the 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, European nationalism, and the political colonization of the 
Middle East posed challenges to both communities that instigated theological and political revolutions. 
Theologically, these debates were revolutionary against the long tradition of apolitical messianism in 
their concession that a legitimate state might be formed in the absence of a “divine saviour”. Politically, 
these debates addressed the necessity of a revolution against the political status quo and the formation of 
a nation state. They included anti-colonial themes, responded to the political situation in Europe and the 
Middle East, and were passionate for national political sovereignty. Significantly, these new approaches 
to the relationship between messianic theology and politics re- defined the relationship between secular 
and religious political groups over the structure of the law and the state in the post-revolutionary phases. 
In both traditions, in the Revolutionary Phase secular forces were not concerned with the fulfilment of 
messianic promises and preserving religious traditions. Rather, the main factor that motivated religious 
groups to unite with the non-religious in the Revolutionary Phase was the religious groups’ opposition 
to the spread of secularism and their fear of the process of assimilation, and the complete annihilation of 
religious traditions, beliefs, and rituals. 
 
Under the influence of modern political thought and as the result of the new challenges that were posed 
to these communities, a new form of politically active messianism emerged that was intrinsically 
different from the pre-modern messianic doctrine in term of its goals and actors. The new form was 
highly nationalistic and aimed to institutionalise the pre-modern spiritual-apolitical messianism in 
modern political terms and concepts. Consequently, political independence became an indispensible 
pre-condition of spiritual redemption and the formation of a nation state was transformed to a religious 
obligation as much as a civil one that metamorphosed messianism and messianic hope in Shi’a and Jewish 
theologies into a nationalistic revolutionary ideology. Nationalism became the dominant and unifying 
narrative of messianism. It culturally and politically marginalized apolitical and spiritual pre-modern 
messianism and adopted a revolutionary character that viewed state formation the sole practical 
response to ending the political oppression. 
 
 
In my interpretative approach, the understanding of history, aesthetics, and redemption in the 
revolutionary narrative of messianism in Iran and Israel reflects a Benjaminian understanding of 
historical development. This is because in both cases the theological interpretation of messianism allows 
 
the inclusion of a redemptive factor in a political revolution. Benjamin’s view on Marxism is similar to 
the views of revolutionaries in both the case of Iran and Israel, in three ways. First, in neither of these 
cases, was early Marxism considered to be an answer to the devastating political and social situations, 
yet both embraced Marxist social activism and revolutionary ideology. Like Benjamin both 
revolutionary discourses recognized a redemptive character in theology but viewed a religio-political 
modern state instead of theocracy to be the answer to ending suppression. Secondly, they were 
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Benjaminian in that they both insisted on the significance of theology in the relationship between the 
development of history and redemption. Thirdly, the progressive account of messianism that Benjamin 
offered through his analysis of complete and incomplete (dichotomy of suffering and hope) generated a 
reciprocal relationship between the present and the past in which each informs the other thus opening 
up the possibility of a revolutionary account of messianism to emerge. In addition, Benjamin 
understands messianism as an absolute extra-historical concept and his emphasis on the universality of 
messianism resonated in both revolutionary discourses. 
 
Jewish and Shi’a jurisprudential literature has always been founded on a relationship between the time 
for the coming of the messiah and human conduct. This dependency is the foundation of their political 
theology. Whatever the literatures assume to be the conditions of the coming of the Messiah, whether 
he comes in the time that he is most needed or in the time he is most deserved, messianic time is when 
the political and legal rule of God supersedes those of humans. 
 
The establishment of such a ruling system intrinsically contradicts the notion of a nation state that 
heavily relies on human capability in ruling human societies. This intrinsic tension makes the 
revolutionary narrative of messianism adaptive to the notion of unity and a nationalist revolution but is 
simultaneously potentially anti-modern due to its negation of individual rights. The Nation state is the 
most globalised manifestation of institutional separation between religion and politics. The globalization 
of the nation state has introduced the option of a non-religious ruling system and consequently a way of 
life in the world. This philosophical foundation of a nation state, this study argues, is the main factor in 
the drastic transformation of the perception of individual rights in both Israel and Iran. 
 
By observing Israel and Iran’s political structure, legal systems and security politics, this study 
demonstrates how the dynamics of revolutionary messianism and nationalism embedded in state politics 
necessitates the emergence of mediatory theologies. This comparative study discusses the elements that 
give rise to growing groups of political theologians and theologian politicians who transform the 
political scene of these state as well as the theological orientations of religious institutions to which they 
are associated. The study concludes that these religio-political states can maintain their legitimacy only 
through redefining a boundary between politics and religion in their dealings with challenges that the 
securitization process creates. Without carefully monitoring the transition from revolutionary 
messianism to securitized messianism and solely relying on the states’ mediatory role between religion 
and politics, political issues can create challenging legitimacy crisis for religion in both cases. 
 
While the striking similarities between the two cases provide the rationale for this study, it is their 
different understanding of nationalist Revolutionary Messianism that highlights the unique 
characteristics of each case. In Iran, Revolutionary Messianism evolved and was later presented as the 
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basis for Ayatollah Khomeini’s Jurisprudential Leadership theory. In the Revolutionary Phase, Khomeini, 
as a charismatic leader, became the sole agent for materializing the messianic promises of the revolution. 
He directly linked the theological state legitimacy to an agent based interpretation of Revolutionary 
Messianism in which the role of a Jurisprudential Leader was centralized. After his death, however, his 
messianic charisma faded and needed to be institutionalised in the body of the Islamic Republic. The 
failure of the state in rationalizing the Jurisprudential Leadership position and its institutionalization 
resulted in the emergence of continuous challenges to the state legitimacy. In the post-Khomeini period 
confrontations over the messianic goals of the state became the framework for modern political debates 
over the conditions of the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Specifically, the challenges have targeted 
the issue of the legitimacy and authority of a Jurisprudential Leadership in relation to the Constitution 
and the hierarchical citizenship system that Khomeini’s agent based understanding of Revolutionary 
Messianism has created. Due to this agent based interpretation, in Iran all political tensions and 
challenges directly target the legitimacy of the Jurisprudential Leadership. 
 
By contrast, in Israel after the foundation of the state, Revolutionary Messianism remained concentrated 
on an institutionally based narrative. Therefore, while the government’s responsibilities towards 
preserving the Jewish identity of the state and citizens have developed within messianic debates, the 
relationship between the secular and religious factions in Israel did not become as tense or oppositional as 
in Iran. Israel has viewed the success of Zionism as the result of the efforts of its charismatic leaders, 
mainly Herzl and Ben Gurion, but considers the state rather than these agents to be the main actor in 
the fulfilment of the Zionist utopian promises. The secular Zionist leaders in Israel remained signifiers 
of national identity but focused on the institutionalization of messianism. Revolutionary Messianism in 
Israel has developed into a more religiously conservative form as the result of the increasingly 
complicated ties between political parties and religious institutions. Due to its institution based 
Revolutionary Messianism Israel has successfully institutionalised the charisma of its revolutionary 
leaders in the body of educational institutions and the military. As secular political parties in Israel 
progressed in this process of institutionalization their interaction with religious institutions created a 
closer relationship between secular and religious party politics. However, most Israeli Prime Ministers 
have been politicians with a military background. 
 
Outline of chapters 
 
 
The aim of Chapter One is to elaborate on the relationship between messianic theology and national 
unity in the Revolutionary Phase. It investigates similarities and differences between the two 
revolutionary messianic narratives and the political context in which they became the dominant 
revolutionary narratives. It examines how during this first phase, Revolutionary Messianism enabled the 
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revolutionaries in both cases to mobilize various groups for the revolution and how for both this 
messianic reading of nationalism is integral to the establishment of a modern state. It examines how this 
narrative positioned theology in revolutionary politics by separating messianism from its traditional 
context and attaching to it political values in order to direct the revolutions to forming a new model of 
the religio-political state. It draws on Benjamin’s re-reading of Marx’s theory in order to examine how 
both traditions understood the formation of a state to be the only response to their theological and 
political oppressions and whether revolution for both was a response to their histories or solely a 
political revolution against a particular oppressive system. 
 
The aim of Chapter Two is to articulate the relationship between Revolutionary Messianism, the re- 
reading of theological history, and the changes in the traditional concept of authority in legitimizing the 
post-revolutionary states in Israel and Iran. It investigates the theological changes that the revolutionary 
narrative demanded as it changed the ritualistic reading of sacred texts, re-defined its distinct status in 
these religious traditions, and transformed their supporting hermeneutical traditions in the 
Revolutionary Phase. It examines how the revolutionary narrative of messianism translated the 
traditional theological authority of the clergy into the political authority of the states, and the political 
implications of this translation for the state legitimacy in both cases. It further investigates whether with 
the idealist revolutionary vision of a utopian and progressive messianism the post-revolutionary states 
could efficiently re-define the traditional concepts of legitimacy. It argues that in both cases 
Revolutionary Messianism gave the states the authority for implementing economic and legal policies 
that were deemed to be consistent with religious imperatives. 
 
Chapter Three of this study argues that the process of state building in both Iran and Israel resulted in 
changing the revolutionary narratives of messianism into the foundation of the post-revolutionary states’ 
security policies. By analysing the process by which the states positioned this narrative at the heart of 
their security discourse, this chapter draws on Barry Buzan’s securitization theory for studying the 
dynamics between religion and politics in this State-Building Phase. Securitization, it is contended, links 
the political state legitimacy to revolutionary identity and the wars in which these states were involved. 
The wars generated new theological debates that further bound religion to politics. The success of the 
states’ securitization project was the outcome of their revolutionary hermeneutics of messianism that 
effectively associated the security of the state with the security of religion. In both cases, securitization 
created new state elites, who became the main political decision makers in the states and enabled them to 
sustain their power because of the securitization that generated a polarized political situation. In both 
cases, the wars allowed the states to implement policies that could support their securitization project 
by creating social solidarity in the face of threats. The contention of this chapter is that securitization 
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changes the messianic idealism of the Revolutionary Phase to a political ideology in the State-Building 
 
Phase. 
 
 
Chapter Four of this study investigates the process of establishing the authority of Revolutionary 
Messianism in the states’ legal institutions. It examines whether within their legal systems, as the most 
influential agency in establishing the state legitimacy, Israel and Iran could institutionalize Securitized 
Messianism and merge religious laws with revolutionary messianic ideals in their national laws. This 
chapter examines how securitization contextualises state legitimacy within policies of national security. 
It further examines if the success of the institutionalization of Securitized Messianism in the states’ legal 
systems depends on the success of the securitization of messianism prior to the process of 
institutionalization. The integration of national and religious laws, the chapter argues, poses novel 
political challenges to the states, particularly in defining boundaries between politics and religion in 
national life. It explains how the main challenges to establishing the legal authority of the states are 
directly related to the inherent tension between divine and human law, which is the result of the 
different sources of legitimacy for these laws, their goals, and methods of implementation. 
 
Chapter Five examines the development of Securitized Messianism in Israel and Iran in the State- 
Maintenance Phase when the revolutionary momentum declined and the Cold War situation ended. 
This chapter focuses on the end of the Cold War and debates between the revolutionary elites and 
emerging political groups over the messianic goals of the state. These become factors that contributed 
to the rise and development of neo-fundamentalism in the political scene in both Israel and Iran. It 
contends that neo-fundamentalism gains power at the State Maintenance Phase and develops parallel to 
the de-securitization of messianism. It argues that the de-securitization process undermines the 
legitimacy of Revolutionary Messianism when oppressive political systems that gave momentum to the 
revolutionary ideology are removed and the external and existential threats to the wellbeing or the 
identity of the state have declined. While securitization legitimizes the post-revolutionary states, the 
lack of a military threat and an oppressive political system intensify political instabilities in these religio- 
political states. 
 
Chapter Six of this study aims to demonstrate how Iran and Israel construct norms for civil behaviour 
through the integration of the individual and religious identities of their citizens and by means of 
integrating religious and national identities of citizens in legal and social policies. This integration 
process determines the success of the institutionalization of the collective identity in the political and 
legal bodies of the states. The chapter examines how in the State Maintenance Phase, Israel and Iran 
have incorporated elements such as urbanization and technological advancements in their civil policies. 
It further explains how technological advancement, industrialization, and urbanization that encourage 
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the development of individual identity could be included in Israel and Iran’s civil policies. The claim of 
this chapter is that the transformation of messianism from revolutionary idealism to security strategy, 
and then to a political guideline, de-sacralises messianic theology and makes it a tool for the states by 
which they can control the involvement of citizens and the clergy in state politics. The politicization of 
messianism is reflected in these states’ nationality laws and in their definition of citizenship. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
It is through examining the development of Revolutionary Messianism in the post-revolutionary states 
of Israel and Iran that the specific nature of secularity within these states can be explained. Examining 
pre-modern and modern interpretations of messianism is essential for understanding the process of 
secularization. In addition to the relationship between the states and religious institutions, the challenges 
that the development of Revolutionary Messianism poses to the traditional religious views on individuals, 
the state legitimacy, and the clergy’s involvement in a participatory political system determine the 
success of these states in balancing religion and politics. These challenges are more evident and highly 
contested in three features of the religio-political state: the actual authority of the state and national law; 
the political factionalism; and the civil rights of individuals. 
 
This research encourages the rethinking of secularization theory as it relates to the process of 
institutionalization of revolutionary ideology in the body of religio-political states. Without 
institutionalization a state cannot define its political identity nationally, its security doctrines, and its 
criteria for citizenship. In the process of the construction of these states, religion and religious 
institutions are integrated into modern politics. The historical and political contexts in which these 
states were established contribute to this integration. As a consequence of this integration the 
liberalization of the individual, which is an indispensible component of western modern political 
thought, loses its central importance in contemporary Israeli and Iranian politics. Therefore, Politicised 
Messianism in these states relies heavily on securitization and limits individual liberty. In Iran the strong 
rejection of liberalism by the state has resulted in the development of a highly idealistic and populist 
approach to politics. In Israel, while western liberalism is practiced by the state, the social context 
determines a more conservative approach to individualism. In Israel the ongoing conflict situation has 
created a more unanimous view on politics across political parties. However, gradually the power of 
more conservative parties has increased and religious institutions have been more politically orientated. 
Therefore, this thesis asserts, contrary to European secularization where secular nation states have 
moved towards a pluralistic understanding of religion, in Iran and Israel institutionalization of 
messianism has left only a small space for secular political debates. 
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This study raises several questions regarding the necessity of further research for defining a nation state 
in the new millennium. It suggests that the acknowledgement of the existence of various forms of states 
such as the religio-political states fosters better understanding of secularization and the various forms of 
state that could result from the establishment of electoral democracies. The recent shifts in the balance 
of power in the region necessitate the presentation of a practical definition for nation states and their 
ethical boundaries. It also raises questions regarding modern religious debates and the many inevitable 
challenges that clergy face as consequences of their involvement in modern complex issues such as 
international relations and the state politics. 
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Chapter one  – The Rise of Revolutionary Messianism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This chapter presents a historical background to the interplay between European political secularism and 
the constructing of the modern nation state in Iran and Israel.13 It examines the influence of the French 
revolution and neo-Marxist philosophy in shaping each revolution and argues that messianism, 
particularly through its political and theological impacts, has been a crucial factor not only in shaping 
these nation states bureaucratically, but also in legitimizing their political authority. It claims that 
although the rise of these religio-political states can be read as one of the consequences of rapid political 
changes in the region and the similarly swift globalization of ideas about the modern nation state, 
political messianism is the central theme based on which both Iranians and Jewry have shaped debates 
about secularism, secularization, and the goals of their revolutions. In both cases, the concept of 
Revolutionary Messianism motivated the formation of a modern religious state and fundamentally 
changed the political status quo. In the Revolutionary Phase, the majority of religious figures 
interpreted traditional messianic ideas in modern political terms and employed the notion of 
Revolutionary Messianism in their support of the formation of nation states. Through the concept of 
Revolutionary Messianism both traditions have redefined European secularism, enabling each to form a 
national identity in two parallel religious and political histories. 
 
In both cases during the Revolutionary Phase, articulating the aims and goals of a messianic revolution in 
synchronic histories created an exclusivist political theology. It successfully linked the goals of 
messianism to political ideals of Russian and French nationalist revolutions, anti-imperialism, and anti- 
colonialism. The agents of the revolution established their legitimacy through attesting this historical, 
religious, and national narrative of messianism which enabled them to resolve the tension between 
traditional and political messianism. Among various philosophical traditions, Walter Benjamin’s neo- 
Marxist philosophy can illucidate the philosophical themes in shaping both messianic revolutionary 
ideologies. However, the Revolutionary Messianism that Benjamin’s philosophy offered proved to be 
theologically and politically unstable as a political theory for the post-RPs. This inherent instability of 
Revolutionary Messianism, I argue, was the factor that encouraged the revolutions and determined 
post-revolutionary politics and theology in these states. 
 
Walter Benjamin’s view on messianism, expressed in his debates with Jewish philosopher and historian 
Gershom Scholem over the nature and possibility of a messianic age through the formation of a nation 
state, clearly articulates this tension. In his writings on Jewish messianism, Benjamin idealized the 
 
 
13 By secularization I mean the radical changes that followed the enlightenment and transformed European societies from a 
system in which religious values dominated political structure to a non-religious and institutional system. 
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notion of a messianic age but contradicted Scholem’s idea that such an age could be achieved through 
political endeavours or the formation of a state. Benjamin argued that such an age could only be realized 
where a major transition from a traditional understanding of messianism to an individual and spiritual 
one has occurred. Scholem believed that a revolutionary ideology with strong theological and cultural 
links could respond to the question of nationalism and modern messianism. The development of such 
debates, in the Revolutionary Phase, reflects the real political actions that the notion of a religio- 
political state mobilized. In conclusion, by examining their debate on messianism, we can explain the 
political theology of these revolutions and post-revolutionary states. Debates over the nature and ideals 
of an ideal state that Scholem and Benjamin discussed were also represented in Iran’s political debates in 
the 1908 Constitutional Revolution and developed into an effective revolutionary ideology by 1979. 
Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati’s views on the nature and goals of a Shi’a revolution in Iran 
represented this tension in the Iranian revolutionary context. 
 
In Iran, as the revolution succeeded and Khomeini established the post-revolutionary state, a specific 
theological and political discourse dominated Iran’s politics that has served to undermine the historical 
diversity of Shi’a jurisprudence. In the Revolutionary Phase, messianism, as a political idealism, has 
played a mediatory role in the tense relationship between secular nationalism and the apolitical religious 
tradition. While in Israel Revolutionary Messianism aimed for the fulfilment of messianic promise by 
focusing on a progressive messianic age, by comparison, Iran’s 1979 revolutionary ideology remained 
faithful to the traditional agent-based narrative of messianism and maintained a view that success was to 
be the result of centralizing political and theological power in one position. Attributing ultimate 
political and theological power to Jurisprudential Leadership was the response to the political and 
theological tensions between apolitical, political, and traditional messianism. 
 
In both cases, theological debates over messianic revolutionary idealism were embedded in their 
revoltuioanry ideologies with some of the particular characteristics of European secularism. These 
characteristics, such as national unity based on political sovereignty over a specific territory and unified 
language, were factors that verified the legitimacy of the post-revolutionary states. Such secular notions 
enabled these ideals to gain indisputable support and authority amongst the revolutionaries. Modern 
messianic theology, particularly the concept of the nation state, inspired a new and dominant 
interpretation of messianism which legitimized debates over the character and goals of the national 
revolutions and the state. During the Revolutionary Phase, it enabled the revolutionaries to explain 
ideas of nationalism in a politically selective narrative of messianism that encouraged an inclusivist 
political discourse. In both cases, the success of the revolutions transformed this revolutionary ideal to a 
political system that regulated theological debates on messianism. Any regulation required 
institutionalization and the institutionalization of Revolutionary Messianism in turn gave rise to new 
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political challenges that could introduce new variables to messianic debates or terminate a vital factor 
that re-shapes these debates. 
 
Embedded Secular Notions in Revolutionary Messianism 
 
 
Explaining the elements and implications of the condition known as modernity has been the topic of 
many studies of nationalism, secularism, and secularization. Marxist and neo-Marxist philosophers have 
sought not only to explain and define modernity but to describe the social and theological changes that 
have followed the rise of national secular states.14 Secularization theorists have different views from the 
neo-Marxists on the fundamental principles that have had the most influence in the process of 
secularization. However, a majority of them consider the following forces to be pivotal motivators of 
modernity.15 For the purpose of this thesis I separated these elements into two distinct philosophical and 
political categories. Philosophical issues such as rationalization, differentiation, the birth of the 
subjective individual, and categorization of knowledge are the dominant variables in all secularization 
theories. Unanimously, secularist theorists agree that the rise of a modern view on history and 
individual identity have instigated a crisis for the existing political order.16 The notion of a political 
individual has inspired the move towards political and economic equality. Secularization and neo- 
Marxist philosophers both refer to Emmanuel Kant and argue that in a nation state, these philosophical 
ideals could materialise in the ways in which the state defines its power structure and goals. 
 
Kant connected the idea of freedom to rationalism.17 He distinguished a transcendental understanding of 
freedom from a rational and practical understanding of freedom, calling the first the negative, and the 
latter, a positive conception of freedom.18 His definition of the concept and its connection with the 
notion of a state that respected the will of individuals was based on his modern understanding of 
differentiation between religion and politics, which has been a premise in the majority of secularization 
theories. In the European context this link between freedom, individual identity, and the differentiation 
between religion and politics determined the limit of the power of a nation state over institutions and 
citizens. It is also a philosophical foundation that gave rise to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ 
revolutions that replaced monarchical and clerical rule with a state as the centre of political decision 
making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Henry Williams, “Liberty, Equality and Independence; Core Concepts in Kant’s Political Philosophy,” in A Companion to 
Kant, ed. Graham Bird (NY, John Wiley and Sons, 2009), 364. 
15 For a comprehensive study on these factors See: P.E. Glasner, The Sociology of Secularization:  a Critique of a Concept (London: 
Routledge, 1977), 110-140. Also see: D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularization  (London: Gregg Revivals, 1993), 52-63. 
16 Ibid. 
17 K. Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 30. 
18 Ibid. 
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Defining what religion is – intrinsically a modern concept - would not be a matter of debate under pre- 
modern political and social conditions. It was only after the rise of modernity and the categorization of 
knowledge that difficulties in defining these concepts and their relationship with each other arose.19 The 
radical changes in defining these concepts have been the subject of other extensively studied topics in 
secularization theories. Classical and contemporary theories of secularization struggle to provide a 
definition for the term religion and to identify the spheres in which it operates.20 Emile Durkheim’s 
study on the role of religion in societies was one of the earliest attempts that motivated a modern 
understanding of the distinct spheres of state politics and religion.21 Durkheim, who was interested in 
studying the way religion operates in a society, was concerned with the future of humanity in the world 
where religious communities no longer held political power.22 He was convinced that religion would 
lose its power in a society where it was excluded from political power. Early secularization theorists, 
such as David Martin, considered differentiation between the two uncompromising spheres of rational 
realization of politics and theological politics an indisputable premise for any nation state.23   As a result, 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries any scholarly work on the relationship between 
religion and politics has taken place within this philosophical framework. The majority of early 
secularization theories considered the dominance and impact of secular politics and lifestyle would 
result in a decline in religion.24 Regardless of their divergent opinions on the influence and status of 
 
religion before and after modernity however, most theorists argue that “authentic individual identity” 
has been progressively asserted during modernity and has since been an integrated part of modern 
political ideologies. 
In addition to Durkheim, most early secularization theories rely on Max Weber’s analysis of the modern 
subjective individual, which he considered to be a product of the domination of Protestant ethics around 
Europe and the emergence of capitalist economic structures.25 Weber emphasised that capitalism 
achieved supremacy over other economic ideologies because of the “spirit of capitalism” echoed in the 
 
19 Émile Durkheim defined religion as “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things…” Karl Marx defined 
religion as “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless 
situation. It is the opium of the people.” Freud defined religion as “"Religion is an attempt to get control over the sensory 
world…" See: É. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. by C. Cosman (London: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 48-52. K. Marx, Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of right', trans. by J. O'Malley (NY: Cambridge University Press 
Archive, 1977) 79-103. Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. by K. Jones (Irvine: Vintage Books, 1967), 64. 
20 Ibid. 
21 É. Durkheim, Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 David Martin, in his 1965 critique of secularization theory, claimed that the theory itself can be criticized as an ideology 
and its propositions often contradictory. D. Martin, On Secularization:  Towards a Revised General Theory (NY: Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 2005), 20. See: D. Martin, Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularization, in Penguin Survey of the Social 
Sciences, ed.Julius Gould (NY: Penguin Books, 1965), 47-68. 
24For various intellectual traditions on the effect and future of religion in the context of American secularization process, see: 
Troeltsch 1955 – 109 (sociology), Shiner 1967-215, Erich Fromm 1950 (psychoanalyses) and William Clebsch 1969 
(theology), Also See: P. E. Glasner, op. cit., pp. 30-39. 
25 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,  trans. by T. Parsons (N. Chelmsford: Courier Dover Publications, 
2003), 55-62. 
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Puritan doctrine of Protestantism.26 He linked the concept of individual piety to the rise of capitalism 
and the birth of the individual.27 Following him, most secularization theorists have argued that the 
emergence of scientific inquiries, the flourishing of philosophy, and rule-bound definitions of legitimacy 
led humanity into a secular world.28 The universe became de-mystified and history de-sacralised.29 As 
Gilbert Germain notes, Weber’s definition of a disenchanted world relies on the demystification of the 
world and the assertion that humanity is in charge of its own destiny.30 Based on this view of the 
disenchanted individual, traditional secularization theorists argue that the inevitable consequence of 
modernity is the privatization of religion. The modern, empowered individual should therefore become 
less religious. 
 
Early secularization theorists asserted that the European models of secularization were the only and 
unavoidable outcomes of secularism.31 However, the United States of Amercia had a different experience 
of modernity and formed a different model of a secular state. Uniquely, secularization in the United 
States of Amercia did not stigmatize the political involvement of religion in the social context. Contrary 
to the European model, religion has played a significant part in the construction of American 
national identity and the political identity of the state. 32 David Martin and Jose Casanova both argue that 
the difference between European and American experiences of secularization stems from their different 
histories and social contexts.33 These dissimilar conditions of secularization fostered different 
relationships between religion and the state. Recent secularization theories present diverse explanations 
about the role, function and future of religion.34 While early secularisation theorists argued that a 
decline in religious beliefs was the only outcome of secularization, later theorists state that modernity 
can have various outcomes in regard to the relationship between religion and politics. Charles Taylor 
defined these outcomes as “multiple modernities”.35 Within Taylor’s explanatory framework, 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1984), 51. 
29 Sutcliffe argues that the desacralization movement began before the Enlightenment and is a result of the Reformation and 
not the Enlightenment. He identifies banishing the institution of priesthood, the translation of sacred texts and the 
destruction of icons as indicators of this movement. To Sutcliffe the emphasis that Otto and Tillich place on the “holy” served 
to re-sacralise Protestant theology and was rather a reaction to the above mentioned process. Peter Harrison on the other 
hand argues that the process of desacralization began after the Enlightenment and is a result of the rise of scientific inquiry. 
See: S. Sutcliffe, Religion: Empirical Studies (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2004), 60. P. Harrison, “Religion” and the 
Religions in the English Enlightenment (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5. 
30 G. G. Germain, A Discourse on Disenchantment: Reflections on Politics and Technology (NY: SUNY Press, 1993), 30-35. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See David Martin’s interview with Mirozlav Volf  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QISnc1Zqqw also see Jose 
Casanova interview with Mirozlav Volf on  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iSnNAc3hGgc 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ch. Taylor, A Secular Age (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2007), 21. 
35 Ibid. 
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secularization does not necessarily result in a decline of religious beliefs or absolute separation between 
religious and political institutions.36 
 
Regardless of their positions in defining the role of religion in a secularised society, they all agree that the 
rise of nation states in Europe ended the hegemony of religious institutions on politics. Following 
Weber, Nietzsche, and Marx, secularization theorists considered this institutional separation as an 
indispensible premise for the nation state. 37 In the case of Israel and Iran, although the European 
revolutionary ideology motivated the rise of national revolutions, the formation of the post- 
revolutionary states resulted in an increase in the role of religious institutions in politics and society. In 
each case, their unique encounter with modernity, secularism, and colonialism raised new questions 
regarding the relationship between religion and politics and the possibility of multiple understandings of 
secularism.38 The reason for studying messianism in the Revolutionary and SBPs is to explore what 
Casanova calls “the Knowledge regime of secularization” in Iran and Israel. 39   During the Revolutionary 
Phase the idealised image of a state with messianic features created an inclusivist political ideology by 
designating a nationalistic narrative of messianism that could only be meaningful within the context of 
modern bureaucratic models of a state. Studying these revolutionary ideologies allows us to focus on the 
political implications of what Benjamin called the aesthetic of redemption on these messianic ideals in 
order to explore the relationship between the messianic and nationalistic ideologies that facilitated the 
legitimation of these post-revolutionary states. 
Differentiation between the public and private spheres is an indispensable component of the modern 
nation state. However, different experiences of modernity determine different limits for this 
separation.40 While secularization theories have argued that “differentiating” political from religious 
 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 For a recent view on Secularization and the future of religion see: Jose Casanova, ‘Secularization revisited; a Reply to Talal 
Asad’, in Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors, eds. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), 12-30. Casanova argues that the rise and interactions of multiple public spheres in Europe 
resulted in the decline of the influence of religion on state, science and the economy. See: J. Casanova, Public Religions in the 
Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 211- 221. 
38 Talal Assad criticizes the model presented by Taylor raises questions on the role of individuals in the process of election, 
even in contemporary liberal democracies. He negates Taylor’s assumption in considering a direct access to power structure 
by the politics of participation. He notes that access to politics is less evident in society and that the participation in elections 
every three or four years does not prove individual commitment and discipline. In order to support such claims, he notes, 
secularization requires anthropological observation. Casanova supports Assad in his theory, however, sees answers to 
questions of secularization as issues that require detailed historical comparative studies, specifically the context in which a 
nation state produces political culture and responses from society. See: T. Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), 1-67. 
39 Lorne L. Dawson, ‘Privatization, Globalization, and Religious Innovation; Gidden’s Theory on Modernity and Refutation 
of Secularization Theory’, in Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary Debates, eds. James A. Beckford and John Walliss 
(Chesterfield: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 105-119. 
40 Casanova defines differentiation as “...core and the central thesis of the theory of secularization is the conceptualization of 
the process of societal modernization as a process of functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres – 
primarily the state, the economy, and science – from the religious sphere and the concomitant differentiation and 
specialization of religion within its own newly found religious sphere.” J.Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 19. 
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spheres has contributed to the construction of the subjective individual, and thus the revolutionary 
(whose identity is separate from that of their community), in Iran and Israel the revolutionary ideology 
contributed to the formation of a strong religious identity for the post-revolutionary states. In both, 
although the ideals of revolutionary individuals significantly contributed to the formation of these states, 
it simultaneously undermined an autonomous individual identity. The political culture of these 
revolutionary states and their messianic doctrines are crucial issues that define differentiation between 
political and religious spheres and determine the limits of the power of the state. In both Israel and Iran, 
urbanization, industrialization, and rationalization motivated their modern revolutionary ideologies but 
each post-revolutionary state presented a unique definition of the relationship between politics and 
religion. Their definitions were not formed or developed in isolation but rather heavily influenced by 
contextual factors such as economy, ethnic distribution, and technology. These factors not only instigated 
different approaches towards Revolutionary Messianism but they also motivated diverse ideological and 
political encounters with the states regardless of their similar messianic theology. In both Shi’a and 
Jewish traditional messianism, the divine saviour was a male descendant of the founders of the religion 
and his genealogical link was a necessary condition of the Messiah’s ultimate authority. Revolutionary 
Messianism, however, deconstructed this hierarchical narrative of messianism, redefined its goals in 
revolutionary idealism, and transformed the traditional messianic charisma to what Weber viewed as 
“Pure” charisma with an anti-hierarchical and anti-patriarchal nature.41 
 
By observing history in a progressive Hegelian manner, Weber stated that the legitimacy of rule either 
rested upon customs, as in the time of old regimes, devotion under charismatic leadership as in the case 
of the prophets, or upon the virtue of “legality” as in the case of nation states.42 The ruling system that 
invests in the virtue of legality transfers the authority to the validity of a legal status, based on rationally 
created rules.43 By “legal status”, Weber meant a bureaucratic system in which ruling agents are either 
selected by people or appointed by the legitimate system, like officials in a democratic government.44 A 
bureaucratic system, Weber noted, is the “purest form of legal rule” but even in this purest form, legal 
rule is not absolute and includes different forms of authority.45 For Weber, traditional rule represented 
the feudal, old regime, a regime in which the ruler was a master and the ruled his servants. The ruler 
was not selected but selected his servants. This form did not follow rational rules, rather it operated 
based on emotions that defined the relationship between ruler and the ruled.46 Personal relationships 
and favours affected the rule and instead of an institutional relationship, nepotism and closeness to the 
 
 
 
41Hans Heinrich Gerth and Charles Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, 2003), 247-48. 
42 M. Weber, Max Weber's Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations (NY: Algora Publishing 2008), 157. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Max Weber and Sam Whimster, The Essential Weber: a Reader (London: Routledge, 2004), 133. 
45 Ibid, 134. 
46 Ibid. 
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ruler decided individual positions within the state, whether they were directly dependant on the feudal 
lord or if they lived with high social status and possessions. In traditional systems, the legitimacy of the 
ruler was limited to the area where tradition and customs had influence, but beyond this boundary, the 
power of the ruler was limited.47 In charismatic legitimacy, Weber contended, the legitimacy of a leader 
is not linked to kinship ties or an institutional framework but is constructed through devotion and 
loyalty of an individual to the charismatic leader.48 
 
 
In Israel and Iran, Revolutionary Messianism bridged the gap between traditional and modern political 
authorities and offered an alternative discourse to the existing political situation based on this new 
narrative of messianism. The revolutionary narrative of messianism attributed theological authority to 
the revolutions and bound the post-revolutionary states’ definitions of the secular and religion to 
revolutionary idealism. It is through this ideological position that political and religious groups 
communicated their understandings of secularism and the nature of the post-revolutionary state. In both 
cases, the longing for an egalitarian society and economic justice that became a major force in forming a 
revolutionary community had roots in their messianic theology. Specifically, the attainment of a just 
political and economic society which was one of the main characteristics of these messianic theologies, 
played a critical role in determining the goals of the revolutions. In addition to these impacts, the 
formation of a revolutionary idealism in both cases responded to the colonization of the Middle East and 
the spread of colonial states in the region based on the French Jacobin model in which there was hardly 
any place for the involvement of religion in politics.49 
 
Walter Benjamin and Revolutionary Messianism 
 
 
“A Klee painting  named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is about to move 
away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his 
wings are spread. This is how one perceives the angel of history. His face is towards the past. 
Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one catastrophe, which keeps piling  wreckage upon 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and 
make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his 
wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels 
him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. 
This storm is what we call progress.”50 
 
 
 
 
47 Ibid, 139. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Even now the American pluralistic approach towards religion is not included in Middle Eastern debates on the nature of a 
nation state. 
50 B. R. Hüppauf, War, Violence, and the Modern Condition (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 44. 
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This research draws on Walter Benjamin’s view on messianism based on his critique of Marxism to 
articulate the concept of Revolutionary Messianism in Israel and Iran. There are three reasons for basing 
the theoretical framework of this study on Benjamin. First, Benjamin was a Marxist and although 
neither of the revolutionary narratives of Iran or Israel was communist uprisings, Marxist motifs and 
symbols had a heavy presence in both cases. Secondly, amongst neo-Marxist theorists, Benjamin 
identified the mutual dependency of theology and historical development and considered the neglect of 
this factor detrimental to the success of a revolution. In both case studies, this mutual dependency is the 
ground for the emergence of a revolutionary narrative of messianism and the legitimization of it as the 
possible solution to political oppression. Even though in Iran and Israel the revolutions had different 
motivational factors both evidence this dependency as one of the premises of their revolutions. Finally, 
Benjamin viewed history as a catastrophie that is a piling of “wreckage after wreckage” and argued that 
only this inherent nihilist character of history provides the possibility of redemption through revolution. 
In the case of Israel and Iran, revolutionary narratives were based on such nihilistic visions, because 
neither viewed a possibility of reform from within the existing political situation. This was partly due to 
similarities between traditional Jewish and Shi’a messianism and was partly the result of historical 
realities. Benjamin connected historical development to “remembrance”, “oppression”, and “revolution”. 
 
 
This particular approach towards messianism creates an inherent flexibility in the understanding of 
oppression that allows us to use Benjamin’s concept of messianism in new ways and in new contexts. 
This flexibility also relates messianism to the material world and makes revolution possible. This 
characteristic of Benjamin’s messianism is also a fundamental aspect of Revolutionary Messianism in 
Iran and Israel and is the ground for establishing and maintaining post-revolutionary states in both cases. 
Through analysing Benjamin’s concept of messianism and discussing the Benjaminian characteristic of 
the revolutionary messianic narratives in Israel and Iran we can clearly explain their structure and goals. 
This section focuses on the works he wrote during the time of his exile, the last decade of his life in 
France. While his views on messianism were evident in his early writings on German literature and his 
article on translation, it was developed politically in his later writings on Marxism in which he used 
historiography, literary criticism, and Jewish theology in order to explain the aesthetic of redemption 
and his view on messianism. This piece connects different chapters of my thesis, as my main argument 
in this thesis is the continuity of Benjaminian themes in the three messianic phases that I identified in 
Iran and Israel; Revolutionary Messianism, State Building Messianism, and State Maintenance 
Messianism. 
 
In Walter Benjamin’s time, for Marxist theorists, the devastating economic situation in Europe between 
the two world wars and the rise of fascism that plagued Europe was a signal of the crisis of 
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‘capitalism’.51  Benjamin agreed with Marx on the growth of capitalism in Europe but disagreed with him 
over the predictability of history and the rise of an inevitable proletariat revolution against the 
bourgeoisie. He also disagreed with Marx over the concept of alienation. Marx viewed the ownership of 
means of production and not the means themselves as the source of alienation. Benjamin, however, saw 
the means of production as a reason for alienation.52 Benjamin was among the scholars who attempted 
to present a neo-Marxist response to the failure of Marx’s theory, and to highlight the neglected factors 
 
in that theory, in order to overcome the undermining of its credibility.53   It is in his critiques of the 
Marxist notions of history, aesthetic, theology, and redemption that we can find his understanding of 
revolution and messianism.54 
 
Benjamin’s View on History 
 
 
Benjamin articulated his view on history based on his critiques of Hegelian historicism and Marxist 
historical materialism.55 He criticized Hegel’s theory on history and argued that it left no ground for 
historical criticism. To him, historicism bound each historical event to its particular contextual 
conditions and neglected the voice of the oppressed. Therefore, historicism to Benjamin was an 
unsatisfactory approach to the question of history which could neither present a comprehensive view of 
historical development nor open a possibility for historical criticism.56 Benjamin also criticized Marx’s 
view on a progressive history that followed a rational order but he agreed with Marx over the necessity 
of a ‘revolution’. Benjamin recognized an inherent redemptive feature in Marx’s historical materialism, 
for the possibility it provides for revolting against oppression, and for its social activism. Richard Wolin 
notes that from Benjamin’s early writing it was clear that he did not envisage any redemptive feature in 
Marxism because of its ideological position on history and its rejection of theology, but Marxist social 
activism attracted Benjamin to it.57 
 
 
 
51 It was Adorno who introduced Benjamin’s writing and collected them for publication after his death. For a historical 
examination of Adorno’s relationship with Benjamin see: Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, The Complete 
Correspondence, 1928-1940, ed. Henri Lonitz (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 24-31. Also R.Wiggershaus, The 
Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. by M. Robertson (NY: MIT Press, 1995), 90-97. For 
Marx’ theories see: J. M. Bernstein, The Frankfurt School: critical assessments (London: Routledge, 1994), 41-48. 
52 Richard Wolin contends that eschatological motifs in Benjamin’s writings are natural reactions to the disastrous economic 
and political situation of Europe in the early twenty-first century. R. Wolin, Walter Benjamin, An Aesthetic of Redemption (LA: 
University of California Press, 1994), xxvii. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Hegel defined the realisation of “world spirit” as the ultimate goal of history that forms the dialectic process of historical 
development. He considered the state to be the synthesis between the undifferentiated unity and differentiated disunity and 
the foundation not only for law but also for art, science, and social development. Benjamin eloquently described his goals in his 
critiques of Marxism in his critical essays on art where he examined a work of art as a source of culture as well as its product 
and as an ideology that operated in an industrial society. Ch. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 466-468. 
55Hegel viewed the contemporary state of the human situation to be the result of the exact event of the past. Ibid. 
56 A. E. Benjamin, Walter Benjamin and History (London: Continuum, 2005), 121-124. 
57 Richard Wolin, op. cit., p. xxvii, Benjamin accepted Marx’s definition of ideology as sets of unchangeable pre-suppositions 
that could be either conscious or unconscious but disagreed with Marx that what appears to him as ultimate historical truth 
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Benjamin’s critiques of Marxism shows a departure from the critical tradition of Marxism in the 1920s 
that idealised the human condition as a pre-supposition for Marxist utopian vision of society. Rolf 
Tiedemann considers Benjamin’s position on history to be clearly articulated in his work Theses and his 
interpretation of Paul Klee’s painting in 1921. According to Tiedemann, rather than a coherent and 
homogeneous view of history, in his commentary on Angelus Novus, Benjamin offered a fragmented one 
in which events do not necessarily follow a rational order.58 Benjamin freed history from being an 
empiricist science and argued that “remembrance” was the factor that showed the limits of the scientific 
explanation of history.59 
 
For Benjamin, Wolin asserts, the destructive character of the world in the Marxist nihilistic view of 
society portrays society as a system that is constantly on the verge of total destruction.60 Its nihilism can 
only be overcome by a revolution because revolution creates the possibility of redemption. Benjamin 
emphasized this characteristic of historical materialism as he wrote to Max Horkheimer, “Remembrance 
can make the incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the complete (suffering) into 
something incomplete (happiness).”61 In this statement Benjamin considered this relationship between 
complete and incomplete as the foundation of messianism which is represented in the past generation’s 
messianic hopes (incomplete) and their oppression (complete). Benjamin stated that a work of art was 
representative of attempts at human liberation. The utopian hope of each generation holds a secret 
promise, which Benjamin called “weak messianism”.62 Tiedemann notes that while Benjamin accepted 
the redemptive characteristics of historical materialism he disagreed with Marx and Hegel over a 
causative relationship that is formed by necessity or a progressive nature for history.63 He viewed the 
disastrous situation of human life as a complete failure, where the technological progress of humans gave 
rise to ultimate barbarism and brutality. Benjamin expressed his view on history in his comment on Paul 
Klee’s painting.64 
Scholem notes that the painting functioned as a “meditative focal point” for Benjamin. He perceived it as 
a Biblical angel, a Mala’ch, a messenger “from the world of paradise” who failed in his mission and is 
 
 
could have timeless universal validity. Benjamin however, agreed with Marx that technology reshapes human’s relationship 
with the world and that the ideological narrative that the dominant class in a society produces through technological means 
represents their way of thinking as the only truth narrative of the world. In his essay “Work of Art” he extends Marx’s 
definition of ideology and argues that the mass production of art can be used as a means for sending political messages for 
creating a political “truth” as it becomes a commodity in late capitalism. See: Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction” in, Media and cultural studies: keyworks, eds. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas Kellner 
(London: John Wiley & Sons, 2006), 364. 
58 Rolf Tiedemann, ‘Historical Materialism or Political Messianism? An Interpretation of the Theses “on the Concept of 
History”’ in Benjamin: Philosophy, History, Aesthetics, ed. Gary Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 190. 
59 Ibid, 182. 
60 R.Wolin, op. cit., xxvii. 
61 A. E. Benjamin, op. cit., 122 
62 A. E. Benjamin, Walter Benjamin and Art (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005), 15. 
63 A. E. Benjamin, op. cit., 177. 
64 B. R. Hüppauf, op. cit., 120. 
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gazing at the piles of wreckage without anything more to communicate.65 Tiedemann argues that 
possibly for Benjamin the failure of the angel is because the angel attempted to initiate or complete the 
work of the Messiah.66 The inevitable gaze of the angel at history resembles the horror of humans as they 
view their history. The ambiguity of the future, which is at the back of the angel, has a redemptive 
factor but only if the present is informed by the past, the remembering of the past and the search for the 
“lost paradise”.67 Benjamin admired Klee’s painting for its symbolic representation of hope and the 
utopian vision that it represents in weak messianism. Benjamin saw in Angelus Novus human striving for 
completeness while it clearly stated its incompleteness. This attempt to revive the lost paradise of the 
past in the future which is a utopian characteristic of a messianic era, Tiedemann notes, is identical to 
the Jewish image of a messianic age in which the lost paradise of the past is revived in its full glory.68 
 
 
Benjamin’s discussion on historicism and historical materialism opened a way for him to formulate 
another critique of the Marxist ideological position that shaped his messianic ideas. Ernest Bloch, who 
was a prominent neo-Marxist philosopher and wrote extensively on history and utopia in “the Principle 
of Hope”, attracted Benjamin. Specifically, he was inspired by Bloch’s critique of social realism for its 
neglect of the utopian visions that humans expressed throughout history and continues its existence in 
popular art.69   Bloch considered art and literature as a mediator for human relationships as well as a 
drive for utopia. The connection that Bloch made between utopia and literature indicates that for him 
utopian visions and endeavours are about human everyday life. His criticism of Marxist social realism is 
because of its failure to recognize this utopian characteristic that reflects the hope of the oppressed, and 
for presenting an ideological and pessimistic narrative of history.70 Benjamin’s view on messianism, 
Wolin notes, was the realization of the promise of redemption that the past carries into the present. A 
promise that exists in each generation but is not fulfilled and will never be, unless the messianic age 
comes, when the whole structure of human history collapses. This promise of redemption passes from 
one generation to the other by means of remembrance and tradition. The messianic age is when this 
promise is fulfilled and the end of history comes.71 Wolin argues that for Benjamin, the messianic era 
was not an abstract or metaphoric phase of human existence but an inevitable outcome of the 
destruction and the “dialectical recuperation of human history”.72 
 
 
 
65 E. Jacobson, Metaphysics of the Profane; The Political Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem (NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), 26. 
66 R. Tiedemann, op. cit., 194. 
67Ibid, 180. 
68 Ibid. 
69 E. Bloch, Aesthetics and Politics (Maharashtra: Verso, 1980), 84. 
70 Bloch extends his critiques on social realism to explain how each daily action has a utopian characteristic. See: Ernst Bloch, 
Jack Zipes, and Frank Mecklenburg, The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays (NY: MIT Press, 1989), xxxii. 
71 R. Wolin, op. cit., xiviii. 
72 Benjamin’s view on the interconnectedness of redemption and destruction is evident in his writings on Blanqui’s 
cosmology. See also, Ibid, 108. 
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There are two striking similarities between Benjamin’s understanding of history and the understanding 
of history in the revolutionary messianic narratives in Iran and Israel. First revolutionists in both cases 
acknowledged nihilistic character in the world and particularly in their political situation. Zionists and 
Iranian revolutionaries both insisted that the political situation had left no space for reform and believed 
in no possibility for negotiation or for changing the system from within. Secondly, although both the 
Israeli and Iranian revolutions rose out of specific historical catastrophe (genocide for Jews: the 
Holocaust, and systematic political oppression for Iranians: torture and execution of political dissidents), 
for both Revolutionary Messianism was a response to historical oppression rather than a reaction to 
recent political events. Both deemed the revolution to be an act that had redemptive characteristics 
beyond the realm of politics, with universal goals. In Iran, the revolutionaries believed that the 1979 
revolution was a response to millennia of hegemony of empires and the rule of others.73 It was, they 
argued, the spring of human liberation and could be the example for all liberation movements regardless 
of their ideology or political situations.74 In Israel, Zionist revolutionaries regarded the building of the 
state as the response to millennia of exile, living under foreign rule, and genocide. In both cases, 
theology became a means for redemption.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benjamin, Aestheticization of Politics, and Messianism 
 
 
Rodolphe Gasche contends that Benjamin’s understanding of aesthetic relies on some of the motifs 
present in Kant’s theory of aesthetic.76 For instance, Benjamin, like Kant, viewed beauty as a form of 
expression free from object and more connected to the feeling of satisfaction and dissatisfaction from 
the experience of the subject. Gasche notes that Benjamin’s position connected him to rationalist and 
utopian traditions of David Hume, Kant, and Marx.77 Like Kant, Benjamin expressed interest in 
explaining the aura of an artwork in connection to the function of an artwork in magical or even secular 
rituals.78 In his essay “Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” he criticized late capitalist 
mass production of art that has utterly transformed its function by taking away its aura and separating it 
 
 
73 This notion was particually emphasized in the revolutionary motos and songs such as “May the spring be praised” [Baharaan 
Khojasteh baad] and motos such as “Our revolutioan was the explosion of light” [Enghelab-e maa enfejaar-e nour bood] 
74 Ibid. 
75 J. Kornberg, Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 159. 
76 Rodolphe Gasche, ‘Objective Diversions; On Some Kantian Themes in Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’, in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, ed. Andrew E. Benjamin (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 185. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Gasche notes that although Benjamin “modified” the Kantian definitions of subject, object and their relationship, his theory 
heavily relies on Kantian objectives of aesthetic. See: Ibid, p. 184 both Claude Imbert and Gasche point to the elements in 
Kantian aesthetic to which Benjamin objected. See: I. Kant, Critique of Judgement (NY: Cosimo, Inc., 2007), 27-30. 
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from traditions. He argued that mechanical mass production makes a work of art a capitalist commodity 
and a means for the aestheticization of politics. The core of Benjamin’s argument is this changing of the 
function of an artwork that ultimately constructs its meaning, separated it from its traditional function 
but attached to it new values of “authenticity” and “originality”.79 He asserted that in the pre-modern era, 
 
religious places where one could find artworks and their sighting were associated with performing sets 
of rituals and expressing faith in particular dogma. These factors attached an indispensible mysterious 
quality (aura) to an artwork. 80 The mass reproduction in industrial society has provided the possibility 
of separating a work of art from its environment and attaching a different meaning to it through 
intended reproduction. Benjamin considered it was these characteristics of mass production, 
particularly, the “liquidation” of traditional values of cultural heritage that gave rise to fascism instead of 
inspiring utopian revolutions.81 
 
In his analysis of the transformation in relationship between art, politics, and the modes of production 
Benjamin linked the aestheticization of politics to the rise of fascism. 82 For Benjamin, the bourgeoisie 
used national symbols for mass indoctrination and social conformity by the aestheticization of politics 
through controlling mass communication means, staging street demonstrations, and using national 
symbols. Lutz Koepnick states that Benjamin’s essay on the age of mechanical reproduction 
concentrated on explaining the methods that a state uses in order to generate social loyalty.83 Through 
this process of mass indoctrination, the state uses technology in order to make its archaic methods of 
populist propaganda socially effective. Therefore, the hardware of modernity becomes the justifying 
force of mass indoctrination that Benjamin calls archaic software.84 The popularity of fascism in Europe, 
 
Benjamin argued, was specifically the outcome of successful engraving of the charismatic energy of 
fascism into ornaments of power that the state intentionally produces as vehicles for generating social 
loyalty.85 In his writings during the 1920s and 30s Benjamin viewed leadership as an example of the 
ideological account that aestheticization of politics produces.86 
In the case of both Israel and Iran, rejecting the assimilation of tradition into western secular culture and 
the fear of a substitution of values were significant themes in Revolutionary Messianism . In Ayatollah 
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Khomeini’s and Rabbi Kook’s theologies, preserving tradition and preventing the total annihilation of 
culture as the result of assimilation, were foundational themes. These themes have continuation and 
remained as grounds for political legitimacy for the post-revolutionary states. In Israel’s case, the hope of 
assimilation shattered following the rise of fascism and the tragedy of the Holocaust. The ideological 
nationalism that fascism spread throughout Europe disillusioned European Jewry about assimilation and 
showed them the horror of mass indoctrination. They witnessed how the separation of art and literary 
works from their environment could produce sets of completely new ideas and prepare the ground for 
fascist brutality. Kook’s position on tolerance and coexistence between religious and non-religious Jews 
was the strategy that had the potential to preserve the tradition. In Iran, Khomeini argued that the 
Pahlavi monarchy could sustain its dictatorship by constantly undermining the role of theology in 
politics. In Benjaminian fashion, he associated the rise of dictatorship with the demystifying of the aura 
of traditions and replacing it with modern and destructive values. 
 
 
Benjamin and Theology 
 
 
“First the Messiah completes all historical occurrence, whose relation to the messianic (in this sense) 
he himself first redeems, completes, and creates. Therefore nothing historical can intend to refer to 
the messianic from itself out of itself. For this reason, the kingdom of God is not the telos of the 
historical dynamic; it cannot be set toward a goal. Historically seen, it is not a goal but an end. 
Thus the order of the profane cannot be built on the idea of the kingdom of God; theocracy, 
therefore, has no political but only religious significance. To have repudiated the political 
meaning of theocracy with all intensity is the greatest service of Bloch’s Spirit of Utopia.” 87 
 
Messianic motifs and theological language are recognizable from Benjamin’s early writings. However, it 
is after his friendship with Gershom Scholem that he developed his views on Jewish theology and 
messianism.88 During the1920s, Scholem asked Benjamin to immigrate to Israel and work with him on 
his project on Jewish mysticism but Benjamin refused.89 While Benjamin supported the assimilation of 
Jewish culture in European culture and spent the last decades of his life writing on Marxism, he 
maintained his position on the role of tradition in human hope for self-development and for the 
development of a utopian vision of history. Scholem’s migration to Israel and his taking up the study of 
Jewish messianism made him more conservative in his support of tradition as a means of preserving 
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identity and encouraged Benjamin to contribute to Zionism rather than entertaining the idea of a 
utopian neo-Marxist community.90 
 
Although Benjamin greatly appreciated Scholem’s understanding of Jewish theology and mysticism he 
did not share Scholem’s view on Jewish messianism, identity, and political Zionism. Their difference 
stems from their different understandings of the goal of theological messianism. Benjamin rejected 
nationalist and political Zionism based on the ground that to him messianism was the end of history and 
the construction of a political state could not be assumed as the historical goal of messianism. 
Nonetheless, both agreed that theology was a missing element in Marxism. As Tiedemann notes, to 
Benjamin, remembrance generated an experience that prevented humans from understanding history 
without theology but he warned against reading history theologically.91 The “nationalist” characteristic 
of political Zionism to Benjamin entirely opposed the universality of Jewish messianism that reduced it a 
 
“radical cultural will” to him.92 Bernard Witte argues that for Benjamin Jewishness was “a duty toward 
the development of European culture”.93 Based on this definition, Benjamin called himself a “cultural 
Zionist” who strove for the realization of Judaism that he viewed as “the most distinguished bearer and 
representative of the spiritual”.94 Benjamin was well aware, Wolin states, of the possibility of reading his 
writings in light of the fascist ideology that dominated Europe.95 Therefore, he emphasized his 
“conservative revolutionary tendencies” to avoid any misconception of his understanding of revolution.96 
Benjamin agreed with Marx and Weber about the disenchantment of the world by modernity, but 
argued that through the re-emerging of mythical motifs and symbols in modern narratives such as 
politics, late capitalism and its super narrative of consumption, the world were re-enchanted.97 
 
For Benjamin, the notion of theology was closely connected to redemption, as evident in messianic 
hopes. Michael Mack argues that Benjamin’s view on theology had its roots in German romanticism.98 
His use of theology provided him with a solid critique of Marxism and at the same time became a means 
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for Benjamin’s theory on history.99 Benjamin understood messianism as a utopian vision with an extra- 
historical dimension but rarely directly connected messianism in his writing with theology, considering 
redemption as the only important theological theme for politics, and the most suitable means for 
historical materialism.100 Remembrance and traditions are means through which he defines the 
relationship between messianism and theology. This position emphasizes the significance of theology in 
historical development but negates the possibility of a political theology or a messianic state. Mack 
argues that in his ‘Theological-Political Fragment” essay Benjamin differentiates the profane from the 
messianic in order to clearly explain their dependencies.101 
 
In his later writing ‘On the Concept of History’, Benjamin defined the relationship between historical 
fate (historicism) and historical materialism based on “chess automaton” in which historical materialism 
could only win when it binds its power with the “wise hunchback” of theology.102 Tiedemann and Irving 
Wohlfarth’s interpretations of Benjamin’s works represent two intellectual positions on the relationship 
between historical materialism and theology in his writings. According to Tiedemann, for Benjamin, 
theology is “subservient” to history while Wohlfarth argues that for Benjamin, presenting a 
comprehensive account of the past requires theology and this premise in Benjamin’s writings makes 
history subservient to theology.103     This ambiguity is very important to my work and is the key point in 
the political legitimacy of the post-revolutionary states. This ambiguity is the most significant thrust of 
Benjamin’s discussion on the relationship between revolution and messianism and one of the reasons for 
Benjamin’s rejection of political Zionism was his awareness of the potential conservatism embedded in 
this ambiguity. He was also well aware of the consuming power of late capitalism and its efficiency in 
using symbols for mass production of intended and new values. In this ambiguity lies a potential for 
utopia as well as a potential catastrophe. The catastrophe, to Benjamin, would be transforming the 
messianic hope he saw in theology into a state ideology that demystified messianism by using it as a 
means for the aestheticization of politics. 
 
The danger that Benjamin noticed has affected Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran in different ways 
due to the different political realities of their situations. Nonetheless, in both cases, messianic narratives 
and theology represented the voices of the oppressed during the Revolutionary Phase. In the State- 
Building Phase, theology transformed messianism from an extra-historical and universal utopian vision 
into a security-orientated political theology. From the moment that revolutionary energy declines 
Revolutionary Messianism becomes a political ideology and thus is bound to historical conditions. This 
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Benjaminian narrative of messianism is a successful means for legitimizing post-revolutionary states 
because it suggests that the reciprocal relationship between complete (suffering) and incomplete 
(happiness) is a necessary requirement for understanding the aesthetic of redemption. In both Iran and 
Israel the completeness of (suffering, revolution, immigration, and war), and the incompleteness of the 
state resembles the incompleteness of messianism. In both cases, theological apocalyptic messianism was 
substituted by political progressive messianism and the states have been progressively dependant on 
messianism as a political ideology. Thus messianism lost its mystical aura in the Revolutionary Phase and 
has become a means for aestheticization of politics. This is the danger that Benjamin warned us about in 
the theological reading of history. 
 
Revolution, Socialism and the Messianic Age 
 
 
Since the sixteenth century in Europe, the separation of religious from administrative and legislative 
institutions and the rise of nationalist politics have transformed the nature of the relationship between 
state and citizens. Eric Hobsbawm articulates this notion in his discussion on post-nation state nationalism 
which he considers to be different from pre-state nationalist sentiments in three key ways.104 
First, post-nation state nationalism facilitated individual cooperation and involvement in state politics. 
 
Secondly, it consolidated political and military powers in a central administration, and encouraged 
territorial expansion, and finally, technological development. The consolidation of military forces and 
the centralization of political power in the body of a state enabled European states to extend their 
economic and geographical territories into new regions and encouraged the political and military 
domination of more natural and human resources.105 This transformation negated the existing political 
exclusivism and included all members of a group in a “body of people” that declared themselves as a 
nation and demanded the right to have an independent state. 
In the Middle East, the promise of an autonomous state encouraged various communities to claim 
territorial sovereignty. There are two distinct views about the spread of the nation state from Europe to 
the Middle East. Scholars, such as Daniel Brown, argue that the history of state formation in the Middle 
East was not constructed through colonization or the western imposition of a nation state on the region, 
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rather it was due to an increase in contact between the two.106 Other scholars, such as Sami Zubaida and 
Roger Owen, argue that the “modern” states in the region are a “compulsory form of the western 
model”.107 Both of these views could hold some truth in these cases. Iran was never officially colonized 
and Iranians motivated and supported changes in the political system. In the case of Israel, the territory 
was officially colonized by Britain. While one case, Iran, proves Brown’s argument, the other, Israel, 
attests to Zubaida’s approach. Nonetheless, in both cases intellectuals eagerly responded to the idea of a 
bureaucratically structured state, either similar to or copied from the European model and rejected 
colonialism and imperialism. These models have played vital roles in the nationalist discourse in Iran and 
Israel during the Revolutionary Phase. 
 
In the Middle East, the competition between the military powers, British, French and later Russian, 
over Middle Eastern resources and the two world wars fuelled nationalistic sentiments. Early responses 
to the colonization of the Middle East appeared in the late nineteenth century and continued until the 
advent of the Cold War. In this period, the geopolitical map of the Middle East was redrawn.108 This 
was due to a number of factors, such as the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the colonization of the region, 
the Russian revolution, Iran’s Constitutional Revolution, the rise of Zionism, and tensions between 
nationalist and religious communities. As in Europe in the nineteenth century, these factors dramatically 
changed the geo-political map of the Middle East during the twentieth century. Some states, such as 
Turkey and Iran, invested in the secularization of their states in order to create a legitimate bureaucratic 
administration with a strong army.109 
 
Iranians and Jewry were attracted to the idea of a nation state for different reasons. However, both 
encouraged the formation of a strongly nationalistic state through a messianic revolution. Similarly to 
the situation in Europe in the eighteenth century, Iranian intellectuals of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries championed nationalism, particularly ideas of independence and unity, as a means to 
 
limit the power of the monarchy.110 They admired the technological progress of the West and 
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recognized that industrialization and the formation of a Constitutional monarchy was the only way to 
reconcile the tension between the ruling system and the public.111 Abour eighty years after the defeat of 
the Safavids, the Qajar monarchs imported western military technology and sent students to European 
countries to be trained in how to operate this technology.112 The importation of modern military 
technology, and the training of military personell in the West, facilitated further intellectual encounters 
between Iran and Europe. Iranian intellectuals, who became familiar with the concept of limiting the 
power of a ruling system to the peoples’ will, spread ideas about nationalism and mobilized the public 
to oppose the ultimate power of the Qajar Monarchs.113 
 
 
Iranian intellectuals were attracted to socialism, as they believed accommodating socialism in state 
politics could guarantee the political success of Constitutional monarchy.114 Their opposition to absolute 
monarchy provided a means of articulating loyalty to home, as well as a means to unite the masses, both 
of which were required factors for a modern state. Their encounter with modern western political 
theories and their opposition to the Qajar resulted in the Constitutional Revolution in 1909.115 The 
formation of the Parliament (Majles) was the most evident political outcome of this revolution. 
Although Reza Shah resumed the monarchical ruling system in Iran, he fulfilled many of the goals of the 
 
Constitutional Revolution during his time.116 Primarily, he established ministries of education and 
 
justice and imported secular education and judiciary systems from European countries - mainly France - 
to Iran.117 
Similarly, in nineteenth century Europe, Jewish intellectuals were inspired by the ideals of 
nationalism.118 Many of them were assimilated within their country of residence and became passionate 
nationalists.119 Contrary to those intellectuals who were promoting assimilation, many Rabbis were 
hostile to the assimilation of Jewish communities and strived to protect Judaism from the perceived 
infiltration of secularization.120 The failure of secular politics to end political discrimination against 
Jewish communities in Europe gradually attracted Jewish intellectuals in support of nationalist Zionism 
as an alternative to European secular nationalism.121 Throughout Europe, Jewish communities debated 
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the processes of secularization with a particular focus on the role and position of messianism.122 Zionism 
incorporated tradition into modern politics and mobilized the Diaspora by creating a sense of 
synchronic history, which revived the glory of the past and planned for the future. Early Zionism was 
secular with a strong messianic ideal. This characteristic made Theodor Herzl’s Zionism a strategically 
valuable ideology in territorial arguments about a modern Jewish state.123 By the late nineteenth century, 
many European Jewish intellectuals and Rabbis fervently supported Zionism and attributed the charisma 
of the theological messianic figure to Herzl and his vision of Zion.124 Gradually secular Zionism came to 
include religious messianic discourse and articulated a messianic theology within the context of national 
identity.125 
 
In the early twentieth century, the territory that later became the modern state of Israel was under 
British rule. The Ottoman Empire lost its power due to its extensive borrowing from the West and 
continual warfare with Great Britain, France, and Russia.126 Capitalist ambitions instigated a fierce 
competition between colonisers over Middle Eastern territories and resources. Moreover, as Beverley 
Milton-Edwards notes, the capitalist adventure of European businessmen and investors occurred before 
the formal colonial history of the Middle East.127 By the mid nineteenth century these entrepreneurs had 
developed strong economic ties with local businessmen and had drawn the attention of Ottoman 
officials to the Western market. This competition resulted in the establishment of weak colonial states 
which were intended mainly to create a harmonious economic system and to facilitate easier 
transportation of goods and resources.128 
Competition between France and Britain, the focus of the Ottoman Empire on modernizing the military 
instead of liberal democracy, the growth of urbanization, and the colonial states’ inability to satisfy the 
demands of the newly settled urban population were all issues that contributed to the failure of direct 
colonial states in the region.129 The public and intellectuals separated the colonizers from the colonized, 
rejected colonization but fervently supported nationalism, thus, transformed the power structure in the 
region. During the First World War, Britain’s better strategic position and technological superiority 
allowed it to defeat the Ottomans. However, British mismanagement of the Arab revolt in 1919 and the 
unstable post war situation weakened their authority as direct rulers of the governments in the Middle 
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East.130 Controlling the colonial states became more challenging and the economic recession of the 
 
1930s added another layer to the complex political situation. Soon after the establishment of secular 
colonial states in the region the excluded religious institutions re-organized and became more involved 
in public politics.131 
 
Nationalism challenged traditional definitions of identity and it became difficult for new states in the 
Middle East to define a nation. The new framework of a secular government contradicted the faith- 
based arrangement of the old political system, thus the new states were only able to vaguely define the 
national identity of their citizens.132 The European concepts of territorial boundaries and of statehood 
were not meaningful for Middle Eastern communities who had understood their relationship with the 
Ottoman Empire based on tribal and religious identities. Terms such as geographical boundaries, shared 
languages, ethnicity, national loyalty, or even secular administration were confusing for the newly 
separated tribes.133 The establishment of these new regimes raised questions and debates about the nature 
of the sovereignty of a state and its relationship with its citizens. Ultimately they faced challenges with 
regard to the appropriate agents to implement national laws and the broader political identity of colonial 
states. In order to respond to the emerging anti-colonial resistance, colonial states heavily 
relied on their armed forces or foreign support to ensure the interests of the political elites of these new 
regimes.134 
 
In the Middle Eastern political context, the state of Israel took form through the tireless endeavours of 
Zionists who encouraged a revolutionary nationalist movement.135 Their efforts bore fruit following the 
Second World War when Israel became an official member of the United Nations. The Zionist 
movement was an example of the growing nationalism that challenged the colonial ties between the 
ruling elite and religious figures and reconstructed these traditional relationships through the 
framework of a nation state.136 Strong political ties with the business community and the resultant 
 
mismanagement of political and economic affairs made British colonial forces in Palestine the target of 
fierce opposition.137   In addition to domestic political uprisings, colonial forces faced challenges in 
creating a comprehensive governing system for an ethnically and religiously diverse population under a 
nation state. The notion of modern nationalism entered into the literature of resistance against post- 
colonial governments. Zionist groups such as Haganah and Irgun viewed British colonialism as 
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inadequate and untrustworthy and strongly advocated nationalism.138 They believed that only through 
the consolidation of military power around a nationalist state, the formation of a judiciary, and the 
proliferation of secular education, could people experience political emancipation. Ironically, the 
nationalists’ demand for sovereignty over a geographical territory was rooted in the literature of 
European nationalism and Giuseppe Mazzini’s view of “every nation one state”.139 Contrary to the 
situation in Europe during the late nineteenth century, where the notion of nationalism became the 
dominant political discourse, the transformation of the social and political environments in the Middle 
East was instigated by opposition to colonial states.140 
 
Walter Laqueur, in his comprehensive study of the history of Zionism, notes that in the early years of 
the twentieth century European Jews rapidly adopted modernity and were integrated within the new 
urban cultures.141 Modernity became more popular amongst urban European Jews than the traditional 
apolitical culture of the Diaspora.142 Those who supported assimilation rejected Jewish messianism and 
traditional Jewish communal life.143 Gabriel Riesse, a well-known Jewish scholar at the time and a 
strong supporter of assimilation in Germany, considered those German Jews who opposed assimilation 
as criminals. 144 Riesse praised the Jewish community in Russia, who viewed communism as a messianic 
revolution and rejected supporters of Zionism for adopting romantic views about the future of Jewry.145 
 
At the time, traditional Jewish messianism was incapable of attracting audiences in either Europe or 
 
Russia until the late nineteenth century when Herzl staged his Zionist campaign.146 
 
 
Herzl’s campaign itself was the result of the modernization of Jewish tradition. In Europe, the early 
modernist Jews of the eighteenth century began this process. A century after Baruch Spinoza’s (1632- 
1677) de-sacralization of sacred texts, Moses Mendelsson translated the Pentateuch and founded the 
tradition of miskilim (rationalism). Prussian intellectuals encouraged Haskalah (enlightenment) and the 
abandonment of pre-modern traditions.147 The process of modernization continued despite increased 
anti-Semitism during the last decades of the nineteenth century. The modernization of Europe 
emancipated Jewish communities with rapid social integration and increased participation in economic 
activity. As the pre-modern monarchical and feudal systems lost power over the state there were 
challenges to political legitimacy within the modern states. The vacuum that the pre-modern political 
system had created regarding the mediating agencies caused these challenges. Jewry’s longing for 
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emancipation and equal participation in modern European states gradually faded as anti-Semitism 
became established within the states’ institutional structure. In addition, the focus on individualism, the 
capitalist economy and the growing power of states posed a threat to the legitimacy of non-Christian 
religious communities. Increasing anti-Semitism pressured many to relocate to the United States of 
Amercia or other places such as Palestine. 
 
Herzl (1869-1904), who was influenced by ideas of modernity and Jewish emancipation, travelled 
throughout Europe to convince European Jews that emancipation under the rule of others was an 
illusion.148 He argued that only after the formation of an independent state could the survival of the 
community be possible. Herzl became a messianic figure who worked incessantly to see the dream of a 
Jewish state in Israel materialize.149 As Laqueur notes, traditional messianic ideas were proved to be 
ineffective in presenting a national identity for the diverse Jewish communities.150 During the world 
wars and when the United Nations passed the Declaration of Independence there was hardly a Zionist 
who doubted that the messianic age was at hand and that the gathering of Jews from Galut (exile) would 
bring redemption.151 However, the combination of Zionism and messianism was a later development 
during the Revolutionary Phase.152 Early Zionism was secular, with a strong messianic utopian vision for 
 
territorial sovereignty. As the situation in Europe changed, increasing anti-Semitism and European 
secularization instigated reactions from Rabbis who viewed Zionism and the formation of a Jewish state 
as a solution to the integration of Judaism within western cultures.153 The failure of secularization in 
ending political discrimination against Jewish communities gradually gave momentum to a Zionist 
revolution. 
 
Theological debates, both in support and in opposition to the process of secularization, became common 
within the Jewish communities of Europe. Zionism incorporated traditional messianism into modern 
politics and motivated the Diaspora by creating a sense of nationalism and reviving the glory of ancient 
Israel. Zionism interpreted messianism within a political context in the attempt to establish a political 
system based on the idea of redemption and connected it to modern nationalism. The re- reading of 
Jewish history in the context of self-determination as a nation and de-legitimizing other accounts of 
history mediated the intrinsic contradictions between the two discourses. The nationalist interpretation 
of history required radical changes in traditional theological discourse that defined history as a divine 
mystery. In pre-state Jewish theology, history was understood to be a linear path of actions 
and reactions between the divine and humanity. The cause of historical events could only be understood 
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when they passed through the process of theological appropriation. The appropriation of history into the 
great divine plan was the main tool by which divine determination materialized in messianic theology in 
which history documented God’s purpose and was directed towards a divine goal. 
 
 
 
Gradually, secular Zionism included religious messianic discourse and idealized a religio-political state. 
Eastern European Jewish communities attributed the charisma of traditional messianic figures to Herzl 
and fervently supported him and played a pivotal role in this process.154 While the assimilationists 
regarded the traditional messianic responsibilities of the Jews to be Jewish in exile, Zionists presented 
an alternative vision of how to keep tradition from totally assimilating with other cultures. 
Assimilationists’ aversion to Zionism gave Zionists a platform to highlight the importance of a state. 
They emphasized that those who stayed in their land, waiting for the Messiah, were waiting for “pot 
flesh” and not the real Messiah.155 In this process the nationalistic interpretation of messianism provided 
a political legitimacy that defined a theological “truth” in a revolutionary discourse. Nationalism became 
 
infused with the meaning of messianism and was placed as the premise for interpreting messianic 
literature and ideology. 
 
Theological Background of Iran’s Revolutionary Messianism 
 
 
While the political situation in Europe sped up the success of Zionism, Iran faced different challenges 
following the Qajar’s encounter with European secular states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.156 As Houchang Chehabi notes, the sense of continuity in Iran’s history as a nation is similar to 
some European countries.157 European secular states, specifically France, significantly influenced Iranian 
intellectuals’ understanding of a state. However, in the first parliament after the Constitutional 
Revolution there was no indication of the secular identity of the state. On the contrary, the political 
participation of the Constitutionalist ulama (jurisits) guaranteed their involvement in the parliament. 
The importation of the printing machine from Europe and growing literacy made access easier to 
various state ideologies, such as socialism and communism, and provided intellectuals with alternative 
viewpoints about the limits of the power of a monarchy. Ideas such as gender equality and a Marxist 
economy supported the yearning of many Iranians for economic and political justice.158 
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in today’s Turkey and most of the Middle East, the Qajars 
decentralized politics proved to be an ineffective system for assimilating the population within a nation 
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state. The monarchy was weakened due to a lack of professional human resources needed to operate 
imported western military technology and the new industrial machinery.159 Intellectuals wrote of the 
wars, economic devastation, and symbolized public opposition against the tyranny of the monarch.160 
They contended that modern nationalism provided a means for articulating the feeling of loyalty to the 
home country.161 They admired liberal democracy in the west and recognized that industrialization and 
the formation of a nation state, even in the form of a Constitutional monarchy, was the only answer to 
the question of nationalism and development.162 Iran experienced its first modern revolution in the early 
twentieth century (1906), just a year after the Russian revolution (1905).163 Iranian intellectuals 
advocated ideas of independence and national unity and voiced the necessity of a Parliament.164 The 
formation of the Parliament (Majles) was the most evident political outcome of the revolution that 
intellectuals passionately supported.165 
 
During the time of Reza Shah (1925-1944), he established and developed efficient state institutions. 
Although the state was not politically democratic the existence of a functioning central state terminated 
political disorder around the country. 166   During the Pahlavi era, the two world wars radically changed 
the political situation in Iran.167 Following the forced abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 his son 
Mohammad Reza became the King. Mohammad Reza Shah followed his father’s path in the 
modernization of Iran but the state became more politically exclusive when Mohammad Reza Shah 
refused to accept the participation of other political parties such as the Communist Party (Tudeh).168 
Public support of the nationalization of oil and the demand for political freedom resulted in a growing 
unrest in Iran in 1953 when the Prime Minister of the time, Mohammad Mossadeq, opposed the Shah’s 
oil policies.169 Mohammad Reza Shah left the country but returned after a coup and increased the 
suppression of all political parties and organizations.170 
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The masses were mobilized around issues of economic injustice and access to political power. 
Intellectuals and religious institutions united in support of ending the monarchical rule and political 
injustice. The Shah’s economic reforms that had targeted the traditional market sector also reduced the 
power of religious institutions. Their loss of power united them with other forces who criticized the 
Shah for the mismanagement of the oil budget and his strong pro-American politics. However, neither 
of the revolutionary forces demanded forming a pre-modern Islamic state or dismantling the 
bureaucratic institutions. In effect, the difference was over the order of religion and politics in the state. 
At the time of the 1978-1979 revolution, the revolutionary interpretation of Shi’a messianism operated 
as an inclusive ideology and constructed a collective anti-monarchical and anti-imperialist identity that 
attracted individuals regardless of their religious commitment or political orientations.171 In the long 
battle among various religious and secular forces over the form and nature of a nation state, the idea of 
an Islamic Republic seemed a position of compromise. Religious and non-religious groups have 
contradicted each other over the arrangement of politics and religion in the body of a state for over a 
century in Iran and their conflict has shaped the country’s contemporary political history. At the centre 
of these debates rest the differences between a modern and the pre-modern Shi’a understanding of 
political legitimacy and messianism. 
 
In debates over the role of religion in politics in the Constitutional Revolution, a split developed 
between two major Shi’a Jurisprudential schools over the source of governmental legitimacy and 
individual political participation within a conditioned monarchy during the time of Qeybah 
(occultation).172 The Usulies (Prinicipalists) justified the revolution and the Akhbaris (Traditionalists) 
rejected it. Both used Shi’a messianism to support their political positions.173 While Usulies like 
Ayatollah Nai’ni attested that in the time of occultation establishing an administration to end the tyranny 
and the oppression of monarchy was obligatory, the Akhbaris disputed this.174 The Akhbaris supported an 
absolutist monarchy and were concerned over securing the ulama’s status in the judiciary and education 
systems.175 
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Constitutionalist ulama like Na’ini in Najaf and Ayatollah Mahallati declared their solidarity with the 
revolutionaries by calling for the formation of a parliament as a religious duty for the ulama.176 They 
argued that the lack of political and economic justice in the time of the Qajar was extensive and obeying 
the monarchy should be forbidden. During the time of the occultation it was the duty of the Ulama to 
ensure the execution of justice, thus they considered the formation of a parliament to be the most 
practical representation of justice in the absence of a divine government.177 In opposition to Na’ini, 
Seyyed Kazim Yazdi, an absolutist and Akhbari, claimed that taking sides with the revolutionaries in their 
call for the deposing of the Shah was an “irreparable loss [in Islam] and cannot be indemnified except by 
the coming of the twelfth Imam”.178 Nai’ini strongly supported the idea of revolution and rejected the 
idea of the rule of the ulama in the absence of the twelfth Imam. He announced “the opposition [to the 
Constitutional revolution] thinks that Tehran is the district of the Twelfth Imam, and it is the period of 
Ali Ibn Abi Talib’s rule, and the people are attempting to interfere in his rightful leadership. I wish it 
could have become clear that Tehran is neither the sacred district of the Imam nor does anyone want to 
usurp the Imam’s authority. The people’s representatives only want to curtail oppressive rule”.179 In 
addition to Na’ini another prominent Shi’a Ayatollah, Mirza Hasan Shirazi, who had issued a fatwa 
against Tobacco concession in 1891-1892, fervently supported the revolution based on Shi’a messianic 
views. In his fatwa against the Tobacco concession he had announced “today the use of tunbaku or 
tobacco in any form is reckoned as against the Imam of the Age”.180   His fatwa sparked a national 
campaign and provoked a civil uprising against the concession. This influenced the royal court of the 
Qajar and forced Naser-e din shah to terminate it.181 From this year on, national independence entered 
public political discourse, and Shi’a modern messianism for both Constitutionalists and Absolutists 
resonated as the ideal of national independence.182 
 
Sheikh Fadhlollah Nouri and his followers were Absolutists who disagreed with the Constitutionalists 
over parliamentary authority. They forbade the support of the revolution. Nouri contended that 
Constitutionalism was a western idea that was incapable of managing Iran’s affairs.183 He remained loyal 
to the monarchy and opposed the Constitutionalists. In his sermon against the nationalist’s proposal of 
state law, he said: 
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“The principal party of this game-Constitutionalism- was played by the erroneous 
groups [i.e. the non-Muslim citizens and most probably the Babis] in order to escape 
from the four definite provisions which are made for those who renounce Islam. What 
a wrong idea! What a [set of] vain thoughts! The house [i.e. the territory of Islam] has a 
lord and the religion has [its] master - Oh, heretics! If this state law is in conformity 
with Islam, it is not possible to include equality in it,… See how the master of the 
Shari’ah has granted you honors because you have been embellished with Islam. He has 
granted you privileges, but you deny them by saying that you must be equal brothers 
with Zoroastrians, Armenians and Jews; God’s curse may be upon those who approve 
this [equality]- Sheikh Fadhlollah Nouri.” 184 
 
The absolutists maintained their dominance over Shi’a institutions and as Said Amir Arjomand notes, 
they gathered power in the first years after the revolution. 185   Neither group at the time believed in the 
idea of Jurisprudential Leadership. Those who opposed the revolution remained loyal to the monarch 
and later quietists. The fragmentation of these ideological positions intensified under the semi-secular 
rule of the Pahlavi, which influenced Khomeini’s theory of Jurisprudential Leadership. Khomeini’s 
modern interpretation of Shi’a messianism relied on arguments put forth by the Iranian Shi’a ulama of 
the Constitutional Revolution.186 His theory contradicted the concept of an Islamic Republic with 
regard to the power structure of republican politics but it could not prevent the incorporation of secular 
 
nationalism into Shi’a messianic discourse. Jurisprudential Leadership, as a political position, is merely 
functional in a state with a secular institutional foundation. It channels the power into a hierarchical 
system for the establishment of a religious monarchy. The traditional Shi’a religious institution that had 
withstood attaining administrative power, and reacted to the formation of a parliament, due to the 
traditional Shi’a messianism, supported Khomeini during the 1978-1979 revolution. 
Khomeini praised Nouri for his vehement hostility towards a secular parliament and agreed with him 
about limiting the power of parliament to Islamic Shari’a. Much like Nouri, Khomeini, focussed on the 
Shah’s economic and political policies, which directly targeted the interests of the Shi’a institutions but 
did not reject a monarchical system. In fact, he advocated a similar political system in his theory.187 
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Khomeini’s hostility towards Pahlavi’s secularization plan in the early years of his political activities 
never extended to claiming political authority for the ulama. Rather, it was the nationalist revolutionary 
readings of Shi’a messianism that gave rise to his revolutionary position during the 1970s.188 Ayatollah 
Boroujerdi, the founder of the Qom theological institution, believed in the separation of religion and 
the state.189 His position gave the Qom centre an autonomous status.190 This apolitical position provided 
 
Khomeini with the possibility of developing his theory, which relied on the philosophical foundation of a 
monarchy. 
 
Had it not been for the efforts of socialists like Jallal Al-ahmad and neo-Marxist idealists like Ali Shari’ati, 
Khomeini’s notion of an Islamic Republic would not have been comprehensible as a practical leadership 
model. Jallal Al-Ahmad, who was a prominent critic of the Shah’s policies in the 1960s, presented a 
metaphoric interpretation of Islam. Calling Islam the core identity of Iranians he argued that the Mahdi’s 
“popularity arises from him being the hope and refuge of believers against the insurmountable inequities 
of the world”. 191 He considered individual “Westoxication” and the gaze to 
the West to be the source of Iran’s failure in attaining independence.192 Al- Ahmad argued that return to 
 
Islam and the rejection of the western concept of a secular state were the solution for preserving Iran’s 
cultural identity.193 This neo-Marxist reading of Shi’a myths, specifically Shi’a messianism, by non- 
clerical intellectuals such as Shari’ati and Al-Ahmad situated Khomeini’s theory at the centre of Iranian 
intellectual’s anti-monarchical idealism and reconceptualised the notion of political legitimacy in Shi’a 
theology. Khomeini’s vision for an Islamic Republic was a combination of the Constitutionalists’ 
understanding of messianism and the traditionalists view on political legitimacy.194 
 
In a similar fashion, theological debates that centred on Revolutionary Messianism within Zionist ideals 
demonstrated theological tensions over the establishment of a Jewish state during the time of waiting for 
the Messiah. Although European secular intellectuals planted the seed of Zionism, the movement did 
not gain widespread popularity until Heredi Jewish Rabbis established the Sephardi, a religious party 
that unified the Zionist movement under David Wolffsohn (1856-1914).195 Russian Jews who joined the 
Zionist movement and attempted to bring about the messianic age relied on the success of the 
communist revolution in Russia and nationalist revolution in France. They were passionate, filled with 
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revolutionary zeal and strongly nationalist.196 Yoram Shapira argues that the formation of Zionism was 
predominantly the result of Jewish disappointment with modernity, a direct response to anti- 
Semitism.197 Their disappointment united various groups and combined Russian patriotism, French 
romanticism, and neo-Marxist idealism in Zionism. The nationalistic and inclusivist narrative of 
messianism and re-reading of the role of individuals in the fulfilment of the messianic age compromised 
the disagreements between secular and religious Zionists, and between the Heredi Jewry and Zionists. 
Disagreement between Heredi rabbis and Zionists had its roots in their understanding of Jewish 
messianic theology. Heredi messianic literature lamented their lost autonomous political identity and 
yearned for the end of suffering and exile.198 In addition to political identity, which they defined in 
intercommunity politics for centuries, the apolitical messianism that they expressed in poetry and 
literature allowed them to form a Heredi community in exile that hoped for divine intervention in the 
restoration of their political identity.199 
 
Michael Myers and Vardit Ravitzky both emphasize the importance of acknowledging apolitical 
messianism as the dominant form of pre-modern Jewish political philosophy.200 Myers identifies three 
key issues that are important to understanding the relationship between messianism and Jewish national 
ideas at that time of the rise of Zionism. The three issues comprised of the main purpose of the 
messianic promise to end the exile, that human intervention could play a role in the ending of exile, and 
the discussion of the means through which Jews should terminate the exile and the nature of the post- 
exile society.201 A Rabbi’s response to these questions determined his political position as either a quietist 
or an activist messianist. National Zionism was different from the active messianism that flourished 
during the Bar Kochba (132–136 CE) revolution and later in Rabbi Zvi’s (1658-1718CE) movements. 
The pre-Zionist active messianism was a Universalist philosophy, as Benjamin noted, with the potential 
to be a political ideology but it did not offer any practical political plan for changing the existing situation 
or the structure of a possible political system. Therefore, the politically passive form 
of messianism remained the dominant theology in the pre-modern era when Jewish communities faced 
the challenges of exile.202 These challenges were evident in the historical messianic figures such as Bar 
Khochba. As Richard Marks notes, the image of Bar Khochba in traditional literature is an example of 
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pre-revolutionary active messianism.203 In response to Yehoshafat Harkabi’s The Bar Khochba Syndrome 
 
(1981), Marks explains that the response of the traditional rabbinic literature to Bar Kochba’s 
 
revolution was a combination of condemnation and admiration.204 He mentions two other thinkers who 
studied Bar Kochba’s images in Jewish history. The first is Scholem, who argued that the Rabbis did not 
respond positively to Bar Kochba’s revolution, although he remained a hero-Saint amongst the people. 
The second is Yegael Yadin, who claimed that Bar Kochba’s image was one of a national hero - “a 
people’s hero”.205 
 
For Heredi Jews of Eastern Europe the issue of a state in Israel was theologically problematic. Returning 
and living in the holy land was considered a religious mitzvah, but having a state contradicted their 
passive messianism that focused on preserving the Mitzvoth- Halakhah and viewed Zionism as a betrayal 
to the spiritual mission of Jews. Moreover, forming a state threatened the main duty of Jewish scholars 
within the Heredi communities. This duty was to define everyday life matters within a greater divine 
historical scheme. The view that history solely involved the unfolding of the transcendent plan 
contradicted active participation in the state building process. A main doctrine of Heredi Judaism, states 
that the will of God rules the universe and all aspects of human life; the course of history is to prove that 
his will supersedes all earthly powers. When this divinely determined “time” comes, God will send the 
saviour to the world. God determines the time and nature of this promised divine redemption and 
human intervention disturbs the divine balance. During the early 1920s however, many Heredi Jewish 
Rabbis who had previously expressed opposition to Zionism and the formation of a nation state became 
more lenient towards the building of settlements in Israel.206   It was ultimately the issue of security and 
the devastating political situation in Europe that made them alter their strong ideological positions in 
opposition to the Zionist movement. Specifically, following the Arab riot of the late 20s and the murder 
of three Rabbis in Safed, Jerusalem, and Hebron they became more cooperative with the Zionists.207 
During the 1950s, a new theological development began with Rabbi Kook and his interpretation of the 
 
messianic age. His Revolutionary Messianism bridged the gap between the theological value of the land 
and nationalism and gave momentum to religious Zionism. 
 
Rabbi Kook 
 
Rabbi Kook (1865–1935 CE) is rightly called the theological founder of religious Zionism. In his 
writings, he developed the image of the state of Israel as a progressive redemptive move towards the 
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fulfilment of Jewish messianism.208 Suggestive of his fervent support of Zionism, Rabbi Kook called the 
state building process “the beginning of redemption” and the “age of return” to the holy land. 209 He 
argued that the return to Israel and the formation of a state was not primarily an intervention by human 
agents in the divine plan, but a direct order from God.210   Kook contended that the Torah offers a 
template for modern Zionism. In response to anti-Zionist Heredi Rabbis like Margolis, who accused 
Zionism of “forcing the end”, Kook said: “No, it is not we who are forcing the end but the End that is 
forcing us”.211 Ravitzky writes that in the religious Zionism that Kook developed he viewed the religious 
concepts of redemption and repentance within a Zionist nationalist ideology. Thus, instead of 
presenting purely a theological critique of apolitical messianism Kook offered a political ideology.212 
 
 
Kook’s view was an example of the integration of national politics and theology that has remained 
significant in Israeli politics.213 Religious Zionism with a messianic approach towards the state 
compromised the existence of a secular state. He argued that the religious identity of the state should be 
expressed through a strong independent and moral state rather than within an Heredi theocracy.214 He 
took a stand against Heredi anti-Zionist Rabbis because of their opposition to the formation of the 
state.215 He also opposed secular Zionists who insisted that Zionism was a secular nationalist 
movement.216 He did not accept that there were any inconsistencies between a secular nationalist 
movement and Jewish messianic ideology. Rather he considered the existence of one to be the necessary 
pre-condition of the other. Kook’s religious Zionism has been taught in Yeshivot around Israel and in 
the late 70s became the main ideology of the rightwing Gush Emunim.217 This party had a major 
 
influence on Israeli politics and society after the Six Days War. Many of the leaders of today’s religious 
parties have been educated within this system.218 
Kook’s religious Zionism responded to the issue of state authority during the time of state building in 
Israel. While pre-state messianism emphasized the coming of a divine saviour as a response to suffering 
and exile, it conditioned the possibility of a messianic age to the unification of the Jewish people and 
their political sovereignty over the Holy Land. Whether the issue was returning to the Holy Land or the 
implementation of justice, it aimed to unite people for the realization of a progressive messianic state. 
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Revolutionary Messianism , based on which Kook formulated his religious Zionism, emphasises 
economic justice, political justice and independence as the prerequisite for the coming of a messianic 
age. In pre-state messianic theology, the characteristics and attributes of the divine saviour are all 
indicative of the political authority of a leader, which in the Revolutionary Phase were idealised in the 
vision of a state. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
For Iranians and Jews, Revolutionary Messianism provided the possibility of understanding modernity 
politically and theologically. At a political level, revolutionary ideology held the possibility of 
emancipation and theologically messianism promised a progressive step towards the fulfilment of 
utopian promises. Both groups understood messianism in light of modernity as a revolutionary politics 
that expressed messianic hope in the context of national self-determination, thus, uniting various groups. 
While in the West the non-religious revolutionary disassociated individuals from their religious 
communities, Revolutionary Messianism in both cases strongly bound individuals to their religious 
communities which theologically and politically committed them to state building. All other responses 
to colonization, from secular political authority or apolitical messianism, lost legitimacy. The 
centralization of state power affirmed the dominance of this politically inclusive and theologically 
exclusive ideology. Iranian and Jewish religio-political systems emerged because of the political and 
religious implications of modernity and in response to the colonization of the Middle East. In both cases 
their encounters with regional colonization united religious and non-religious groups and individuals 
around the ideas of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. 
 
In both cases, the inclusion of theology in revolutionary idealism was partly a response to regional 
colonization that both Iranian and Jewish clergy supported in order to prevent the integration of 
traditional power structures and values in secular states. The pre-state apolitical messianism 
theologically connected Iranians and Jewry to the states by mediation, as the authority of the clergy was 
not derived from their connection to a ruling power, but rather from their commitment to religious 
laws. According to apolitical messianism the concept of a politically legitimate state during the time of 
waiting was absurd. The existing political rules under which they lived were only conditionally accepted 
and their authority was limited to communal and family affairs. By connecting messianism to 
nationalism, they eradicated the possibility of apolitical messianism. Active messianism, which played a 
central role in legitimating the revolutions and post-revolutionary states, became a dominant theology. 
Revolutionary Messianism that encouraged Iran and Israel to form a state to fulfil a divine promise and 
sustain divine sovereignty over human life was inherently nihilistic and considered no option for 
resolving the politically oppressive situation. In the Revolutionary Phase, while revolutionary idealism 
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created a politically inclusive environment, active messianism limited theology in two ways. First, it 
rejected the existence of an apolitical theology and second, it limited both theologies to redemption 
theologies. 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to elaborate on the relationship between messianic theology and 
national unity in the Revolutionary Phase. It explored how in both cases Revolutionary Messianism was 
an example of Walter Benjamin’s re-reading of Marx’s historical materialism in which he suggested 
theology as the answer to Marx failure. In the case of Israel, a pre-state political authority created an 
inclusive religio-political system in which secular movements could gain momentum. Rabbi Kook’s 
view of a state and its messianic functions, in which the glory of the divine saviour was manifested in the 
body of the state, created a compromise political culture in the Revolutionary Phase, giving rise to a 
vibrant party politics. Revolutionary Messianism offered an inclusive political sphere for the 
development of collective national identity that included both the non-religious and religious voices. It 
formed a revolutionary identity for the members and attached their religious identity to the sacredness 
of the land, making it the dominant criteria for acknowledging an individual’s rights. The theological 
and political utopia expressed in their revolutionary ideals formed a political theology that affirmed the 
legitimacy of the revolution through a web of collective political and religious histories. 
 
In Israel and Iran, the revolutionary narrative of messianism achieved political legitimacy and positioned 
theology in everyday politics by separating its values from its traditional context and attaching to it new 
values, such as nationalism, for the purpose of revolutionary unity. When theology was reduced to one 
messianic narrative, it could become a means at the service of politics. Positioning messianism as the 
central narrative of legitimacy for revolution associated the historical realities of a political situation 
with messianism and the idea of progress to a theological utopia. The inconsistency between traditional 
messianic utopia and real politics, however, could potentially result in the de-sacralization and 
secularization of theology. The next chapter explores the link between politics, the diverse theological 
interpretations of religious texts, and the suppression of alternative readings of a sacred text in the 
Revolutionary Phase. Contrary to western institutional secularism in which states have progressed 
towards a pluralistic understanding of religion, in Iran’s and Israel’s post-revolutionary states 
Revolutionary Messianism dominated political debates and informed each state’s national religious 
identity. The establishment of a post-revolutionary state equally affected theology as it transformed the 
revolutionary into a securitized narrative of messianism. 
59  
Chapter 2- Hermeneutics of Sacred Texts  and Political legitimacy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Discussions in this chapter address the transformations of Revolutionary Messianism into a state political 
ideology with reference to Israel’s and Iran’s political and historical contexts. It studies the relationship 
between hermeneutics of sacred texts, clerical authority, esoteric and legalist approaches to messianism 
and state authority in both cases, in order to clarify the relationship between messianic idealism and 
nationalism in the Revolutionary Phase. This chapter suggests that this relationship characterizes the 
states’ position regarding the intrinsic contradictions between the theological legitimacy of traditional 
messianism, which intrinsically negates the establishment of a political state, and the political legitimacy 
of the post-revolutionary states. In the Revolutionary Phase, messianism offers a modern political 
response to the oppressive situation and mediates inherent tension between a pre-state theological 
concept of messianism and nationalism. In this phase, revolutionary idealism transforms messianism into 
the primary theological foundation for the legitimacy of a nationalist state. The success of the 
Revolutionary Phase, the legitimizing foundations for the states’ bureaucratic system, and the power of 
religious institutions all rest upon the relationship between esoteric and legalist messianism, and 
between the theological and the modern political concept of authority. 
 
 
This chapter contends that in both cases, in the Revolutionary Phase, the interpretation of messianism 
did not explicitly address the question of the role of religion in the post-revolutionary state but clearly 
asserted the goal of the Revolutionary Messianism in structuring a state based on religious legitimacy. 
The nationalist characteristics of these revolutions could adapt the bureaucratic structure of a nation 
state but the state legitimacy remained conditional upon the outcome of the dynamics between 
nationalism and messianism. The legitimization of the revolutions in the pre-state interpretation of 
messianism rested upon the approach that the revolutionary ideologues adopted towards the traditional 
understanding of sacred texts and the agent of messianism. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to show that in both cases, Revolutionary Messianism elicited a new theology 
based on traditional understanding of authority. To elaborate on the impacts of this theology on the 
concept of political authority in the phase of State Building, it is necessary to analyse the traditional Shi’a 
and Jewish theological notions of authority. In the section on hermeneutics, leadership, and agency, this 
chapter demonstrates that first, both traditions are flexible in generating revolutionary hermeneutics, 
yet maintain their authority and the authority of the text. Secondly, that the hermeneutics of both 
traditions create religious elites whose power is hermeneutic and is related to their interpretation of 
traditional materials. Thirdly, the importance of this understanding of authority is that it is never ideally 
fulfilled and the authority of the clergy is never complete. However, because of the open structure of 
60  
these hermeneutics, the clergy can claim religious and political authority. The theological treatment of 
the concept of authority has had immense weight in the political legitimacy of both states. In the section 
dealing with the esoteric and the legalist aspects of authority, this chapter presents an external 
framework to examine these traditions, rather than an internal one, as this provides a more analytic 
approach to clarifying the relationship between theological and political authorities in these states. 
 
Hermeneutics of Sacred Texts 
 
 
In their core philosophy Jewish and Shi’a messianism rely on the monotheistic cosmology in which 
divine determination instigates creation. The destiny of humanity, conceived as the ultimate goal of 
creation, is decided by God whose absolute power over time designates the course of history. This 
homocentric view of the world necessitates constant divine intervention in human affairs. As the 
ultimate product of creation, humanity’s innate ability in producing languages distinguishes their status 
from other creatures. Language is the intermediate agency for human involvement in the history 
determined by God. In this system, prophets are thus human agents whom God chose for their 
infallibility in understanding and transferring the divine message in words. According to this cosmology, 
no deviation from the original message occurs in the prophets’ understanding or in the transference of 
the message into linguistic form. The trustworthiness of the prophets in this process is the dominant 
feature for their selection, the main characteristic of Abrahamic prophets, and highly emphasized in the 
narratives of their life stories. Their trustworthiness preserves the sacredness of the message in its 
original totality and in sacred texts. 
 
In both traditions sacred texts are the vessels that contain the complete codes of creation and provide 
answers to existential and philosophical questions, but their comprehensive understandings are 
conditional upon human existence on earth which obstructs deciphering the definitive meaning of sacred 
texts. They acknowledge that on two levels the limited knowledge of humans creates a barrier for 
comprehending the true meaning of a text; first, in the process of understanding the texts, and secondly 
in transferring its message. To reduce the effect of these barriers a specialized group, the clergy, 
developed linguistic strategies to study sacred texts. The traditions acknowledged the fallibility of the 
clergy and their legitimacy was dependent on scholarly endeavours, the commitment expressed in their 
scholarly work, and their absolute loyalty to religious laws.219 The term in Persian and Hebrew for 
meaning, Ma’na, indicates discovering the enclosed message of the text. The tradition of tafsir 
(interpretation) includes contextualising sacred texts in order to generate the theological continuity and 
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legitimacy of historical events. They explain monotheistic cosmology and human/God relationships in 
this synchronism.220 
 
Rabbis and Shi’a ulama developed theological frameworks, implemented disciplinary strategies, and 
established religious educational institutions while simultaneously emphasising the education of 
individuals in formal reading.221 Although in the pre-Revolutionary Phase, one of the main tasks for 
rabbis and the ulama was instruction in the rituals of formal reading of sacred texts, they did not place 
emphasis on the teaching of exegesis or methods of interpretation in their public teachings. This was due 
to their belief that the meaning of a sacred text could not be disclosed by any individual or institution 
and comprehending its hidden meaning required discerning the net of meanings in symbols and signs 
that construct the texts. In the pre-Revolutionary Phase, the clergy did not apply informal reading, 
understanding a text as an indispensable component of reading, to sacred texts and religious institutions 
discouraged it.222 
 
The formal and ritualistic reading of the sacred text defined its distinct status in these religious traditions 
and stressed the status of agents who discerned the connotation of symbols and articulated the layers of 
meanings of the texts. The aim of studying sacred texts was to elaborate God’s political sovereignty by 
creating a semiotic association between language and history. Therefore, contextualization and 
interpretation constructed the political philosophy of Jewish and Shi’a theological thoughts. In addition to 
primary sources, recognizing the “true” meaning of a text in both traditions requires studying the existing 
interpretations of previous scholars within the fixed premise of a divinely determined history.223 
This approach distinguished divine sovereignty from human political authority, negated the latter and 
praised the former. Mastering the skills of understanding a sacred text gives the agents of interpretation 
a position of trustworthiness in using exegesis for decoding history. As Michael Mayer notes, 
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throughout the pre-modern era, Jewry believed that history was the place for God to determine the fate 
of his chosen people and Jewish historiography was a means through which they explained the will of 
God in diverse approaches.224 
 
Revolutionary Messianism deconstructed this understanding of history, human/God relations, and the 
process of interpretation. The translation of apolitical messianism into a revolutionary idealism led to the 
expression of messianic hope in nationalistic discourse and introduced the new factor of a state to their 
messianic theologies. It de-validated the differentiation between God’s sovereignty and human 
authority. Messianism in the pre-state phase solely explained the reasons for the failure to preserve the 
political authority of the religious communities, and recognized the will of God as the sole redeeming 
factor. The revolutionary idealism, however, transferred the responsibility of changing the course of 
history from God to humans. Instead of emphasising the importance of individual loyalty to a collective 
religious identity in delegitimizing the authority of a ruling political system, it focused on constructing a 
collective religio-political identity and a legitimate political system. 
 
The synchronic relationship between history and the people strengthened the authority of religious 
history through religious Zionism in Israel and an Islamic Republic in Iran. During the Revolutionary 
Phase this encouraged moderation with others within the revolutionary community. Although 
politically pragmatic, Revolutionary Messianism in both cases nationalised religious laws of purity, diet, 
initiation, rites of passages, and inter-communal economics. Revolutionary Messianism propagated an 
idealist vision of a religio-political state that could effectively replace the traditional agent based system. 
In this idealist vision, the state replaced the traditional religious agents for monitoring social and 
individual behaviours and implementing religious disciplinary methods. This state centred narrative of 
messianism negated the possibility of alternative theological interpretations, became the dominant 
messianic theology, and the only political discourse that could effectively limit the boundaries of 
interpretation. Revolutionary Messianism unified political groups around the goal of enacting economic 
and political justice and directed the interpretation of sacred texts towards legitimizing a state. 
 
Revolutionary Messianism fused various perspectives on the conditions and characteristics of the time 
and the agent of messianism and attributed a sense of sacredness to both geographical territory and the 
ideal of a utopian post-revolutionary state. This nationalist feature made the fulfilment of messianic 
promise conditional on human involvement in real politics. Although varied in symbols and structure, 
the theologians either developed interpretations of sacred texts which were adoptive of the nationalist 
discourse or limited their apolitical interpretations to the current political situation. In both cases these 
narratives were supportive of revolutions, extremely nationalistic, and emphasized at the core the 
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centralization of religious and political powers. Because of their inclusive nature, nationalist narratives 
attained public support and simultaneously extended the influence of religion from politicians and 
theologians to law makers, non-religious political groups, and apolitical religious citizens. 
 
Revolutionary Messianism transformed the traditional limitations of interpretation and placed the 
sacredness of land as an indispensable element for deciphering the messianic history. It deconstructed 
the traditional relationship between text and history that in the past had attributed to the text a higher 
status. Therefore, during the Revolutionary Phase an interpreter became an agent in the service of 
revolutionary ideals. The revolutionary interpretation of sacred texts thus focused on the relationship 
between the state, messianic history, and God. Theologians who had depicted historical moments in 
sacred texts in order to explain God’s power in determining the course of events, in the Revolutionary 
Phase, conceived them as evidence of the role of the community in changing its political situation. The 
theological disciplinary functions of sacred texts became extended to forming idealist visions of a 
utopian egalitarian state that would enforce religiously legitimate economic and political policies and 
encourage individual loyalty. Contrary to the pre-state narratives, in which passing the boundaries of 
human authority resulted in detrimental consequences, Revolutionary Messianism praised the 
formation of a powerful central state and the involvement of individuals in the revolution. 
 
Leadership and Agency 
 
 
In Jewish and Shi’a messianism, the Messiah’s lineage affirms his commitment in protecting the religion 
of his fathers. In Judaism, the Messiah is a descendant of King David through his paternal line.225 His 
lineage is accompanied by distinguished qualities that identify him as the indisputable legitimate political 
authority. 226 In Shi’ism, the divine saviour, the Mahdi, is the descendant of Mohammad through his 
paternal line, and will appear at the end of time to bring justice.227 He will be successful because God 
designates his “time” and guides him to rule. He will not receive revelations, however, with his infallible 
and divine knowledge he will open the gate of knowledge and renew his ancestors’ religion.228 
In both cases, traditionally, messianism created a unique approach towards the rise and decline of 
political powers in relation to religious identity, political authority, and economic prosperity. Relying 
on a complex net of historical, linguistic and political symbols, it outlined this political identity by 
defining the boundaries of the domestic and regional activities of the ruling power. Apolitical 
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messianism acknowledged and promoted a distinction between political authority and political 
legitimacy. Political authority, being both temporary and vulnerable, was illegitimate due to its human 
nature. The political legitimacy that belonged to God was both permanent and victorious and was 
expected to be implemented by the Messiah in its complete form. In the time of waiting, the clergy 
could enjoy political and religious legitimacy but were denied political authority. This contrast shaped 
the discourse of messianism and articulated the position of religious institutions in relation to the 
existing political system. They expressed their yearning for the time when these two would consolidate 
under the rule of the Messiah in religious literature. Religious institutions justified their apolitical 
position by expressing faith in the divine promise and used this interpretation as a survival and political 
strategy. 
 
As discussed above, in the Shi’a tradition of Tafsir (interpretation) the interpreter is an object of the text 
and exploits linguistic methodologies to describe verses in the Qura’n in relation to the contextual 
conditions in which the verse was revealed (Sha’n-e Nozol [conditions of revelation]).229 Since the 
medieval period, the ulama used Tafsir to attest to the existence of a divine saviour who would end the 
political oppression of the Shi’a community under the Sunni rule. A treatise by ‘allama al-Helli, a 
scholar in the 14th century, explained the necessity of Imamate, a divinely guided political leadership, as 
 
a requisite in human creation. 230   He categorized two “major” and “minor” premises to verify that the 
Imamat was one of the pillars of faith for Shi’a Muslims and to corroborate the existence of the twelfth 
Imam.231 The major premise in his argument referred to the realm of the metaphysic arguing that the 
Imamat was the only means to fulfil the aim of divinely designated history.232 The minor premise of the 
argument referred to politics and the necessity of social order. Like Thomas Hobbs, al-Helli considered 
a determined leadership essential for avoiding political and social anarchy.233 Lutf (God’s blessing), al- 
Helli noted, is the first proof for the existence of the twelfth Imam, since conforming to a political 
authority directs people to good behaviour.234 Hence, the political authority of any appointed leader is 
limited relative to the Imam, whose sovereignty is “incumbent” and able to recognize all aspects of evil. 
Al-Helli suggested that in the case of a concealed Imam the possibility of the end of occultation at any 
moment was a transcendental blessing for the faithful.235 Following a similar line of argument, Tabatabai, 
 
a prominent Alim (pl. ulama) in contemporary Shi’ism, stated that whether the twelfth Imam is known 
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or concealed, a world cannot exist without the presence of an Imam to comprehend the true meaning of 
religious laws and protect it.236 
 
In both cases, Revolutionary Messianism bridged the gap between these traditional narratives and 
nationalism, responded to the question of the legitimacy of a nation state, and directed the involvement 
of clergy in politics. In Iran, it temporarily resolved the historical disagreements between Absolutists 
and Constitutionalists and between Absolutists and nationalists by presenting an idealistic vision of an 
Islamic state in the 70s. The majority of ulama believed that any attempt in forming an Islamic state in 
during the time of the occultation was forbidden. Prior to the revolution, one of the main reasons why 
the ulama supported the monarchy was to avoid participation in politics. The ulama considered political 
participation an attachment to worldly affairs that disturbed the course of the divinely designated 
history.237 Contrary to the monarchical system, the formation of a parliament and a bureaucratic state 
would coerce them into being involved in politics as citizens and affect their power status as sources of 
emulation for the faithful.238 
 
The formation of a nation state could be an opportunity or a potential threat to the ulama’s religious 
legitimacy. Theologically, in a monarchical system there is no concept of citizenship and in fact, it 
discourages the political participation of the public. A culture of political participation would extend the 
responsibilities of the ulama as sources of emulation in giving advice and passing fatwas (religious creeds) 
in support of or against political groups. This political responsibility could associate the clergy to the 
centres of power, spread worldly ideologies in theological studies, and open a door for economic and 
political corruption. The question of political participation and the limits of the power of the ulama in 
the post-revolutionary state, however, remained unanswered during the Revolutionary Phase. 
Khomeini’s theory of Jurisprudential Leadership offered a solution to the ulama’s hesitation to 
participate politically as it idealized the accommodation of state policies within a religious legal 
framework.239 
Amongst Jewry, Ashkenazi rabbis encouraged the issue of political participation and presented 
theological justification for a nation state by messianism. Scholem distinguishes three schools within 
Rabbinic Judaism: conservative, restorative, and utopian.240 Conservatives assume a legalistic approach 
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and have contributed to the development of Halakhah, Restoratives strive for reviving the glorious era of 
religion, while utopians work for a utopian future. The conservatives, Scholem notes, did not play a part 
in the development of messianic ideas within Judaism, rather, they remained protective of Jewish life in 
exile.241 Scholem views the advancement of one group over others as closely connected to the changes in 
the European political environment and the emerging rationalism of modernity during the Middle 
Ages.242 He argues that the advancement of the restorative messianic ideas of Maimonides during the 
medieval period was closely connected to the situation of life in exile, however, the growing 
rationalization of Europe completely eradicated the restorative approach and interlinked Jewish messianic 
ideas with utopianism. According to Scholem, Hermann Cohen was the prominent scholar on 
messianism whose writings explicitly demonstrate the influence of modernity on messianic ideas. 243 
Cohen, in his essay titled “The Human Face, Anticipating a Future Prior to the Past”, rejects the idea of 
 
a restorative messianism and argues that Jewish messianic views should focus on the human universal 
condition and its redemption.244 
 
In Iran Revolutionary Messianism advanced the political status of the revolutionary ulama over both 
apolitical ulama and other revolutionary groups. Jewish Revolutionary Messianism attributed political 
power to culturally religious but politically secular intellectuals. The political environment in which 
these ideas flourished amongst Jewish intellectuals in Europe defined Revolutionary Messianism as a 
non-religious political ideology. The growing anti-Semitism in Europe and the rise of Nazism and 
Fascism that endangered the life of millions of European Jews saw the failure of enlightenment 
philosophy in fulfilling its egalitarian promise, but it did not impede the development of secular politics. 
Even Benjamin, who channelled messianic hope to political activism, remained faithful to secular 
politics. However, in both cases, Revolutionary Messianism identified a distinguished class for clergy 
based on individual support of the revolution rather than their religious authority. This was a radical 
change in the traditional role of the clergy and the first step for their involvement in state politics. 
 
In both cases, supporting the revolution was an individual responsibility that indicated both political and 
religious commitments. The strong religious component of Revolutionary Messianism also attributed a 
revered characteristic to the groups who supported the revolution and endeavoured for its success. The 
assumption that a revolutionary’s life is devoted to serve a metaphysical goal and to emancipate a group 
or a society from oppression attributes a non-beneficial character to the revolutionaries. Consequently, 
the revolutionary community evolved into a harmonious political unit with short term strategic alliances. 
 
Revolutionary Messianism in both cases mediated the intrinsic tension between the mythological 
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language of sacred texts and political language of nationalism. Contrary to what Benjamin believed, in 
neither of these cases could Revolutionary Messianism be limited to liberating the mythological 
language of messianism through a historical process, or rationalising messianism in ethical language as 
Hermann Cohen argued.245   In the political context Revolutionary Messianism translated the 
mythological language of redemption to the libration of individuals from political oppression by 
commitment to preserving the revolution’s nationalist idealism. This ideology that attributed a sacred 
character to the revolution affected and was affected by the two main schools of esoteric and legalist 
messianism. 
 
Esoteric Messianism versus Legalist Messianism 
 
 
The traditional framework of theological interpretation of sacred texts in both religions designated a 
space for the subjectivity of the interpreter. By indicating this space in naming a religious concept or 
elaborating on the meaning of sacred texts, the subjectivity of the object and the subject were connected 
and crystallised. It acknowledged the paradox between the context-bound meaning and the “true” 
meaning of the texts free from any context. As a result of this acknowledgement interpreters were 
permitted to use logic and philosophy as a means of interpretation.246 Revolutionary Messianism 
redirected the main focus of the interpretation of messianism by creating a unanimous subjectivity for 
interpreters who eagerly supported the formation of a state. Their interpretation of messianic literature 
thus became an attempt to discern a national history, which was described in the text, and to 
understand the past in relation to their political present.247 Attributing a mythological value to the 
 
revolution was the result of the merging of the legalistic and mystical schools of interpretation. 
Legalistic and mystical approaches towards hermeneutics of sacred texts share some fundamental 
premises in their scholarship, nonetheless their understandings of messianic doctrine are often 
contradicting. They both agree indisputably that the divine source of sacred texts grants a divine 
character through a mystical dimension, to the texts. They disagree however, over the conditions of 
interpretation, the limits of human knowledge, and the methods through which the secrets of sacred 
texts could be realised. 
The legalists, who formed the majority of the clergy, interpreted the texts in relation to the existing 
historical situation and employed philosophical methods within the framework of religion to 
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contextualise the divine order for human life.248 The process of legalistic interpretation that they used 
for explaining religious laws incorporated the appropriation of historical events within a greater religious 
context.249 Similarly to the Jewish tradition, the legalist Shi’a ayatollahs were not involved in esoteric 
interpretation of messianic debates.250 In both traditions, mystic commentaries regarding messianic 
theology have been either apocalyptic or utopian but all considered humans to be involved in the divine 
plan, or at least capable of deciphering its time and condition. During the pre-state phase, legalists 
opposed the mystic messianic claims, generally cooperated with the ruling power, and were involved in 
communal political affairs. They explained their social and at times political, involvement as an 
inevitable task that ensured the survival of the community and the religion. They acknowledged God as 
the sole agent of history and human involvement in changing political authority unproductive, even 
destructive. Pragmatic legalistic scholars debated the textual meaning of sacred texts in relation to the 
context of the socio-political situation.251 
 
Parallel to the legalist school in both traditions a mystical school of messianism had been developed 
where scholars viewed sacred texts as windows to the divine.252 Mystics attempted to look into the 
divine through the text rather than appropriating sacred texts to the context of the socio-political 
situation for legal injunctions. For them, a sacred text did not only reveal law for human life, it also 
revealed the divine in its mystical code.253 The mystical approach signified a legalistic component and 
their followers were committed and at times were even more passionate than the legalists, about 
religious regulations. They were esoteric and attempted to discern the signs and conditions of the time 
of the messiah by using semiotics and numerology.254 Their followers assumed their masters to have a 
direct relationship with the divine through their visions and dreams. Mystics considered commentaries 
of previous mentors as sacred and attributed numerical value to these texts to predict the time of the 
coming of the messiah.255 
The “codes” in sacred texts represent an enigmatic “true” meaning and could only be interpreted by an 
agent with specific characteristics whose endeavour in understanding the divine fostered a metaphysical 
relationship between the agent and God. The relationship between the inner and literal meanings of 
sacred texts had political and social implications for the understanding of messianism. In the pre- 
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Revolutionary Phase, in times of political upheavals when the community desperately needed a messiah, 
mystics became charismatic/messianic leaders and heroes. They had idealist visions, practiced asceticism, 
and preferred revolution to reform. They were not pragmatic in their political view towards political 
authority and were either completely apolitical or revolutionary. The coexistence of these contrasting 
modes of thinking was possible due to the apolitical messianic doctrine of the legalists. It provided a 
pluralistic theological sphere where these schools could flourish and a space for the articulation of their 
views in writings. Being connected to the political authority by association freed both mystics and 
legalists from concerns over appropriating communal laws to state politics. The mystical component of 
the text and the significance of the agent of interpretation are fundamental reasons for the existence of 
these schools. 
 
The esoteric philosophy that mystics have recorded in literature heavily relies on attributing sacredness 
to great mentors.256 Traditionally, they reported the miraculous deeds of their prominent religious 
figures and discouraged intellectual debates. In the Shi’a mystic tradition of Erfan and the Jewish 
tradition of Kabbalah, mystics are regarded as holders of the divine light (blessing) on earth.257 In some 
literature the existence of the world in each generation relies on the existence of a group of mentors 
whose status guarantees the continuation of God’s blessing, thus their knowledge is superior to 
humans.258 This outlook is the outcome of their messianic doctrine and their expression of redemption 
in one human agent. For mystics who believed in a messiah who is a male and well-versed in the texts, 
means potentially each prominent mystic master could have divine attributes. In both traditions, the 
records of their miracles indicate an innate capability that resembles the prophets’ trustworthiness in 
transferring God’s message in its totality.259 
 
Kabbalah, the mystic sect of Judaism, flourished in the early thirteenth century and was led by Rabbi 
Isaac ben Abraham who criticised the teaching of Law of the legalist Maimonides.260 The Kabbalist sect 
developed through the attempts of Nachmanids and followers of Girona during and after the thirteenth 
century. It created a religious system based on personal knowledge and experiences of wise sages.261 
The flourishing of various Jewish mystic traditions from the sixteenth century until the eighteenth 
 
century was the result of the autonomy that the Jewish communities experienced during this time and 
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ended with the division of Poland between Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the late eighteenth century.262 
 
As the Jewish centres declined in Spain and Germany, the centre of Jewish mysticism was transferred to 
Poland.263 Moshe Idel notes that early Hassidic masters in the late seventeenth century were influenced 
by Moshe Cordovero’s understanding of prayer in metaphysical terms, the spread of divine blessing 
through letters and the sounds of the prayer.264 Influential mystics like Rabbi Yisrael ben Eliezer, the 
Besht, were recorded as masters with the power of healing that they gained from using sacred names. 
This approach significantly influenced Hasidism and their perception of uttering sacred names with 
divine power for healing through concentration and pronunciation of letters and sounds.265 The 
nineteenth century witnessed the rise of rationalism and the spiritual traditions of Kabbalah and 
Hasidism were marginalised and practiced by only small groups of Jews across Europe. 
 
 
Here it is worth mentioning the difference between Scholem’s representation of Jewish mysticism and 
Moshe Idel’s. To Scholem and the intellectuals of his time, all forms of Jewish legalistic and mystic 
traditions could flourish intellectually when the goal of Zionism would be fulfilled.266 His strong 
nationalist sentiments shaped his view on Jewish messianism and mysticism. Moshe Idel in his study of 
Kabbalah writes that Scholem’s definition of Jewish mysticism underestimated the anthropocentric, 
individualistic, and ecstatic characteristics of Jewish mysticism. 267 Scholem’s definition, Idel notes, 
limited Kabbalah to the canonical, pluralistic, and less mystical forms of Jewish mysticism.268 Scholem’s 
description of the pluralistic characteristics of Zionism was in the tradition of Benjamin, Buber, Kafka 
and many other German intellectuals who although each analysed Jewish messianism from different 
angles they all agreed that it provided answers to the two threats that targeted the Diaspora: assimilation 
and anti-Semitism. For religiously observant intellectuals like Scholem messianism guaranteed the 
continuation of Jewish traditions and for the secularists like Benjamin it offered spiritual emancipation. 
However, in both cases they understood this continuation and emancipation to be conditional on the 
staging of a revolution against the apolitical messianic tradition. Scholem argued that Revolutionary 
Messianism offered a better environment to most apolitical mystics and Halakhah sects regardless of 
their political affiliation, bridged the gap between legalist and mystic messianism, and cultivated the 
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process of political unification.269 Rabbi Kook’s religious Zionism was an example of this pluralistic 
characteristic.270 
 
Rabbi Kook’s writings on the issue of the migration of secular Jews from Europe and his view on the 
fulfilment of Tiqun Olam (putting the world in the right order) demonstrates that the mystical power of 
the pre-state traditions was channelled through the theological legitimization of a political state. For 
Rabbi Kook the state of Israel was a preparation state for the messianic age.271 The state of Israel in his 
view aimed to bring “the Light of Repentance”.272 With its redemptive nature it could fulfil the mitzvah 
of Tiqun Olam.273  Each of these concepts had been central to different Jewish traditions. Lurian 
Kabbalism’s concept of Tiqun Olam was associated with the Halakhik idea of repentance, and messianic 
ideologies that most of the other traditions shared.274 Kook strongly believed in progressive messianism 
and considered the state of Israel to be the window of a global messianic liberation which could only 
materialize following the migration of Jews to the holy land and the establishment of a powerful and 
independent state.275 He understood the completion of the messianic age to be interlinked with the 
ethical and political behaviour of human beings and the coexistence of the religious with non-religious 
Jewish migrants to Israel its theological necessity. 276 
 
The Shi’a mystic tradition is an agent based system in which comprehending the inner layer of a text 
through interpretation of its symbols is impossible without the mentoring of a master.277 Sufi masters of 
the time clearly stated this theological approach in their writings that dominated mysticism in the 
medieval era. Farid edin Attar Neyshabouri, a prominent (Aref) mystic at the time, in his book 
“Tadhkirat al-awliya” (biographies of the Saints-11th century), gathered recordings of the visions and 
“miracles” of the mystics of his time and connected their “miracles” to their religious devotion that made 
their living experience infused with the longing for unity with God.278 The mystics were advocates of an 
uncompromising faith and for them, faith superseded pragmatism.279 Their devotion to the path that 
their mentor specified took precedence over obeying the social norms. They believed that there was a 
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possibility for establishing direct contact with the divine through visions. This was the result of the 
absolute faith and dedication of one’s life to abstinence, in order to detach one’s self from the material 
world.280 Rationalizing religious commandments and debating Shari’a were earthly concerns and could 
lead one astray from the truth of the text and the light of God.281 
 
Contrary to the legalistic ulama whose debates about Shari’a comprised the main component of their 
methodology, mystics believed in the concept of the “Perfect Man”.282 In the seventeenth century, 
Mullah Sadra was the founding philosopher of Shi’a mysticism in Iran. He instigated a radical change in 
the understanding of Shi’a messianism which had been assumed to materialize when the world was 
unjust and chaotic. Sadra’s conception of history and thus messianism was progressive. He considered 
the redemption of humans possible during the time of occultation as one reached the status of a “Perfect 
man”.283 Prophets, Imams, and their companions were the examples of the Perfect Man, whose esoteric 
knowledge distinguished them from ordinary man.284 Sadra who was significantly influenced by the 
Platonic idea of the philosopher king viewed redemption as only possible under a utopian (Madineh 
Fazelleh) political system in which the Perfect Man rules. 285 For mystics, the perfection of a spiritual 
existence was possible only by gaining esoteric knowledge. 286   It required detachment from the material 
 
world and contradicted political activism which was associated with the emotional attachment to an 
ideology. During the time of the Safavids, occasionally, the ulama declared the mystics heretics or 
staged attacks against them to “cleanse” the Shi’a religion from heresy. However, by the time of the 
Safavids the mystics enjoyed a relatively peaceful era.287 
 
The Shi’a political culture that the Safavids (1501 to 1722 CE) implemented was influenced by their Sufi 
background. 288   Similar to other mystic traditions, Sufis highly respected their leaders and attributed 
miraculous deeds to them. The monarchs developed powerful theological centres for Shi’a ulama, 
supervised the performance of religious rituals, gave sermons, and answered political problems by 
revealing secrets in their dreams and visions.289 The places the monarch resided, the food they touched, 
and the land they walked on were considered to contain healing and blessing powers. During the time 
of the Safavids the kings introduced mysticism to state politics and Shi’a scholars were expected to be 
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respected in the same manner as a Sufi monarch.290 The monarchs sponsored national praying sessions 
for the coming of the twelfth Imam. Most sermons ended with the praying for the health and the 
coming of the Mahdi in order to strengthen the public power of his representatives during the time of 
occultation.291 
 
Safavids considered the Shah to be a mystic with political and religious authority. 292 His distinguished 
status gave him ultimate power over the ulama, the mystics, and the public.293 Shah Ismael Safavi viewed 
Shi’a apolitical messianism as a great political tool for igniting an uprising against the Ottoman 
Empire.294 For the first time, Shi’a scholars, who joined forces with Shah Ismael, argued that, in the 
 
time of the occultation obeying a caliph would be haram (prohibited) which negated the existence of any 
legitimate Islamic state during this time.295 In reality they preferred a Shi’a monarchy with close political 
and economic ties to and in control of Shi’a leaders and their educational centres. Safavids who claimed 
to follow the model of Ali’s caliphate announced Shi’a Islam as the official religion and encouraged the 
expansion of Shi’a educational institutions.296 
 
During the Qajar monarchy the role of the Shi’a ulama was to support the monarch and guarantee their 
group interests. 297   Contrary to the Safavids, Qajar kings did not claim divine power or a mystic lineage, 
and thus were less threatening to the ulama.298 During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, secular 
nationalism achieved support from intellectuals but conservative ulama like Nouri vehemently opposed 
them. Following the Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of the Pahlavi monarchy, the 
majority of ulama attempted to maintain the status quo by continuing their existence as a social 
institution.299   In addition to many economic and political reasons, the ulama became involved in 
political activism as an inevitable consequence of the Constitutional Revolution. Although the state 
remained a monarchy during the Pahlavi era, modern political ideas flourished in Iran. 300 The 
emergence of diverse underground political parties made the implementation of a one party political 
system of the monarchy vulnerable to liberal democratic ideas.301 The more the Shah limited political 
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freedom, the more revolutionary ideas spread throughout society. Religious groups became the 
dominant voices in the revolution due to the suppression of any other political groups.302 
 
Revolutionary Messianism in Iran mediated the inherent tension between the legislative and mystical 
approaches to messianism and united both groups. Khomeini studied Islamic mysticism (Erfan) and was 
conscious of the mystic approaches to religious mentoring.303 Although he remained a legalistic jurist his 
view was a combination of both traditions.304 He respected Sadra’s view on the metaphysical 
relationship between Allah and devoted ayatollahs but did not consider any exceptional innate power to 
be influential in the position of a Jurisprudential Leader.305 He considered the clergy the best reference 
for political authority, not because of some mystical or direct relationship with the divine, but because 
he believed they had the best knowledge of religious laws, were detached from earthly interests, and 
could not be tempted by worldly lures. 306 Following the mystic tradition of the Safavids, Khomeini 
viewed political power a vital factor for ending the time of the occultation. He connected the coming of 
the Mahdi to the success of the revolution and a proceeding phase that perfected the post-revolutionary 
state.307 For Khomeini, the legitimacy of a political system was directly related to the legitimacy of the 
agent of power. His theory reflected the utopian vision of the Shi’a mystics rather than a vision of an 
absolutist Shari’a based state. After the success of the revolution, however, he strongly increased the 
power of the legalist ulama, rejected esoteric knowledge, and isolated secular nationalists.308 The 
exclusivist nature of this messianic narrative during the time of Khomeini gradually developed the 
theory of Jurisprudential Leadership into a theory of “absolute” Jurisprudential Leadership and altered 
the nature and conditions of the position. 
 
Therefore, in both the Israeli and Iranian cases, in the Revolutionary Phase, Revolutionary Messianism 
was theologically dependant on messianic doctrine for legitimacy and the revolutionaries considered the 
success of the revolution and the establishment of a state as the only redemptive political model. A 
religio-political state offered a safeguard against the destruction of religious traditions and values in the 
process of assimilation in secular politics and culture. It validated the necessity of political participation 
of clergy in a state, a system that had been traditionally illegitimate. Modern politics involved the 
participation of religious institutions in everyday politics, thus reducing their political autonomy. While 
the traditional account of messianism acknowledged a commitment to religious laws and faith in God as 
sufficient political activities in the pre-messianic age, Revolutionary Messianism strongly encouraged 
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political activism. In its progressive assumption of messianism, it legitimized the formation of a state as 
the only appropriate response to political injustice. This shifting of the reference of authority to 
revolutionary agents made it an exclusivist theology. 
 
In Israel, Revolutionary Messianism shifted the reference of authority from apolitical to political 
messianism. The agent of the messianic age became the state, and the responsibilities of the Messiah 
became the responsibilities of the Knesset and the judiciary system. The fulfilment of spiritual 
redemption and a messianic utopia were both connected to the success of the nationalist revolution and 
the incorporation of messianic theology into pragmatic policies. It transformed the concept of a 
redeeming “time” from a climatic historical event to a progressive process where the political and 
spiritual dimensions of redemption developed into an ideal unity within a bureaucratic political system. 
A consequence of ending political oppression would be the redemption of individuals and could only 
materialize in the context of national unity. Political redemption, as a preparatory phase of messianic 
redemption, would be achievable through state policies, as well as through demonstrating one’s self- 
disciplined commitment to the fulfilment of revolutionary goals. Therefore, from a legalistic 
perspective, these elements theologically justify the establishment of a nation state. Revolution itself 
was then a blessing bestowed by God that would hasten the progress of human history and would bring 
about the messianic age. Political activism substituted the mystical dimension of redemption, which had 
been the dominant approach in pre-modern active messianism. Revolutionary Messianism encouraged 
fundamental changes in the relationship between esoteric and legalistic traditions. 
 
The pluralistic approach to messianism found in pre-state traditions incorporated aspects of extremely 
utopian, conservative, and apocalyptic narratives of messianism. The revolutionary agents limited this 
approach to their progressive utopian idealism. In Iran, they linked the legitimacy of JLSHtheory to the 
Shi’a mystic progressive view of history and the Perfect Man. In this interpretation of messianism 
human beings are not only involved but also play a major role in determining the end of history. 
Accordingly, Khomeini considered the ulama as the agents of political order who were responsible to 
implement Shari’a during the time of occultation and thus he strongly opposed apolitical messianism. In 
Israel, both religious and non-religious groups considered the victory of Zionism as the beginning of a 
distinguished era and incomparable with any other historical events in Jewish history. In both post- 
revolutionary states, the main political function of the revolution was to implement justice and to 
prepare for the fulfilment of the divine promise which only political activism could ensure. 
 
The revolutionary context altered the role of individual clerics in traditional religious communities and 
encouraged the involvement of non-clerical individuals in theology. It bound the interpretation of 
sacred texts to a specific political idealism. In the process of interpretation, it created a symbolic past in 
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relation to the political present and offered a religio-political utopian vision of the future. This 
revolution-bound history became the source of political legitimacy for the states and the national identity 
of citizens. It shaped a framework for articulating the present political situation in two parallel worldly 
and messianic histories. The infusion of these histories attributed a sacred character to the revolutions 
and the states that followed. A rich history of mystical tradition, its language and symbolism further 
legitimized the political authority of the agents of revolutions. This transformation justified a secretive 
dimension in the post-revolutionary states’ politics which was reflected in the ideological tensions over 
the conditions and limits of the power of the state. 
 
Utopia and Economic Justice 
 
 
Prior to the formation of the state of Israel, the Jewish Diaspora had some economic autonomy and was 
actively involved in local and regional economic growth and trade under various political rules. The 
abstraction of political messianism allowed Jewish communities to maintain their loyalty to their cultural 
identity and allowed for the separation between religious and political authority. Separation from 
political power gave them independence in education and judicial issues.309 Similarly, until the beginning 
of the rule of the Safavids, Shi’ites adopted apolitical messianism in order to be excused from taking 
political action against the Sunni Caliphs, although they did express their disagreement with the 
Caliphate in principal.310 The majority of the Shi’a ulama during the Qajar era maintained this 
theological position. 311 Throughout the rule of both the Safavids and the Qajar, feudalism dominated 
local economies. 312 Parallel to the development of the feudal model in rural areas, Iranians were 
involved in trade which they had developed for centuries by the Silk Road and Iran’s geographical 
position. 
In the Jewish rural Diaspora and Iran’s rural areas, the control of social and political affairs was in the 
hands of religious figures. In trade centres the possibility of monitoring individuals was limited. 
Although in the pre-modern cities members of different religious communities lived in exclusive urban 
quarters their occupations required contact with members of other faiths and ethnicities. 313 There were 
strict religious rules on inter-community, trade and economic activities, but such rules did not apply to 
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outside activities.314 Apolitical messianism produced a religious system that integrated communal 
 
politics and everyday life.315 It opened secular political and economic spheres for individuals, specifically 
in urban areas and trade cities. Economically, this secular economic sphere facilitated interactions with 
other communities. Traders and businessmen connected different agrarian communities with each other 
and connected these communities with urban centres.316 
 
For Iranian and Jewish communities, economic relations were the decisive factor in appropriating 
political changes and defining the class status of individuals within the community.317 The existence of a 
secular public sphere in which economic ideas flourished, created a different circumstance in the Middle 
East than that of Europe. As Weber argued, the formation of secular states in Europe and the rise of 
capitalist economy were significant consequences of modernity and formed a secular multi-communal 
economic and political structure.318 This secular (non-religious) economic situation however, had 
existed in the Middle East for millennia.319 Therefore, both religious traditions theologically accepted 
 
and supported the adaptation of some aspects of the modern economy. Ironically, Revolutionary 
Messianism instigated transformation in the traditional politics of economic relations. During the 
revolution, the ideas of an economically egalitarian utopia in messianism attracted the revolutionists to 
Marxism and socialism and in effect limited the existing economic spheres. 
 
Economic justice, which had been inclusive in messianic redemption, became a communal and 
individual ideal which revolutionists fervently attempted to materialize in revolution. Although the 
Marxist anti-religious ideologies were not highlighted in Zionism, and neglected in the Communist 
Party in Iran, both revolutionary groups incorporated Marx’s ideas of economic and political justice, 
class struggle, and the liberation of labor from the economic status quo in their ideologies. Marxism 
contributed to mobilizing ideologues in both traditions who considered a nation state to be the only 
adequate response to colonization. As Israel Kolatt notes, throughout the last century Marxism has 
significantly influenced the history of Judaism.320 It has addressed the issue of the survival of the Jews 
within capitalist Europe, where their economic activities were gradually limited.321   In Israel, it shaped 
the structure of Kibbutzim and legitimized the Labor Party as the founders of the future state.322 In Iran, 
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it produced revolutionary ideologues such as Jallal Al-Ahmad and Ali Shari’ati who opposed the shah for 
his economic policies that they claimed had created injustice, instigated class struggle, and oppressed 
various political groups.323 
 
The centralization of the economy led to the further integration of messianic ideology with bureaucratic 
politics. Revolutionary Messianism redefined Marx’s view of economic relations as a relationship 
between the state and individuals within a political framework. The notion of redemption added 
economic responsibilities to the responsibility of revolutionaries and increased the power of the post- 
revolutionary states. In this economic context Revolutionary Messianism bound economic activity with 
nationalist and religious idealism. All political groups involved in the revolutions strived for a Marxist 
economic utopia and elaborated their goals in its symbolic and theological terms.324 In the case of Iran, 
Khomeini denied any association between his vision of an Islamic state and Marxism and disagreed with 
the spread of communism and the influence of leftist parties on Iran’s politics while his economic policies 
reflected those of Marxism.325 In Israel, the majority of settlers attempted to convince the religious 
communities to coexist with the Marxists and secular national Zionists and strongly supported the 
integration of socialism in state politics.326 In both cases the implementation of economic justice 
remained one of the main goals of the revolutions and a precondition for the messianic age. 
 
In addition to these intellectual influences, both Iranian and Israeli politics during the 1960s and 70s 
witnessed the rise of communist political parties who attempted to replicate Russian communism. Iran 
shared a border with the former USSR and Israel experienced an influx of immigrating Russian Jews to 
Israel following the World Wars. The communist party in Iran was formed in the early 1940s under the 
influence of Russian communism but officially declared their connections with Russia in the early 60s.327 
They were nationalists and the party announced itself a supporter of Islam, with a majority of members 
calling themselves Muslims.328 Kolatt details the power Russian Marxism had on Zionism by focusing on 
the labor workers’ movement, the Bund, which formed during the late nineteenth century.329 This 
movement became the forerunner in the battle for redemption.330 While, as Kolett notes, the 
fundamental difference between Zionism and traditional Marxism was included in their view on 
nationalism and territorial concentration, in Iran the main challenge was the Marxist attitude towards 
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religion. As Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr note, the main task of revolutionary religious thinkers like 
 
Shari’ati was to appropriate Marxist ideas to the Shi’a political system.331 
 
 
Nationalist Marxism was formed within a specific historical context, at a time when both Jewish and 
Shi’a traditions suffered from the consequences of colonialism and imperialism. The formation of nation 
states in the Middle East de-legitimized the existing political and economic relations within these 
societies and instigated a rethinking of Marxism within a practical political context. The development of 
secularism in Middle Eastern politics limited the communal power of religious figures and involved 
them in practical political debates. This process of appropriation shaped the ideological identity of post- 
revolutionary states in Israel and Iran. The amalgamation of nationalist, revolutionary, and messianic 
ideology made the establishment of religio-political states possible and involved religious figures in real 
political debates on secularism, secularization, and political participation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has explained the complex web of hermeneutics, history, and political authority within the 
Revolutionary Phase in both Jewish and Shi’a traditions. It has discussed how the combination of secular 
nationalism and a revolutionary narrative of messianism created the foundation of religio-political states 
and explained how understanding history through a nationalistic interpretation of the sacred texts 
transforms Revolutionary Messianism into a practical political ideology. The ideal of a nation state 
directs theology towards real politics and reduces messianism to a particular political ideology. The aim 
of this chapter was to show that Revolutionary Messianism creates historical change through the re- 
reading of theological history, re-defining the role of the hermeneutics of the sacred texts in historical 
changes, and legitimizing a nation state. In the Revolutionary Phase, Revolutionary Messianism 
dominated modern theological debates because it included elements from esoteric and legalist 
messianism. Connecting redemption to political sovereignty relates the historical event of the 
revolution to both spiritual and political messianism. This chapter identified the elements that shaped the 
dominant theological and political structure of the Revolutionary Phase based on the transformation of 
pre-modern messianism to this specific nationalist and revolutionary ideology with utopian economic 
and political ideals. 
 
Although different in some aspects, Jewish and Iranian revolutionary intellectuals highly admired the 
Marxist revolutionary ideology and included its economic egalitarianism in their ideals. It bound their 
understanding of a revolution to modern interpretations of politics. Contrary to Marx’s ideal revolution, 
however, it attributed an advantageous political status to religious institutions over other political 
groups. The unification of these ideas limited the non-religious economic sphere which had existed in 
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both traditions. In both cases the discourse of the religious revolutionary forces indicated that in order 
for the continued existence of religious traditions, they would have to work under a bureaucratic 
national political system. Apolitical theological approaches towards messianism were increasingly 
marginalised. The incorporation of nationalist and anti-colonial language in Revolutionary Messianism 
demanded a fundamental change in the existing political system in order to implement revolutionary 
ideals of political freedom, stop oppression, and bring about economic justice. This utopian vision of the 
nationalist revolutionary ideology reflected ideas of liberation found in socialist and communist 
revolutionary ideologies. These political demands united nationalist and religious groups. Revolutionary 
Messianism transformed the traditional intellectual relationship between mystics and legalists with 
regard to the limits of political activism, removed the limits of political involvement of religious figures, 
and legitimized political participation. 
 
The next chapter discusses the political implications of the transformation of Revolutionary Messianism 
on religious centres and the state. It studies how during the State-Building Phase of these post- 
revolutionary states, national and regional circumstances and the centrality of Revolutionary Messianism 
in political debates inevitably suppressed philosophical debates over the source of legitimacy and the 
religious identity of the states. The unification effect of Revolutionary Messianism eradicated the 
possibility of political tensions and allowed the establishment of state institutions. The political 
implications of Revolutionary Messianism, the next chapter argues, were not limited to the source of 
state legitimacy, but shaped the states’ legal framework and party politics. In Iran and Israel this 
legitimized the bureaucratic structure of the administrations and gradually strengthened the power of 
the state institutions. Although traditional apocalyptic messianism legitimized the revolutionary 
interpretation of messianism neither of the states became involved in theological debates on messianism 
or the conditions and nature of the “End Time”. The process of state building transformed messianism 
from an apocalyptic doctrine to a progressive political one in which the legitimacy of messianic doctrine 
is conditional upon the success of the state building process. 
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Chapter 3: From  an Imaginary State to a Political State:  Securitization of Revolutionary 
 
Messianism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The success of Revolutionary Messianism in terminating an existing political system obligates 
revolutionaries to secure and institutionalise the revolution’s ideals in social, political, and economic 
contexts in order to accommodate religion and politics in post-revolutionary state identity. In both case 
studies the State-Building Phase was dominated by situations of military conflict. Developing under the 
shadow of the Cold War, securing revolutionary ideals and fulfilling their goals through the 
construction of strong nationalistic and religious military discourse has defined the messianic identity of 
Israel and Iran. Instead of politicising religion or creating a theocracy, the focus of the State-Building 
Phase became the securitization of Revolutionary Messianism .332 
 
Barry Buzan, in his Security Complex theory in 1983, offered a different approach to studying security 
and threats.333 Buzan suggested that instead of analysing whether something is an objective threat it is 
important to study the process through which an issue becomes a security threat or loses its primacy in 
the security discourse of the state. If an issue becomes a security threat it is securitized and if it loses its 
importance in the security discourse it becomes de-securitized. The difference between politicization 
and securitization, he argues, is the sense of emergency attached to the topic of securitization that 
demands instant action for dealing with an existential threat, a threat that targets that existence of a 
state or a group of people, whether towards a state or environment. There are three foundational 
factors in the securitization process. The first is the securitizing actor or the authority that makes the 
securitizing claim, whether in the form of statements or movements. The second is the referent object 
which Buzan defines as the object (abstract or physical) that requires protection and is threatened. The 
third is audience or those that a securitizing actor aims to convince and unite. This chapter focuses on 
the referent object and draws on Buzan’s theory to discuss the process through which Revolutionary 
Messianism became the rationale for identifying security threats and for dealing with those threats. It 
shows how the conflict situations in these states linked national security to political legitimacy by placing 
 
Revolutionary Messianism as the referent object of their securitization projects. 
 
Throughout the Cold War the securitization discourse in Iran and Israel and the ideals of their 
Revolutionary Messianism reflected the ideological battle between the United States of Amercia and the 
former USSR over political and economic justice. While in Israel the discourse of securitization adopted 
a different theme as the country moved from conventional conflict with Arab states to battles with 
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various Palestinian militias in the later 70s, it remained orientated towards military and securitized state 
politics. In Iran, the success of the revolution and the politics of the Cold War resulted in the country’s 
involvement in a war with Iraq for almost a decade and the state securitization of its authority. The 
process of State Building resulted in the successful establishment of the states’ political legitimacy 
through the securitization of Revolutionary Messianism. The importance of this chapter is to 
demonstrate the structure of the states and the particular stories which developed with Revolutionary 
Messianism. In both the national account of the state raises historical claims that make the state the 
response to Jewish and Shi’a histories of political oppression. The significance of this narrative is 
necessarily drawn to the past and because the past is revolutionary, the revolutionary messianic themes 
are woven into real politics. This chapter discusses this legitimation process within the different 
contexts of colonization and the Cold War and the roles they played in the legitimacy and development 
 
of these states in the State-Building Phase. 
 
 
The conflict situation in these post-revolutionary states created a military orientated government with an 
elite leadership. The new elite were revolutionary agents who endeavoured to secure the ideals of 
Revolutionary Messianism. This chapter discusses how the securitization of Revolutionary Messianism 
generates a different definition of state identity from secular states and theocracies. By studying Israel’s 
political situation throughout the Cold War, it aims to explain the elements that transformed 
Revolutionary Messianism into Securitized Messianism and to highlight the factors that channelled the 
legitimacy of the revolution into the body of the state. In Iran’s case, I discuss how the process of 
securitization defined the Islamic Republic’s power structure within that of the Cold War. In both cases 
the ruling elites of the new system were limited to those who were either associated with the conflict or 
the founders of the revolution. The Politicised Messianism that emanated from the securitization 
process also reduced the understanding of religion by religious institutions to their political 
environments. This process dominated the states’ political factionalism and the discourse of national 
security. It dictated the states’ definition of religion and politics. Far from the utopia that the revolution 
had promised, post-revolutionary Securitized Messianism became both politically and religiously limited 
to the process of securitization. 
 
Post-revolutionary securitization was not exclusively a state political project but involved religion and 
religious agents, revolutionaries, and various social groups. At the State-Building Phase, they were 
similar to secular states in regarding the state as the ultimate agent for identifying and dealing with 
security threats. They differed from secular states in distinguishing religious threats from political ones. 
In Israel, Zionism substituted for Judaism and in Iran the Islamic Republic substituted for Shi’ism. 
Together with religious and political responsibilities, the security responsibilities of these states 
extended beyond the limits of a secular state and extended into religion. It is throughout the process of 
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the securitization that these states accommodated bureaucratic institutions. The conflict situation 
dominated the relationship between the state and its institutions by defining the new national identity 
and leadership structure in a particular way in order to secure revolutionary ideals and legitimize the 
discourse of the revolutionary agents as the only adequate response to any existential security threat. 
 
The Role  of War in State Legitimization in Israel and Iran 
 
 
This section explains how theological discourses in both states addressed the justification of the wars 
 
that each post-revolutionary state faced soon after their establishment. It argues that both Iran and Israel 
considered their wars not only a reaction to a political security threat but as an inevitable component of 
the materialization of theological promises and an existential threat to the security of religion. It was 
because of this approach to war that religious figures were involved in providing a theological 
justification for the states’ engagement in a military conflict. In addition, the atrocity of war, suffering 
and oppression in both theological traditions are inevitable conditions of human existence, but the war 
could be highly praised if the faithful endured the suffering on the way to protecting religion or if it 
could hasten the holy war. In Israel, all the wars were theologically justified by virtue of the biblical 
covenant between Abraham and God in which God bestowed the sovereignty over the land of Zion to 
Abraham. This biblical narrative on territory formed the foundations of Ze’ev Jabotinsky and his 
revisionist followers during the 1948 conflict.334 Following the Six Days War conflict the radical 
political group Kach, who insisted on the transport of the Arab population of Israel to other Arab 
 
countries, claimed their policy to be based on the biblical covenant and the repeated theme of holy war 
in the Bible.335 There are some intrinsic theological values in war, especially the manner in which the 
Bible depicts God as a warrior who either defeats the army of an enemy without the help of humans or 
leads the Jewish army in battle against their enemies.336 Equally, the Bible indicated laws to specify the 
conditions of a war, the acceptable means for triumph, and the motivations and ideals of the fighters.337 
Therefore, Jewish theology discusses and explains war as a reality of human life. In addition to the Bible, 
the issue of war is a significant part of the Jewish messianic tradition that introduces the Messiah as a 
great military figure who will lead Israel in victorious wars.338 
 
In Shi’a tradition prior to the Islamic Republic and according to the quietist Shi’a ulama, the enactment 
of those Shari’a that apply corporal punishment, collect religious taxes, lead Friday prayers and 
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announce an expansionist Jihad remain impossible during the time of the occultation. 339 The law on 
jihad, however, did not cover a defensive jihad.340 After the revolution and according to Khomeini’s 
Jurisprudential Leadership a jurist in that position could announce a holy war like other Shari’a.341 He 
believed that through war, the nation could replicate the suffering of the third Shi’a Imam, Hussein. 
Identifying a territorial war with Shi’a holy wars further involved religious figures and centres in the 
securitization project. Not only were mosques turned into military bases for transporting troops to the 
front, but Khomeini also directly connected the war to the holy war that he claimed was to be waged to 
return Jerusalem to Muslims. One of the most popular mottos of the war was “liberating Quds through 
Karbala” which indicated the strong emphasis on a theological justification of the war. 
 
In both states theological debate about the war and both political and theological justifications have 
legitimized the political authority of the state. Conditions of war, participating in military forces, and 
exemption from military services are not solely legal and include theological debates. In Israel, debates 
over the exemption of Yeshivot students from military service have been an ongoing challenge for the 
state and political parties. The reasons the Heredim offer for the exemption are solely theological but 
have significant political implications.342 Both states employ religious words and language when they 
refer to security issues. Therefore, in both states a defensive position is not only acceptable but also 
generates martyrs, brings the holy war, and is a reminder of God’s wrath and mercy. The reality of 
theological debates is transformative in that state security becomes a religious issue as well as a political 
one. Since the security discourse relies on religious foundations, it incorporates messianic hopes and 
ideals. The states’ framing of a theological orientation in order to introduce a war and to explain their 
security framework gives their particular theological discourse a context. Thus, securitization 
institutionalises the theology of war and national security. This experience leads the states to a specific 
form of securitization which differs from secular securitization not only in terms of definition and 
implications but also in terms of application and practical effects. 
 
The State and its Responsibilities in the Pre-messianic Phase 
 
In Israel the process of nation and State Building has developed simultaneously. The tragedy of the 
Holocaust, which resulted in the mass immigration of European Jewry to Israel, and the Balfour 
Declaration, instigated many theological and political responses to political opporession amongst Jewish 
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scholars. The Declaration of Independence was signed on the 14th of May, 1948.343 Ben Gurion, the 
party leader of the Zionist Socialist Party (Mapai), became the first Prime Minister of Israel.344 The 
tension between the religious and the secular identity of the state was reflected in the Balfour 
Declaration in which both religious and secular concepts were indicated. While the state was called 
“Eretz Yisrael” (which is a biblical phrase that refers to the holy land of Israel), the declaration begins 
with the phrase “Trust in the Rock of Israel” instead of using “Trust in God”.345 Ben Gurion considered 
the state to be of Jewish character although he remained a strong secularist.346 The basic law, agreed 
upon as Israel’s Constitution, determined the objective nationalism for the state and the people of Israel. 
According to the Act passed in 1949, the national identity of Israel was linked to the religious identity of 
the state. 347 The Act stipulated its duty to preserve the Halachik dietary laws, nominated the Sabbath as 
a public holiday, solely acknowledged religious marriages, and supported religious education.348 Instead 
 
of criteria such as a shared language, common ethnicity, or culture that Béland and Lecours call the 
objective component of nationalism and nation building, in Israel, national unity has been formed based 
on a common religious identity reinforced by situations of intense conflict. Therefore the subjective 
component of nationalism, which Béland argues forms a collective act of will, in Israel, securitized the 
secular Zionist ideology.349 Secular Zionism not only combined the subjective and objective components 
of nationalism but it also rationalised nationalism by focusing on Jewish autonomy and independence.350 
Autonomy and independence referred to anti-colonial revolutionary ideologies as well as the conflict 
with neighbouring Arab states. Securitized Messianism became an intrinsic characteristic of the state 
nationalism in Israel. The combination of the securitization project and the collective will for autonomy 
and independence justified the victory of Mapai and the National Religious Party in Israeli politics from 
1948 to 1977.351 
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Amongst the Middle Eastern countries, Iran had geo-political significance for the United States of 
Amercia. The revolution in Iran disturbed the polarized political structure of the region.352 Iran had not 
only been the United States of Amercia’s strongest economic partner in the region after WWII but was 
also a strong regional base for the United States of Amercia from which it could support and ensure 
their economic and political interests in the shadow of the neighbouring USSR.353 Following Iran’s 
revolution, however, each redefined their political ties with Iran and rearranged their forces in 
vulnerable areas like the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.354 
 
Iran’s post-revolutionary state began the process of State Building in the midst of the Cold War when the 
contestation between the USSR and the United States of Amercia affected almost every political change 
in the Middle East. The complexity of the post-revolutionary security situation in Iran demanded the 
revision of Middle Eastern policies for the United States of Amercia and the USSR. Iran connected the 
Asian market to Europe and offered the only route to the Indian Ocean for USSR.355 In addition to 
its significance in the regional economy and transport routes, Iran has sovereignty over the largest 
 
portion of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hurmoz. 356 Considering that the Persian Gulf is the region 
from which about 85% of global oil is transported, the importance of Iran’s revolution on regional 
security cannot be underestimated.357 
 
Changes in Iran’s security policies affected the other main oil producing countries in the Persian Gulf as 
well as the consumers.358 For these producers oil is not only a source of income but ‘the’ only source of 
income.359 The annual budget figure of these countries demonstrates how heavily they rely on oil 
income for providing the basic needs of their population.360 Due to their geographic situations and 
drought their agricultural activities are limited. Their dependency on oil makes their economies reliant 
on the security of the Persian Gulf. The securitization of the USSR as an existential threat to regional 
states encouraged the states to compete over economic cooperation with the United States of Amercia 
in order to further involve the United States of Amercia in the region and gain its political support.361 In 
Iran, the Pahlavi’s focus on economic development and industrialization, spread the capitalist economy 
and widened the gap between social groups.362 These economically motivated politics were confronted 
by the growth of anti-capitalist religious and secular groups, ultimately resulting in a revolution. The 
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revolution and the terminating of the previous regime instigated radical domestic changes. However, it 
was radical transformations in Iran’s religiously constructed security policies that instigated distress in 
neighbouring countries.363 It specifically affected three influential states; Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. 
The post-revolutionary state strongly supported Palestinian groups, cut political ties with Egypt because 
of its political ties with Israel, and became a Shi’a political threat to Saudi Arabia.364 In order to 
ideologically challenge the United States of Amercia’s long-term embargo, Iran gradually strengthened 
its economic ties with China and India who later were emerging as global economic powers.365 The 
post-revolutionary state used the cutting or limiting of its political ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and 
Israel as justifications for the legitimacy of its sovereignty and securitization project.366 The political 
events of 1978-79 were followed by the Iran-Iraq war waged during the 1980s and the execution of 
multi-action sanctions on Iran.367 The Islamic Republic persistently attempted to present a revolutionary 
portrait of Iran abroad and domestically placed full force on a national Islamization mission as a response 
to the polarized political environment of the Cold War. 368 In fact the war and economic isolation 
guaranteed the success of the state’s ideologically assembled securitization project. 
 
Nationalism, National Security and Political Exclusivism 
 
 
If it is the conflict situation that reconciles the inconsistencies between political and religious identities of 
the state in the phase of State Building, the legitimacy of these states is unavoidably security orientated. 
These shared characteristics of the religio-political states of Iran and Israel differ from what John Breuilly 
in Nationalism and the State defines as nationalism in the European context. 369 He argues that nationalism 
is political in nature because it is constructed within the context of modernity and as an abstract concept 
is interlinked with the concept of the nation state.370 To him nationalism needs to be discussed as a 
political concept (and in the context of modern nation states) with the focus of any research in this field 
on studying the changing construction of nationalism in the political environment.371  In these states, on 
the contrary, the state becomes the ultimate legitimate reference for identifying threats to political and 
religious systems as a consequence of being the agent for securing 
victories and ideals of Revolutionary Messianism in a conflict situation. 
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War policies demand a strong state-centred securitization project that can be executed nationally. The 
project should be effective in creating a harmonious representation of the society to face the existential 
threat that targets the state at the time. It should present a response to what a state acknowledges as a 
threat in the areas of recognition, legitimacy, and governing authority from internal or external 
sources.372 As Buzan et al suggest in their conceptual framework for studying national security, any 
discussion on security indicates the existence of a threat.373 An “existential threat” is only meaningful 
when it is discussed in relation to either a particular character of the referent object or its core of 
existence.374 In Iran and Israel the post-revolutionary states considered ensuring the security of 
Revolutionary Messianism as the referent object of national security and their revolutionary ideology as 
the ultimate target of threats. Their use of symbols and the discourse of nationalism, their firm stand on 
territorial sovereignty, and their emphasis on safeguarding the religion serve to underline the ideological 
nature of their securitization projects. 
 
The Securitized Messianism that is constructed in a conflict situation relies on a specific narrative of 
religion that revolutionaries and forces other than religious institutions accept. Military power remains 
the sole solution for dealing with security issues and is the element that consolidates the policies of the 
central authority. This enables the states to utilize military forces, or military discourse, for stabilizing 
domestic unrest or suppressing political opposition. In both Israel and Iran this process of securitization 
resulted in the formation of an institutionalised fundamentalism (one formed within the bureaucratic 
structure of the state) that imbues nationalism with an indispensible religious nature. The challenging 
issue for this form of fundamentalism was creating consistency between the sovereignty of the political 
system and the legitimacy of the divine. The following section explains how the securitization of 
Revolutionary Messianism defined the relationship between religion and politics in the course of 
constructing a framework of national security for both countries. 
 
As a result of these transformations in both states Securitized Messianism linked the security of religion 
to the security of the state. It created an advantage within the domestic political environment for those 
who supported the interests of the revolutionaries over those who attempted to establish an 
institutionalised political system. Gradually, the political system became exclusivist and relied heavily 
on conflict situations for the ideological justification of its militarily orientated policies in order to 
create a stable political situation during a conflict. In Israel’s case the centre of securitization was 
territorial sovereignty. The theological and political significance of obtaining sovereignty over a specific 
geographical territory replaced pre-state, idealist Zionism amongst Israeli politicians. During the phase 
of State Building, Zionist messianism motivated the formation of a religio-political militarism, 
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established rules for defending its territory, and justified the expansion of geographical boundaries as a 
religious obligation during the decades of conflict with its Arab neighbours that formed Securitized 
Messianism. 
 
Development of Military Zionism in Israel during the Cold  War 
 
 
The institutional structure of the state of Israel is made up of a parliament (Knesset), a judicial system 
(High Court), and a presidential office. Israeli Defence Forces and other official institutions operate 
based on the Knesset’s legislation.375 The High Court has been involved in political cases when the 
members of the Knesset disagree over a bill.376 It also reviews official claims and corruption allegations 
against politicians and political parties.377 Parliament in Israel operates on a model of proportional 
representation to ensure the rights of minority political groups.378 As a result, lobbying and changing 
alliances between secular and religious parties have dominated Knesset politics.379 The success of the 
main political parties in achieving a majority of seats is the result of their efficiency in lobbying with 
smaller parties within the Knesset as well as extending their constituency.380 As the state securitization 
project developed, it reshaped traditional party politics in Israel and resulted in the emergence of new 
political forces that ended the dominance of traditional Labor secular Zionism over Israeli politics. 
 
Soon after the formation of the state and the 1948 Arab-Israeli war it became clear that the traditional 
theological foundations of a messianic utopia could not explain the existing conflict situation.381 Far 
from being a miraculous redemption, the state faced various economic and political struggles in its 
development. One of the main challenges for the state in the phase of State Building was passing and 
executing national laws. Accepting religious laws as national laws was challenging for secular Jews, 
many of whom accepted the religious identity of the state but emphasized fostering cultural unity 
against Jewish suffering rather than institutionalising absolute commitment to Halakhah and Rabbinic 
tradition. Secular Zionists, who were the agents of securitization, neither encouraged Herediy nor 
strived for a Halakhik state.382 Rather, they focused on the securing of the state, the expansion of Israel’s 
territory, and economic development.383 Prior to the State-Building Phase, Jewish communities had 
needed messianism for both political hope and survival. However, during the State-Building Phase, the 
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responsibility for securing Jewish communities and political hope was transferred to the state and the 
defence forces. 
 
For both the Jewish citizens of Israel and the Jews of the Diaspora debates on State Building included 
messianism.384 While some traditional factions opposed the domination of politics by secular Zionists 
who based their theological debates on sovereignty, many religious figures followed Rabbi Kook and 
encouraged communities to participate in the nation building process and defend Israel’s territory.385 
Zionism, which interpreted messianism in modern political terms, maintained the unity of secular and 
religious communities by attaching an imminent threat to the security of Judaism, Jewish autonomy, 
and independence.386 Religious Zionism contextualised messianic scriptures in order to achieve two 
security goals. They interpreted the texts to narrate a history that described a national religious past in 
relation to the conflict situation of the present, and to redefine the relationship between religion and 
politics. This politically orientated interpretation undermined alternative understandings of the texts 
and focused specifically on the state. It bound religious messianic hope to nationalism in order to shape 
the state’s response to existing threats and to form its religious legitimacy. Securitized Messianism 
articulated the nationalist discourse of self-determination and developed theologically by attaching the 
meaning of messianism to national security. 
 
The literature of religious Zionism, which later became the most common educational model in Jewish 
settlements, produced an ideological component for the traditional narrative of history and was a main 
component in the state legitimacy. It presented a comprehensive picture of the nation over the course of 
its history that generated a sense of political continuity. Securing this historical political identity became 
the source of unification for culturally diverse immigrant communities. It also constituted a relationship 
between a geographical boundary and a nation. The success of religious Zionism is irrelevant to the 
exact correlation between reality and historical narratives of nationalism in Israel, and is more in debt to 
the securitization process. The securitization of messianism also directly affirmed the right of Jewish 
communities to establish a sovereign state. This factor underlines Rabbi Kook’s writings. He redefined 
the conditions of the messianic time, which had been bound to a politically passive community, to 
actively protecting the security of the state and its prosperity. For secular Zionists with modern political 
thought, the securitization project was vital because to them only the existence and prosperity of a 
Zionist state could resolve issues of geographical territory, national language, and ethnicity in Israel. 
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They viewed the state as the only agency that could contextualise a Jewish religious discourse of 
redemption in modern political context.387 
 
The political system legitimized this theological approach as it required religious legitimacy for State 
Building. The establishment of a modern administration in the form of an electoral democracy in Israel 
is the outcome of the efforts of secular socialist Zionists who were either educated in secular schools or 
trained in the Israel Defence Force (Israel Defence Forces), the most secular institution in the state at 
the time. However, the passionate nationalists who strongly supported the promises of equality and 
freedom in Zionism envisioned in the state the missing link that could be reconciled to a theological past 
with the promise of the future. To them, the securitization of messianism gave meaning to the existence 
of the state and explained the present political situation in relation to a messianic future that revealed 
the true meaning of the history of the nation. The existence of the state was not an exclusively political 
issue, it also had crucial theological implications. 
 
In his study of messianic belief in Israel, Abba Hillel Silver identifies three constructive political 
elements: “the will to live dominantly and triumphantly”, “the rehabilitation in a national home”, and 
“the unfaltering faith in divine justice by whose eternal canons the national restoration was infallibly 
prescribed”. 388   He notes that messianic calculation is rejected in the state of Israel so that the state can 
prevent the encouragement of false hope and social disorder and eliminate its constant concern and 
stress over the rise of a pseudo- messianic ideology or person that exploits messianic longing. 389   These 
three factors endorse the argument that during the process of securitization national security is 
understood as identical to religious security. These three goals have theological as well as political 
foundations and all validate the securitization of messianism. 
 
The Six Days  War and the Political Implications of Securitization of Messianism 
 
 
The securitization project of the 1960s in Israel was predominantly constructed to respond to the Cold 
War policies of its neighbouring countries. As Jordan opposed the Arab League plan for creating a 
Palestinian state, and conflict between Israel and Syria in the east of the Sea of Galilee continued, the 
Syrian government collapsed as the result of an anti-Egyptian coup.390 The Ba’ath party increased its 
power soon after the overthrowing of the Qasim’s regime in Iraq and gradually achieved more power in 
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Syria until the Ba’ath party coup in 1963.391 During this decade the three Arab nationalist regimes in 
Syria, Iraq and Egypt strengthened their political and military relationships with the USSR. and 
announced their strong oppositional position to Israel by establishing the Palestine Federation.392 Due to 
endless conflict between the Arab states at the time, Jamal Abdul Nasser renounced the Federation soon 
after its establishment.393 Syria, however, insisted on supporting Palestinians and their right of return 
thus becoming the main supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Palestinian Liberation 
Organization).394 
 
As the conflict progressed, Israel’s diplomatic efforts for establishing international political allegiances 
increased.395 In the meantime, the United States of Amercia got more directly involved in Israeli conflicts 
as it sold Hawk missiles to Israel and increased the country’s military capability.396 The conflict situation 
intensified as the Arab countries signed mutual defence treaties and united to stage a military attack 
against Israel.397 Clashes between Israel and Syria continued in 1967 and so did the espionage war 
between Arab countries and Israel.398 Egypt increased its military readiness and alongside other Arab 
countries advertised deployment for a United Arab Force. The Iraqi forces that had joined the United 
Arab Regiment entered Jordan.399 Israel rapidly boosted its military power, formed a National Unity 
Government with Moshe Dayan as Israel Defence Minister, and launched pre-emptive strikes on Syrian, 
Egyptian, and Jordanian air bases and forces in Gaza.400 
The sweeping victory of the Israel Defence Force and the defeat of the United Arab forces had a 
significant impact on Israeli politics and society. The Six Days War created an Israeli generation with a 
strongly religious identity.401 It united Israelis as a nation with a nationalist mission of safeguarding the 
country and linked the Diaspora to Israel.402 Gideon Aran argues that the war created an integral link 
between religion and the secular government, Israel’s secular and religious history, and its religious and 
 
 
 
 
391 I. Rabinovich, Ibid, 22 and 26. 
392 William B. Quandt, Paul Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian  Nationalism  (Santa Monica: University of 
California Press, 1973), 159. 
393 Ibid. 
394 Ibid, 160. 
395 E. S. Marshall, Israel: Current Issues and Historical Background (Carbondale, IL: Nova Publishers, 2002), 222- 226. 
396 J. P. Jankowski, Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2001), 87-90. 
397 From 1966 sporadic but serious clashes between Israel, Syria and Jordan were forming. Ibid. 
398 For the espionage competition between Israel and its neighbours see: L. J. Silberstein, Postzionism: A Reader (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 259-261. 
399 Ibid. 
400 The Ba’thist gained power in Iraq and Mohammad Qaddafi became the head of the state in Libya. See: G. L. Simons, Libya: 
the Struggle for Survival (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 170. 
401 Professor Paul Morris, personal conversation, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 28 November 2009 
402 Gideon Aran, ‘A Mystic-Messianic Interpretation of Israel Modern History: The Six Days War in the Religious Culture of 
Gush Emunim’, in Israeli Judaism: the Sociology of Religion in Israel, eds. Shlomo A. Deshen, Charles S. Liebman, and Moshe 
Shokeid (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 197-213. 
93  
national identity.403 To him, the victory of Kookism and Israel’s further militarization in the 1970s were 
the outcomes of the Six Days War and early Kookism.404 Aran notes that in the early Kookist journal 
(Mosharah), which was published during the 1960s, land and territorial issues constituted the 
fundamental themes of the articles. The Kookists’ discourse on land included theological debates on 
redemption (geulah) that considered territorial settlements and conflict as central factors in the victory 
of progressive messianism.405 
 
 
In the post-war literature the war was referred to as “the war of redemption” indicating its theological 
significance. 406 The spread of Kookism, the birth of a religious generation, and religious political parties 
can be explained comprehensively within the context of the securitization process. One of the 
momentous political impacts of the war on the national and religious identity of the state was the way in 
which it strengthened Israel’s position for remaining in the Golan Heights.407 Moreover, it facilitated 
unity amongst political parties in the Knesset in their stance on Jerusalem, and they claimed it as the 
capital of Israel: a “united city”, despite the Arab summit’s non-recognition of an Israeli state.408 
Domestically the war united the secular parties Rafi, and Mapai with the religious party Ahdut 
 
Ha'avodah, who together formed a strong Labor government under the leadership of Golda Meir.409 
 
Regionally, the Six Days War became a scene for the great powers to test their regional influences in a 
conflict. The victory of Israel in the war affected the unity of the Arab states. 410 
Gradually, the Cold War environment polarized the political situation of the Middle Eastern conflict, 
the diplomatic involvement of the United States of Amercia and the USSR, and the building and 
improvement of the military capabilities of Middle Eastern countries intensified.411 In October 1973, 
the Yom Kippur War began, with Syrian and Egyptian military incursions over the contested borders 
that had been established following the Six Days War.412 Oil producing Arab countries announced an 
embargo on the United States of Amercia and Israel. The United States of Amercia attempted to find a 
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diplomatic solution to the conflict, and Richard Nixon warned about a possible USSR attack on Israel on 
behalf of Egypt.413 But, Sadat soon proposed a ceasefire.414 
 
Inside Israel, the political implications of the ceasefire reshaped the government. The United States of 
Amercia ceasefire plan posed major political challenges to Golda Meir and her government lost power 
as the result of the growing gap between the party and its constituents.415 Followers of Gush Emunim 
expressed their opposition to the ceasefire plan and phased public demonstrations and marches in the 
settlements.416 In the post Six Days War the settlements celebrated religious rituals publically and 
pressured the government to recognize the new settlements in the annexed territories.417 While the 
state’s political power remained exclusively in the hands of Labor Ashkenazi parties, religious groups 
like Gush Emunim attracted more followers subsequent to the war.418 After being appointed as Prime 
Minister, Yizhak Rabin urgently announced his strong opposition regarding the formation of a 
Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan but continued diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace plan with 
the United States of Amercia, Egypt, and Jordan.419 
 
As diplomatic ties between Israel and Arab neighbouring countries improved, the “Palestinian question” 
became the dominant issue in Israeli politics.420 Participants at the Arab summit conference in Rabat 
nominated Yassir Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole representative of the 
Palestinians.421 His nomination instigated two major transformations in the Arab countries’ regional 
policy. First, it announced the end of the nationalist unity amongst the Arab countries and disassociated 
Palestinian issues from the politics of the Arab states. Secondly, for Israel this diplomatic decision made 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Palestinians an exclusively Israeli security issue. Israel 
refused to accept sole responsibility for the Palestinians or for negotiating a Palestinian state. They 
opposed the decision of the summit regarding the removal of Arab countries as the main political decision 
makers for the future of the Palestinians and further, announced that they would not participate 
in any negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization .422 The fragile economic condition in 
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Lebanon and the flux of Palestinian refugees fuelled ethnic and religious conflicts in Lebanon, eventually 
leading to a full scale civil war in 1976.423 
 
Inside Israel, the Palestinian Liberation Organization staged attacks in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and the 
Israeli government continued the expansion of settlements within the post 1967 borders. The signing of 
the second agreement between Egypt and Israel demonstrated a complete shift in Egyptian policy 
towards Israel, which was by then a strong ally of the United States of Amercia.424 The United States of 
Amercia supported Israel militarily and economically in order to prepare for any attack from the USSR 
and block the spread of communism, especially in Israel, home to a strong Russian community and the 
Labor Party.425 
 
Domestically, Rabin’s resignation marked the end of the Labor Party’s thirty years of power and 
ushered in the era of the rightwing Likud party - the highpoint of religious Zionism in Israel. 426   In his 
regional politics Menachim Begin pursued peace negotiations with Egypt and other Arab states but 
opposed the idea of recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization or their participation in peace 
negotiations.427 The securitization of Zionism gained momentum after the 1973 war. By 1976, and as 
the result of the achievement of the securitization, more religious communities were involved in Israeli 
party politics. Their success in Knesset elections reshaped the country’s political culture. In December 
1976, Rabin’s government submitted its resignation to the Knesset over a motion of “non-confidence” 
from an Hasidic party (Agudat Yisrael) against the landing of F-15 Fighters after sunset during Sabbat, 
the day of rest.428 By the time of the Begin government, the Gush Emunim movement was well 
established in Israel and its followers were housed in new settlements across the West Bank and 
Jerusalem.429 
In the late 70s a Jewish underground group opposed Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai and the 
evacuation of Israeli settlements in the northern Sinai. 430 At the same time, the increase of Palestinian 
Liberation Organization bases on the Lebanese border, from where Fatah members staged their 
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operations into Israel, instigated another wave of attacks on Israel’s borders.431 In 1978, the Israel 
Defence Force crossed into Lebanon and Begin announced that Israeli forces were to remain in the area 
unless Israel was guaranteed its security from its northern borders. Following resolution 425 the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Forces entered the area and the Israel Defence Force withdrew.432 Israel, Egypt, 
and the United States of Amercia signed the Camp David Agreement which specifically addressed the 
Egypt-Israeli peace agreements and established a five year autonomous territory in both Gaza and the 
West Bank.433 In 1979 Egypt and Israel signed the peace treaty in Washington while sporadic fights 
along the Lebanon border between Syrian forces, the Palestinian Liberation Organization , and the 
Israel Defence Force continued.434   This diplomatic improvement even encouraged Saudi Arabia to 
show interest in recognizing Israel as long as Israel accepted complete withdrawal. 435 
 
The United State’s Middle East policies became more linked to Israeli security after Iran’s 1979 
revolution, the USSR’s attack on Afghanistan, the hostage crisis in Iran, Saddam Hussein’s arms deals 
with the USSR, and the creation of a new pro-soviet front in the region.436 In 1981, Israel bombarded 
areas in the Bokka Valley. The government announced that this region housed bases for Syrian supported 
Palestinian militant groups.437 This development resulted in the 1981 Golan Heights Law in which the 
Israeli government and its laws were applied in the Golan region.438 Clashes along the Lebanon border 
increased until late 1982 when Israel attacked Beirut and southern Lebanon.439 Once more, the United 
Nations ceasefire resolution remained ineffective until the Reagan government became involved in the 
negotiations.440 The war in Lebanon grew to be very unpopular amongst Israelis 
and the massacre of Sabra and Shatilla raised more doubts about Israel’s involvement in Lebanon.441 
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As a consequence of the two wars, the Kookist Yeshivot schools spread in the settlements.442 The 
central theme in their teaching was the spiritual and religious value of defending the land and the 
messianic future of the people and state. The military became central to the nation’s efforts to guard its 
national and religious identity.443 Moreover, although it was specifically Zionist messianism that the 
state securitized, it as well made the future of religion as a holistic system of beliefs conditional upon the 
protection of revolutionary messianic ideals. While the military operated under secular institutional 
rules it adopted a religious framework for its ideology. In addition to the military’s distinguished social 
position as defenders of national security, in less than a decade, the Israel Defence Force became the 
most organized and influential institution of the state.444 The development of military and educational 
institutions in the Israeli political and legal systems gave rise to debates over the military drafting of 
Yeshivot students. Although some Heredi Yeshivot resisted participation in military activities, many 
Yeshivot accepted and encouraged military drafting. 
 
As Mordecai Bar-Lev notes, the main difference between the post-war Yeshivot and the traditional 
Lithuanian religious schools is their approach towards four issues; Zionism, the state of Israel, joining 
military services, and political participation.445 The post-war Yeshivot required students to serve at the 
Israel Defence Force, study the Torah with a pragmatic approach, respect the nation and the state, and 
spread religious education in the settlements.446 Thus securitization of Revolutionary Messianism 
enabled the military to expand its role from being a force for territorial advancement to becoming the 
most influential factor in Israel’s political culture. Adopting a pro-military attitude in Yeshivot 
demonstrated that the securitization of Revolutionary Messianism facilitated the nation’s shift from a 
traditional educational and governing order to a bureaucratic and institutional order. In the State- 
Building Phase, civilian rule becomes subordinate to the military even though the state maintains its 
legal obligations of not interfering in civil affairs. This concentration of political power is not free from 
praetorianism and economic corruption, especially when the military plays a crucial role in political and 
economic reforms. 
 
State legitimization and the Securitization of Revolutionary Messianism in Iran 
 
 
In order to create a distinct national identity the Pahlavi monarchy defined Iran’s national identity, 
 
based on a narrative of Iran’s pre-Islamic national identity and aiming for a distinct and superior role for 
 
Iran in the region. Both Mehran and Arshin Adib-Moghaddam note that the Pahlavi made an effort to 
 
 
 
442 G. Aran, op. cit., 294. 
443 Ibid. 
444 Mordecai Bar-Lev, ‘Tradition and Innovation in Religious Education in Israel’, in Tradition, Innovation, Conflict: Jewishness 
and Judaism in Contemporary Israel, eds. Zvi Sobel and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi (NY: SUNY Press, 1991), 120-21. 
445 Ibid. 
446 Ibid, 121. 
98  
associate a “superior” sense of Iranianness to any discourse on nationalism.447 In the late Pahlavi era the 
Shah became more insistent on advocating “Persian identity” through the 1971 celebration of the 2,500 
years of the Persian Empire in Persepolis, and in abandoning the Islamic solar calendar and replacing it 
with a Persian Imperial calendar in order to create an Iranian utopia.448 Trita Parsi argues that this 
project, although it differed in terms of the agent and ideology, never stopped after the revolution.449 
Nonetheless, during the Cold War Iran’s secular administration and its close economic and military 
contacts with the United States of Amercia placed the country in the western camp and made it closer 
to Israel as the two non-Arab states in the region. Iran remained neutral during the Middle Eastern 
conflicts of the 1960s and 70s. Following the revolution, however, the Arab states were distressed 
about the consequences of Khomeini’s “exportation of Islamic revolution” in the region. 450 
 
Three issues made Iran’s effort of fostering diplomatic ties and exporting the revolution fruitless. The 
first was that Khomeini’s discourse on unity addressed an Islamic Ummah (the Global Muslim 
community) rather than cooperation among Islamic states. In fact, Khomeini on many occasions 
criticized the Arab states for being “puppets of the West” and accused them of deviating from Islam with 
their “monarchical rules”.451 Focusing on Islam as a unifying element for the exportation of the 
revolution was alien to Sunnis, who theologically accept the existence of a semi-secular state under the 
 
rule of a Caliph.452 The rise of pan-Arabism and its attempts at reviving the golden age of the Islamic 
Ummah has its roots in this theological approach. Moreover, while most of the Arab countries compete, 
or at times fight, with their Arab neighbours over natural resources, they consider the historical 
caliphates as the legitimate rulers of the Islamic Ummah. In Iranian Shi’ism none of the four Righteous 
Caliphs, except Ali, was a legitimate ruler. In fact, in early Ahadith (narratives) on Mahdi, the main 
responsibility of the Mahdi in the end-time was to be setting up a just state that opposed the central 
authority of the caliphate.453 
The second issue was that Iran’s revolutionary understanding of Islam included concepts that were anti- 
imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-Zionist, anti-monarchical, and anti-oppression all of which undermined 
the power of the central Arab states. The emphasis on unity and revolution against tyranny disturbed 
Arab states.454 None of the states were attracted to his “exportation of the revolution” project.455 His 
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messages attracted Shi’a minorities, political oppositions, and isolated groups in Arab countries, thus 
creating potential threats to regimes across the Middle East.456 The third issue was that during the Iran- 
Iraq war, the majority of Arab countries supported Iraq and this situation of conflict added complexity 
to Iran-Arab relations.457 The atmosphere of conflict between an Arab state and Iran ultimately 
terminated the possibility of the success of the exportation project. 
 
What intensified the securitization of Revolutionary Messianism in Iran were the 1980 hostage crisis, 
the following hostility between the United States of Amercia and Iran, and the Iraq-Iran war.458 The 
political implications of the hostage crisis further securitized and legitimatized the state. Following the 
takeover of the United States of Amercia Embassy in Tehran the hardline revolutionaries insisted on 
keeping the United States of Amercia diplomatic corps as hostage in the hope that the United States of 
Amercia would return the Shah to Iran for a trial.459 The temporary government and newspapers 
warned the hardliners of the outcome of the possible termination of political and economic ties with the 
United States of Amercia for both Iran and the region.460 It cost Mehdi Bazargan his premiership and his 
cabinet but strengthened Khomeini’s position as the leader of the revolution.461 The continuation of the 
hostage crisis further isolated Iran and instigated hostility between Iran and the majority of Arab states 
which could not survive without the United States of Amercia market and American financial aid.462 In 
the early 80s, Arab states, like Egypt, terminated their diplomatic ties with Iran. Others, like Saudi 
Arabia, minimized their political ties with the Islamic Republic. Syria was an anomaly in the Arab world 
and continued its political ties with Iran, but even Syria was perusing its own political advantages.463 
 
Following the hostage crisis, Iran’s state defined Revolutionary Messianism in anti-Amercianism. 464 
Prior to the crisis, revolutionary literature focused on debating the limits and possibilities of 
implementing freedom of speech, economic independence, and a republic in which Shi’a Shari’a were 
respected in Iran.465 Iranian revolutionary officials criticized the United States of Amercia solely for its 
pro-Pahlavi policies and avoided increasing the tensions between the two countries. In a radical shift and 
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as a consequence of the crisis, the revolutionaries and Khomeini announced their stand against 
 
“imperialism and oppression” in the world as the global messianic goal of the revolution. 
 
 
Four months after the revolution, Iran withdrew from the CENTO because of their ideological position 
and hostility towards the United States of Amercia.466 In addition, Iran became the only Shi’a state in the 
world, eventually motivating different Shi’a communities who had been oppressed as religious 
minorities to follow the Iranian model and form Shi’a political or military groups in their own 
countries.467 The anti-Imperialist and anti-Zionist ideals of Iran’s revolutionary discourse reflected 
Sayyid Qutb’s negation of Jahilliyah (ignorance) and his anti-western ideology which attracted those 
who disagreed with American and Israeli politics in the Middle East.468 The post-revolutionary state 
invested in two regional strategies that could ensure its existence in the new political arrangement of 
the region. The first was discussing the unity of Islamic Ummah in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and arguing that the issue of Palestinians was not just an Israeli or Arab issue but a Muslim issue. 
By substituting the concept of Ummah instead of Mellat (nation) Khomeini aimed to deconstruct the 
traditional pan-Arabism in the region and increase his power in regional decision-making.469 Khomeini 
used the issue of Palestine as the central topic in his sermons on regional policies to demonstrate Iran’s 
keenness for a regional strategic alliance amongst the Muslim countries in order to oppose the 
“hegemony of the West”.470 
 
In the national context Khomeini used the term Ummah in order to legitimize the securitization of 
Revolutionary Messianism. The use of the term affirmed the state’s determination in transforming Iran 
to an Islamic state. To achieve this aim, the state required a new ideological structure for its security 
policies that could direct the aim of the securitization process from protecting a monarchy to protecting 
the revolutionary objectives. Following the hostage crisis the state rationalised its securitization project 
by basing it on three ideological premises: anti-colonialism, the victimization of revolution (conspiracy 
theory), and advocating animosity between upper and lower socio-economic classes. To show their 
loyalty to these ideas, the revolutionaries carried out mass executions of the Pahlavi’s high-ranking 
officials who were accused of connection with the “westernized” regime.471 
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The themes of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism that animated the Islamic Republic’s securitization 
discourse stigmatized oppositional voices in Iranian society. Securitization justified the state’s 
suppression of various political groups and mass execution of their followers, many of whom had played 
a crucial role in the success of the revolution. During the revolution the slogan “neither eastern, nor 
western, an Islamic Republic” referred to the economic and political dependency of the Pahlavi 
regime.472 In the post-revolution era all political groups were recognized by their association with one of 
 
the Cold War “western” or “eastern” blocks and identified as a threat to the revolution.473 The 
construction of an ideological “other” and the introduction of the “other” as the enemy, dominated 
security discourse. As the war against Iraq began, the state in Iran faced a military invasion and sanctions, 
while it accused the “West” of plotting against the ideals of the revolution. 
 
Following the takeover of the United States of Amercia Embassy, the term ‘anti-revolutionary’, was 
attributed to those who supported political ties with the West or chose a secular lifestyle. A westernized 
individual was identified by their appearance, women without a Chador (long black Hijab) and men 
with shaved faces and by the style of their dress. Anyone with Marxist or liberal ideas, supporters of 
Mujahedin Khalgh, secularists, and supporters of the open market economy were called anti- 
revolutionary. The number of political prisoners after the hostage crisis increased and a new element 
entered the securitization discourse.474 The security ideology of the state categorized the public into two 
groups; those who were anti-imperialist and supported the revolution’s global ideals, and those who 
supported imperialism and disagreed with state policies.475 The latter were to be excluded from 
participating in the political scene of the country due to the fact that their disagreement not only 
violated national security but also gave an excuse to the “enemy to enslave” Iran once more by 
conspiring against the post-revolutionary state. By placing the protection of the revolution as the aim of 
the securitization project, the state theologically justified the use of torture, imprisonment, mass 
executions and unfair trials against opposition groups, ethnic groups, and some religious minorities.476 
The conflict situation temporarily alleviated unemployment and other domestic or industrial crises and 
channelled the nation’s recent revolutionary energy into military frontlines, Revolutionary Guards, 
Basij, Revolutionary committees, and other security services. The state designed its national policies in 
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response to political opposition that emphasised this definition of national security. It also considered 
 
any critique of the institutions, freedom of speech, and party politics as threats to national security. This 
narrow definition of national security instigated a gap between the people and the state and assigned 
ultimate authority to the Jurisprudential Leadership. During the time of Khomeini his charismatic 
leadership cemented this gap but maintaining unity within the Islamic Republic after his death proved to 
be very challenging. Similar to the situation in Israel, the success of the securitization process in a conflict 
situation legitimized the state but unlike in Israel, the project produced a one-party political system. 
Thus, any opposition or criticism of the state’s decisions became an existential threat to the security of 
Jurisprudential Leadership and was dealt with by force. 
 
State Political Structure: Bureaucratic Structure and Securitized Messianism 
 
 
The political implications of securitization extend to the nature and limits of the authority of political 
agents and state institutions. The securitization of revolution in Iran temporarily reconciled the real 
tension between state authority and divine sovereignty by strengthening the link between the success of 
the revolution and messianic hopes. In the political context it regulated the relationship between 
political agents, religious institutions, and state institutions by placing a jurist as the ultimate decision 
maker. It centralised religious power and thus brought Iranian Shi’a religious institutions under the 
control of the state, fundamentally transforming the traditional Shi’a discourse on the concepts of 
authority and sovereignty. 
 
The securitization projects in Iran and Israel brought to an end the pre-state theological tradition which 
acknowledged a place for a non-religious public sphere. The quietist and apolitical stand of religious 
figures and institutions can only exist when politics is distinguished from religion. In a religio-political 
state, it becomes almost impossible to create a secular public sphere when Securitized Messianism 
becomes the basis for the institutionalization of revolution. It constructs the states’ political philosophy 
and legitimizes the existing political power by associating it to a progressing messianic theology. In both 
states, political opposition against the existing security policies and the states’ responses include 
religious debates. This is contrary to pre-Revolutionary Messianism in which political opposition to the 
ruling system meant revolting against and interfering in God’s ordained history. In both cases, the 
securitization process placed the state as the pre-condition for the progression of messianic history. 
Therefore, opposition to the ideals of the revolution was religiously forbidden because securing the state 
is not solely a national or even religious obligation, but it is the main element that designates the success 
of messianic history. 
 
The securitization projects in these states direct the structure of its institutionalization. When the state 
is legitimized as the sole agent in the progress of messianic history it initiates new regional security 
486 Ibid. 
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alliances and identifies different targets as threats. Due to its ideological foundations a religio-political 
state is capable of creating ideological bonds and is not limited to geographical borders. In the case of 
Israel, Zionism fostered the formation of the AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) and 
strong political ties between American Jewry and Israel.477 In Iran’s case, the ideological bond prompted 
the formation of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon in 1982, which resulted in a stronger alliance between 
Lebanese Shi’ites and Iranian revolutionaries.478 The emergence of Hezbollah not only instigated 
hostility between Iran and Israel, but also threatened the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.479 
 
Syria attempted to build a strategic alliance with Iran in order to maintain its sovereignty over the Golan 
Heights.480 While the securitization of Revolutionary Messianism in Israel justified the 1982 attack on 
Lebanon, in the Islamic Republic it fostered the formation of the military wing of Hezbollah.481 
 
Redefining security policies in these states was not limited to a regional context; it re-structured the 
national political scene. The regional wars of the 1960s and 70s resulted in the growth of religious 
groups in Israel who theologically legitimized the Zionist goal of territorial expansion.482 In Iran, as a 
result of this conflict situation almost all the ayatollahs supported Khomeini. The absence of Iran in 
global politics, which contradicted the increasing global importance of its natural resources, and its 
perpetual economic isolation, helped advance the establishment of the Jurisprudential Leader’s 
hegemony over Iranian politics. In Israel, Heredi Jewish suburbs like Yamit in the northern Sinai 
demonstrated their power in domestic politics by resisting the government’s evacuation order and 
clashing with Israel Defence Force forces in the early 1980s.483 As the Lebanon-Israel war came to an 
end the tension between Syria and Arafat increased.484 As a result Syria asked Arafat to leave the 
country.485 Begin resigned from his post and Yitzhak Shamir’s government won a vote of confidence 
from the Knesset.486 In 1984 thousands of Ethiopian Jews entered Israel an event that would later 
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drastically change the political map of the country.487 The sharp increase in the number of immigrants, 
as well as the long term conflict situation and the slowing of the process of industrialization led to 
inflation in Israel.488 
 
Regionally, Syria gradually became Israel’s centre of attention as Assad strengthened Syria’s political and 
military influence in Lebanon.489 In 1987, the first wave of Intifada caused more security challenges for 
Israel and initiated stronger military, economic and political ties between Israel and the United States of 
Amercia, as its most trusted ally in the Middle East.490 Following the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization ’s announcement of the establishment of a Palestinian state, Arafat agreed to recognize 
Israel to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the United States of Amercia.491 At the same time, Hamas 
announced its existence by distributing their communiqué in Palestinian territories. Ultimately, the 
United Nations granted the right of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to be referred to as 
representatives of “Palestine”, effectively giving it membership status. Yitzhak Shamir expressed 
concerns over the United States of Amercia Secretary of State George Schultz’s plan for the 
settlements.492 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the disintegration of the USSR put an end to the 
decades of polarized politics in the region. The end of the Cold War dramatically changed Israel and 
Iran’s security situation and the goals of Securitized Messianism. The end of the Cold War coincided 
with the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Khomeini in Iran. In Israel, the mass immigration of 
Eastern Jews (Mizrakhim) and Russian Jews reshaped Israel’s demographic and post-Cold War politics. 
The post Cold War politics of the 1990s influenced the redefinition of Israel’s strategic alliance with the 
United States of Amercia as well as its relationship with the United Nations. This new political 
environment impacted on the Shamir peace plan and the Israeli response to the Intifada.493 In Israel the 
1990s brought about a transition from its State-Building Phase to a phase of state maintenance.494 
 
 
Securitized Messianism versus Revolutionary Messianism 
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Revolutionary Messianism in Iran relied on fostering hostility towards notions of aristocracy and loyalty 
to the monarch. However, Securitized Messianism in the phase of State-Building Phase strongly 
encouraged elitism and the expression of loyalty to the post-revolutionary state. Revolutionary 
Messianism blamed non-revolutionary intellectuals for resisting reform while Securitized Messianism 
considered any reform a security threat. The success of a securitization project in this phase was 
producing a system that rejected any alternative political discourse as a viable possibility. During the 
Revolutionary Phase, resisting the existing political power had been highly praised. On the contrary, 
Securitized Messianism strongly opposed the tradition of protest. Revolutionary Messianism, that 
Marxist ideals of economic equality and justice had influenced, opposed the development of the 
bourgeoisie. Securitized Messianism, in contrast, encouraged the development of a new middle class. It 
rejected the formation or development of any independent collective organization except those that the 
revolutionists strongly supported. 
 
In Israel, Revolutionary Messianism had helped to unite workers, many of whom were members of 
minority populations made up of relocated immigrant communities. The conflicts sped up the 
development of military industry and smoothed their transition from egalitarian communities to 
industrial urban life in the Kibbutzim. The concentration of European immigrants in major cities, the 
state’s emphasis on industrialization, and the development of state institutions, all contributed to social 
and political advantages to Ashkenazi communities who formed the majority of political decision makers 
in Israel. The parties whose interests were associated with the military industry became political 
legislators. Due to the diversity of ethnic communities, even within the Ashkenazi communities, and the 
political structure of the Knesset, the impact of the securitization process on Israeli politics did not 
manifest until the later years of the Cold War. From the 1970s to the mid-80s, North African Jewish 
communities who migrated to Israel in great numbers lived in poor socio-economic conditions as the 
result of the militarism and Ashkenazi elitism of Israeli politics.495 The formation of the Black Panthers 
movement, which staged violent demonstrations in Jerusalem against the first United National 
government, was one outcome of the demographic change and ethnic class struggle in Israeli society.496 
By the mid seventies about one hundred thousand Russian Jewish immigrants settled in Israel.497 
Immigrants from North Africa and Russia established settlements in the West Bank and other post war 
territories.498 
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In both cases of this study the states have needed a conflict situation for establishing their political and 
religious legitimacy and post-revolutionary political institutions. In Iran’s case, the state associated the 
legitimacy of political parties, trade unions and other social communities with revolutionary ideals. 
Establishing Khomeini’s Jurisprudential Leadership as the core issue in any security policy, which relied 
solely on the Revolutionary Messianism, became the main aim of the post-revolutionary state. 
Gradually expressing loyalty and commitment to Jurisprudential Leadership became necessary and 
sufficient grounds for the legitimacy of any political party or individual. In Israel the conflict situation 
legitimized the nation, the state and its institutions, with Zionism becoming the durable element of the 
state and the reference for the legitimation of political parties, trade unions, and various ethnic Jewish 
communities. In Iran those citizens who were not associated with the state were excluded from decision 
making and stigmatized. In Israel, Palestinians became the target of isolation and alienation. 
 
The tension between the secular structure of western nation states and the political power of religious 
institutions in secular states has been one of the most studied areas in the history of secularism. It is a 
concept that defines the source of the state legitimacy. In western democratic states, the bureaucratic 
order of state institutions, a strong civil order, and the participation of political cultures provide the 
grounds for the state legitimacy. These secular sources also establish a form of institutional trust 
between citizens and the state. In religio-political states, the state needs religious legitimacy in order to 
validate the existence of a political state. In both Iran and Israel religious institutions that had differed in 
their perspectives regarding the conditions of the coming of the messiah supported Revolutionary 
Messianism and a commitment to the state in the State-Building Phase. 
 
Religious revolutionaries of whom the majority had been apolitical or quietist passionately pursued the 
securitization process. They used messianic discourse in order to mobilize public support for the state 
during the State-Building Phase and in times of conflict. The Securitized Messianism discourse involved 
not only theological experts in politics but also produced a form of political, legal, and administrative 
discourse based on Revolutionary Messianism which was increasingly religious. These religio-political 
states produced secular forces whose understanding of the secular was religious. For the religious 
revolutionaries, they linked the understanding of secularism to colonialism and oppression. According 
to them, the dominant form of understanding of human interactions and dealing with the world was 
religious and no alternative existed. Thus, a non-religious political governing system was an existential 
threat to both national and religious security. As messianism entered everyday politics it posed new 
questions for theological institutions regarding the relationship between state security and the 
protection of religion. Their responses to these questions further bound state politics and religion to 
Securitized Messianism. 
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Religion gradually gained stronger support as the only appropriate political ideology that could protect 
the national identity of citizens. Israel’s peace initiatives with the Palestinians, which Heredi Jews 
opposed, paved the way for the involvement of Heredi communities in politics. Gideon Aran calls their 
involvement as the preceding legitimacy ground for the emergence of Gush Emunim as a political 
party.499 In Iran the post-revolutionary state formed an exaggerated form of national identity that was 
ideologically different from liberal democracies or socialist states. In a liberal democracy, as Barry 
Buzan argues, threats to a state can be divided into three groups: threats that target the idea of a state 
(nationalism), threats that target the physical and material existence of a state (population and 
resources), and the threats that target the political system of a state. In these post-revolutionary states 
however, these issues were identified as threats to both the state and religion.500 For reformists in Iran 
and secularists in Israel, part of the domestic challenge during the State-Maintenance Phase has been re- 
stating boundaries between politics and religion and changing the closed political culture of the states 
which identifies revolution as the ultimate and deliberate target of all security threats regardless of their 
economic, political, or social nature. Attaching a sense of urgency to securing revolutionary ideals 
legitimized the post-revolutionary states based on the system against which they had revolted. In Iran the 
Islamic Republic copied the monarchical system. Israel focused on the blood-relation of the people as 
the basis of its identity in order to transform Revolutionary Messianism into a collective national and 
religious identity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The process of State Building in both Iran and Israel resulted in the progressive hegemony of Securitized 
Messianism over politics. Normally the focus of studies on state authority is on the political decisions of 
the states, but it is more useful to explain the relationship between national state legitimacy and 
revolutionary identity by using Buzan’s securitization model. It allows us to see the relationship 
between Revolutionary Messianism and the construction of national identity. It also clarifies how 
different perspectives generate a semi-unified idea of messianism centred on the sacredness of land, 
contextual security threats, and the continuation of history that define theology in modern political 
discourse. Although theologians have different perspectives regarding various religious laws as the 
outcomes of the hermeneutics of the sacred texts, revolutionary hermeneutics generate similar 
understandings of the sacred texts with a nationalist tone. 
The hegemony of Securitized Messianism in these states works in accordance with their revolutionary 
ideology and legitimizes the authority of the state, its political culture, and the security goals of the 
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country. In Israel and Iran, in the phase of State Building, securitization created a form of state elitism 
that contradicted the revolutionary understanding of equality. While the securitization process 
connected the Jewish and Shi’a understanding of political authority to post-revolutionary state identity, it 
articulated the states’ definition of nationalism in the State-Building Phase. It translated revolutionary 
messianic hope into the territorial expansion of Zionism in Israel and the Islamization and exportation of 
the revolution in Iran by replacing the state as the ultimate factor for the fulfilment of messianic hope. 
Thus, religious discourse is focused on justifying the state’s policies, or theologizing the states’ conflicts. 
In both states, the conflict situation directed the securitization of messianism towards military idealism 
in the post-revolutionary states. The hermeneutics of sacred texts on messianism accommodated state 
politics and provided it with a source of legitimacy. The securitization of Revolutionary Messianism 
during this phase developed into the ideological foundation of the states’ political structure. The 
existence of a conflict situation, specifically a conventional war, denied the prospect of any political 
alliance amongst oppositional groups in Iran and suppressed Sephardim voices in Israel. Securitized 
Messianism differs from Revolutionary Messianism in terms of its understanding of the concept of 
authority and the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
 
During the State-Building Phase, the securitization process forced Iran and Israel to emphasize their 
central power, characterize their national identity, and solidify their relationship with the Cold War 
superpowers. In Israel the wars strengthened the states’ military, economic, and political ties with the 
United States of Amercia and prompted the unification of religious and secular political groups against 
external military threats. In Iran, Khomeini identified the United States of Amercia’s military bases in 
the region, its military involvement in regional politics, and its support of Iraq during the war as threats 
against the revolution and used these factors as foundations for the Islamic Republic’s securitization 
project. Securitized Messianism legitimized a new form of national identity that relied heavily on 
religious tradition and the history of the revolution. The securitization process created an alliance 
between the military, religious groups, and individuals who shared the goal of protecting the state. 
These groups, although different in their strategies, ideologically supported the securitization process 
and were both nationalist and religious. 
 
Contrary to the Revolutionary Phase, in which an ideological idealism united various social groups, the 
State-Building Phase witnessed the alliance between the state and social groups based on the groups’ 
military and security support of the state. Religion, which had been a significant motivator of political 
opposition during the Revolutionary Phase, became a subcategory of Securitized Messianism during the 
State-Building Phase. In Israel, the parallel progress of State Building and nation building created a 
harmonious development for the solidification of state authority. In Iran, the imposing of a 
revolutionary identity over a well established national identity for the state proved more problematic. 
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The securitization process in this phase resolved the question of the relationship between the state’s 
national identity and its religious identity. However, this issue poses an ongoing challenge to these states, 
which indicates that there is a real tension between Shi’a and Jewish understandings of authority and the 
modern political understanding of authority in a nation state. The next chapter examines how state 
elitism, militarism, and messianic goals became institutionalised in the states’ law and how challenges 
between the secular and the religious created tensions between the new class of political theologians and 
theological politicians. 
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Chapter 4 - Land, State,  Law and the Messiah: Rethinking Divine Law and State 
 
Constitution 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
During the institutionalization of Revolutionary Messianism in the legal system the most crucial 
challenge for Israel and Iran has been accommodating the contradiction between the religious nature of 
messianism and the secular structure of state institutions. In both cases, reconciling contradictions 
between the bureaucratic legal system of a nation state and the theological dimension of messianism has 
been a political issue as well as a legal and theological one. This manifests in the challenges their 
respective legal systems face. This chapter argues that the main functions of Securitized Messianism are 
the legitimization of the state and the formation of a legal system that incorporates both religious and 
civil laws. The success of the institutionalization of Securitized Messianism depends on the success of 
the states’ legal system in resolving these post-revolutionary challenges and also in re-defining the 
boundaries between the secular and the religious. For defining any boundary between legal and religious 
laws both these states require a security discourse that theologically relies on messianism while 
accommodating the realities of the states’ institutional structure. 
 
In these states, the existence of contradictory religious and national sources of law poses difficulties for 
the development of coherent legal systems and defining who a citizen is and what their rights are. In 
addition, due to the importance of messianism in their revolutions, neither of these legal systems could 
be completely non-religious or religious. The solution for resolving this tension is in enacting sets of 
disciplinary laws based on their revolutionary messianic ideals. Moreover, the requirement to 
institutionalise such a disciplinary framework establishes the political and the religious legitimacy of their 
legal systems. In both cases, as the result of the involvement of the state in theological debates and 
issues, and the involvement of theologians in practical politics, the institutionalization of Securitized 
Messianism in the legal system of the states leads to the de-privatization of religion.501 For these states, 
the main challenge in the de-privatization process appears to be sustaining the efficiency of their legal 
systems in balancing the secular and religious sources of law and maintaining their political legitimacy 
within the national context. Due to their different political structures, the de-privatization of religion 
takes different forms in each state. The existence of a secular parliament, free media, and commitment 
to distribution of political power in Israel has produced many public spaces for negotiating these 
challenges. The presence of a conflict situation in the country serves to unite various political groups 
 
 
 
501 I use Casanova’s definition of “de-privatization” in this study on public religion. He writes “By deprivatization I mean the 
fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of 
modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them.” J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 5. 
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and very often it re-contextualises domestic issues and makes them less contentious. In Iran these 
challenges have weakened the closed political system and created a legitimacy crisis for the state. 
 
This chapter investigates these developments by first studying the contextual factors that contribute to 
the transition of Securitized Messianism to Politicised Messianism before discussing these abstract 
notions in the case studies. It examines these changes in Iran from 1985 to 1997, particularly focusing 
on the shift of authority from Khomeini to Khamenei. In the case of Israel, it concentrates on the 1990s 
and the rise of the Shas party. The central argument of this chapter is that these changes are a phase in 
this unfolding process which I have called a transition from Securitized Messianism to Politicised 
Messianism. This chapter outlines the overview of the concept of law in secular nation states and the re- 
setting of legal structures in these post-revolutionary states, then, uses examples to illustrate how these 
states move from the State Building to State-Maintenance Phase. While in the process of explaining this 
transition this chapter refers to some of the legal changes in the real politics, and particularly focuses on 
the formal legal discourse by which these states manage their religious traditions and transform them to 
national laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Law and Securitization of Messianism 
 
 
The non-existence of a divine transcendent power is the indispensable institutional foundation of 
 
modern laws.502 In a nation state, the grounds for the legitimation of law are the decisions of its citizens. 
Citizens can evaluate political parties’ policies in elections and determine the success or failure of 
national political decisions. The limitation of law is subsequently bound to the sovereignty of a state and 
its efficiency in managing public affairs. The state authority is designated on the basis of a social contract 
between citizens and the state. Anthony Giddens argues that the deconstruction of pre-modern trust 
relations in European states and the establishment of modern political trust relations (which is between 
state institutions and the populace) gave meaning to European nation states.503 The reconstruction of 
trust relations around new sources of legitimacy and the establishment of legal systems were the 
political consequences of modernity. Institutional trust relations have remained a determining feature of 
 
modern legal systems since the establishment of nation states in the eighteenth century. 
 
 
 
 
 
502 In modern nation states, the states are not institutionally reliant on transcendental power, except, in somewhat 
anachronistic professions of transcendence in national symbols and rituals such as national anthems or currencies. A. Giddens, 
The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 102. 
503 Ibid. 
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For a legal system to be an efficient state institution, it must create a form of trust between the public 
and the state. In Israel and Iran the post-revolutionary understanding of legitimacy and the tension 
between religious and political sources of legitimacy in relation to national laws have transformed 
traditional religious trust relations. As a result of supporting the institutional model for a national legal 
system, the clergy have necessarily limited their power over legal matters, as the examples in this chapter 
demonstrate. Religious/non-religious tensions and changes in the political atmosphere of these states 
have played vital roles in transforming theological approaches towards the power of the state and in the 
establishment of trust between the populace and a political state. In both states, the subjectivity of the 
individual is a central and contentious issue between the state and religious institutions and a problematic 
issue in theological debates. The inconsistency between the modern understanding of an autonomous 
individual and the theological definition of an individual is also evident in national political debates. 
 
Following Hobbes and his theory of the atomic individual, most western political philosophers have 
defined an individual as having some inalienable rights. Arthur Lord categorized the main factors in the 
modern political understanding of the relationship between the state and the individual into three 
groups. The first is that an individual is the centre of any political thought. The second is that an 
individual is “coming to count for more” in a modern political world and the third is that an individual 
“ought to count for more” in a modern political order.504 Both Jewish and Shi’a religious traditions 
acknowledge the rights of an individual based on their commitment to their religion and the fulfilment 
of their moral duties towards their faith.505 Thus individuals are connected to each other by sets of 
religious, social, and political duties and not only by their individual choices. This religious perspective 
on individual rights contradicts the legacy of the west in which hyper individualism, the protection of an 
individual’s interests, remains a dominant concern. As Revolutionary Messianism develops into a 
security-orientated ideology, traditional understanding of individual commitment to religion transforms 
into one’s service and commitment to the security of the state and also striving towards its messianic 
goals. This transformation limits legal debates on individual and civil rights to political and legal 
concerns over state security. Although Israel and Iran have adopted radically different approaches 
towards national laws and individual rights, their legal decisions and policies are primarily affected by 
security issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
504 A. R. Lord, The Principles of Politics: an Introduction to the Study of the Evolution of Political Ideas (Ayer, MA: Ayer Publishing, 
1971), 205. 
505 M. Fakhry, An Interpretation of the Qur'an: English Translation of the Meanings trans. by M. Fakhry, (NY: New York 
University Press, 2004), (Q. Surah 48:6), (Q. Surah 47:4), (Q. Surah 2:191), (Q. Surah 9:12-28-29-123), (Q. Surah 2:191), 
(Q. Surah 33:61) 
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An account of the relationship between the individual and the religio-political state should be 
complemented by examining these states’ policies regarding the relationship between individuals, 
religion, and the state. This observation leads to an analysis of the tension in these legal systems which 
incorporate a religious understanding of the individual who is not born free, is bound to a religious or 
communal contract with others, and is particularly responsible for the protection of God’s rights in 
modern institutional trust relations between a legal system and citizens. The establishment of 
institutional trust relations in the post-revolutionary states and their religious and political implications 
determine the limits on the rights of religious figures and institutions in legal decision making but 
struggles to create a coherent legal system that protects the rights of all citizens regardless of their 
religious identity. In the security-orientated policies which relate to the civil rights of citizens in these 
states, the equality of individuals supersedes the liberty of individuals. Nonetheless, theological attempts 
to present a theological explanation of national laws and civil rights serve to securitize Revolutionary 
Messianism, eradicate boundaries between religious and national communities, and prioritize the 
political responsibilities of individuals. When a legal definition of the limits of individual freedom is 
solely discussed within the context of national security, the choice of individuals regarding their 
religious identity is undermined. Moreover, such a legal system makes civil rights conditional upon the 
political environment and becomes progressively dependant for legitimacy on the rise of religious and 
rightwing political parties. 
 
Trust  Relations 
 
 
Giddens considers four categories to distinguish the concept of trust and trust relations between pre- 
modern and modern cultures.506 He views kinship relations as a device for organising identity in pre- 
modern societies and identifies the relationship between an authority and a subject as the way to define 
identity. The local community played a crucial role in these societies as a place for constructing and 
establishing trust relations.507 Religious cosmologies in pre-modern societies were another foundation 
for trust relations. Religious traditions complemented these factors, which functioned as a means to 
connect the past to the present and present a historical continuity for society.508 Giddens argues that the 
two concepts of trust and risk in pre-modern cultures were limited to the danger that nature, human 
violence, and malicious magic posed to the group. Modernity, he argues, transformed these concepts.509 
Contrary to the pre-modern system, trust in the modern period relies on a personal relationship instead 
of kinship. Modernity created an abstract system that replaced local communities with national 
 
 
 
506 In this research trust is defined in relation to state politics and does not refer to personal trust in social relations. A. 
Giddens, op. cit., 102. 
507 Ibid. 
508 Ibid. 
509 A. Giddens, op. cit., 100. 
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communities and has functioned as a means for establishing social relations. In modern societies, future- 
orientated and rational thought performs a social function similar to the function that classical religious 
cosmologies played in explaining natural threats.510 
 
Giddens explains the role of religion and religious cosmology in relation to trust relations in the pre- 
modern context as mediatory.511 Religious beliefs, he asserts, can be a source of anxiety and should be 
categorised as a risk. The moral principles embedded in a religious cosmology highlight the 
establishment of trust as a priority between humans and a transcendental force when facing natural 
threats, rather than the creation of a direct link between humans and nature. This complex net of anxiety 
and theological explanation made the transcendent the ultimate source of trust and attributed to religion 
and religious specialists a mediatory role.512 He places emphasis on the reliability which religion gives to 
the “experience of event and situations” and argues that religion provides a framework for individual and 
collective responses to these events.513 Giddens defines religious tradition not solely as an organized body 
of rituals and beliefs, but as the manner by which beliefs and practices are arranged in relation to time, 
which he explains as “a distinct mode of structuring temporality”.514 These modes of trust relations 
decreased after modernity and were replaced by a new understating of time-space and social relations. In 
the development of liberal democracies, he notes, the traditional form of trust relations was 
reconstructed and institutions established mechanisms to control “discretionary powers implied in trust 
relations”.515 Politically, modern institutional trust relations limit the power of state authorities to 
institutional interactions and shape the institutionalization of modern politics in European nation 
states.516 
The radical shift from pre-modern to modern understandings of the trust relations involves conceptual 
transition of trust relations at the social level from an agent based system into an institutional one. This 
form of institutionalised trust, which is now clearly established in liberal democratic states, also creates 
 
 
 
510 Ibid, 102. 
511 Ibid. 
512 Guido Mollering in his book ‘Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity’ explains the conditions and limits to any philosophical 
debates on trust. He warns that there is an infinite number of issues that need to be considered when studying trust or using 
the term in academic research. He notes that trust, like justice or freedom, is an abstract concept. The issue of trust becomes 
important when a lack of trust is felt. He notes “ The plea “Trust me!” certainly sounds helpless and/or raises suspicion in 
most practical situations, irrespective of whether it is uttered by a loved one or the leader of a nation- and is therefore 
generally not to be recommended except as a very last resort, if only because it draws attention to a potential failure as 
mentioned above.” G. Mollering, Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity (West Yorkshire: Emerald Group Publishing, 2006), 
Introduction, 3. 
513 A. Giddens, op. cit., 103. 
514 He considers Levi-Strauss’s notion of “reversible time” essential to his understanding of the temporality of people’s 
behaviour and faith. Ibid, 105. 
515 Ibid. 
516 In his study of democracy and trust, Warren asserts that liberal democracy stems from public distrust of traditional 
religious and elite political authorities. M. E. Warren, Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
1. 
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distinction between trust in people and confidence in institutions.517 While trust between individuals is 
based on face-to-face contact, familiarity and a history of personal exchange, institutional confidence is a 
product of the efficiency of the institution itself.518 Due to the central role of citizens and the 
development of political participation culture, the regulations that the states’ institutions envisage, aim 
to create confidence in people which is central to the legitimization of regulations.519 
 
Israel and Iran face many challenges in adopting the modern changes of trust relations during the State- 
Building Phase. Contrary to secularized European states, these revolutionary messianic states are 
obliged to use the agent-based pre-modern trust relations in order to create public confidence in the 
state and to mobilise support for the legal system. The unique use of pre-modern trust relations in 
legitimising Iran and Israel’s legal system is further complicated by the security-orientated policies of 
both states and the established economic connections between the military and revolutionary elites. The 
latter creates a tight relationship between the local economy and the legal system, which prevents the 
establishment of secular regulations. Therefore, instead of regulations, the states base their legitimacy 
on an agent based trust relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal Authority of Securitized Messianism 
 
 
Authority involves attributing certain privileged rights to a particular individual or group of individuals. 
In Iran and Israel, one of the main challenges to establishing authority through the legal system relates to 
how each state affirms and sustains its “authority”. In these states, a key factor in presenting a claim for 
the ultimate authority of the legal system is the continuing theological tension between the transcendent 
and the actual. Theologically, for both religious systems, the contention that an individual or select group 
of individuals has authority over others appears to contradict the exclusive authority of God. According 
to the theological view, a state can only enjoy legal authority but cannot exercise transcendental 
authority over others. The conflict between the authority of the transcendent and the actual authority of 
the state is the main concern of many religious voices. These religious spokespeople challenge and reject 
the authority of a securitized state. This conflict between religious and secular viewpoints results in the 
emergence of opposing political positions regarding the condition and limits of the authority of the legal 
system over religion and politics. This notion contradicts a key foundation of 
the secular legal system, in which political decisions are taken independently of religious institutions and 
 
 
 
 
517 Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviou, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 344. 
518 Ibid. 
519 Ibid. 
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figures. Examining how Iran and Israel define political authority highlights their similarities and their 
differences in understanding the limits and conditions of the states’ actual and transcendent authority. 
 
The tension between traditional authority and political legitimacy marks the first phase of the 
institutionalization of messianism. A nation state could not be built without a legitimate ruling system. 
Contrary to secular nation states in which public trust is the foundation for political legitimacy and 
stability, in Iran and Israel it is the Securitized Messianism that enables each state to establish civil and 
political institutions. Consequently, each of these institutions should be legitimated in order to be able 
to function, and should be publically engaged in creating social trust. They achieve the transformation of 
divine sovereignty into political authority by institutionalising the divine authority of the Messiah into 
the religious identity of the state. This process creates challenges for traditional religious institutions and 
their understandings of the authority of God over human affairs. Therefore, while in modern nation 
states the power of religious agents and institutions is limited as they gave their legal power to the 
nation states’ representative, in Iran and Israel the authority of the states representatives is emanates 
from securitized messianic laws and religious sources. 
 
The limits of the rights of the legal authority of a state cannot be explained without defining the sources 
and conditions of national law. In Israel and Iran, law is a combination of divine laws (revelations) and 
political laws copied from European Constitutions which require theological justifications. Accordingly, 
in both phases of institutionalization and in the implementation of a national law, these states are 
dependent on religious institutions. Messianic debates, thus, become politically orientated and 
introduce modern issues such as citizenship, parliamentary bills, and individual freedom into theological 
debates. These states become responsible for policing society on behalf of religious institutions while also 
fulfilling the duties of a modern nation state in providing social services such as healthcare and education. 
Consequently, the duty of protecting the religious identity of national law is annexed to the 
responsibilities of a modern legal system. Gradually, the legal systems in these states develop a strong 
dependency on religious institutions. This political situation created an environment in which new 
political parties became subservient or reactionary to influential religious institutions for political 
legitimacy. 
 
The political implications of the securitization process are not limited to civil regulations, security or 
defence laws. Securitized Messianism constructs the ideological foundation of the state and is imbedded 
in military, administrative, and legislative decisions, giving the administrations the legitimacy for 
enjoying executive power. As the State-Building Phase develops, theological institutions require state 
legitimization for social and religious efficiency. Consequently, they lose their semi-autonomous 
institutional administrative power and become subordinate institutions of the state. In turn, religious 
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institutions gain immense power over the legal structure of these states. The tension of the pre-modern 
agent-based trust relations and institutional trust relations further engages religious institutions in 
political competition. The relationship between legal system, administrative, and legislative powers 
creates a political public sphere where various groups challenge each other over sources and social 
implications of laws. Responses from each group to these challenges signal the level of cooperation or 
tension between religious and state institutions. These challenges incorporate various issues from 
decision making at an institutional level to the legitimacy of excising political power relations in the 
administration. 
 
Divine Law versus Collective Legal Solidarity 
 
 
According to Jewish and Shi’a theologies, those who are aware of the religious law and its 
 
interpretations should have the power to implement divine laws in the community. For a legal system in 
a messianic state to become legitimate in religious terms, national laws must consider the incorporation 
of theological views in any legal decision. In contrast, from a modern legal perspective the agents 
involved in implementing laws should be legal professionals, regardless of their religious commitment 
or knowledge. This tension in religio-political states results in the emergence of two new professional 
groups of theologian politicians and politician theologians.520   According to both groups, those who 
favour the increasing power of civil laws not only betray the state but also betray the divine plan of 
messianism. They attach a sense of urgency to strengthening the religious identity of the national law 
and legal system, consider secularism a threat to religion, and favour the extension of the power of a 
religious- based legal system into all aspects of social life.521 
 
Divine law is primarily distinguishable from human law in its source of legitimacy. The purpose of the 
expression or interpretation of divine law appropriates human intentions and actions into God’s law. 
Humans are obligated to obey the law and play a minimal role in formulating the law. Submission, 
rather than participation, defines the structure of religious laws. The religious justification for an 
individual’s submission to divine law is that God, as the omnipotent and omnipresent power in the 
world, has presented the best model of a legal system for the people, as he is the most aware of human 
needs and conditions. In addition, human beings, as God’s agents on earth, are responsible for the 
fulfilment of the divine promise via an absolute commitment to religious laws. The religious community 
and the divine are thus not in a reciprocal political relationship. In this uni-directional cosmology, 
without divine guidance, human beings are unable to fulfil their responsibilities on earth; without 
submission to God’s rules they cannot achieve redemption. In Jewish and Shi’a religious systems, the 
 
 
 
520 Y. Sarfati, The Rise of Religious Parties in Turkey and Israel; a Comparative Study, PhD Dissertation, University of Ohio, 2009 
521 For discussion of democracy in Iran and Israel see chapter six of this study. 
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obligation of obeying divine laws shape the individual’s communal and political identity and is a 
fundamental aspect of the rationalization of messianic goals. 
 
According to these messianic theologies, during the time of waiting, the clergy decide the nature and 
conditions of religious laws and discuss their understandings with other clergy in debates that are 
recorded in long lines of theological commentaries bound to the uni-directional theology.522 In the 
State-Building Phase this theological view of law combined with the securitized interpretation of sacred 
texts, constructs the ethics of the legal system. The framework of national law in each of these legal 
systems consists of regulations that stipulate the states’ explanation of communal history and the 
religious identity of its citizens. In addition to maintaining their connection with messianism the laws 
are written to consider the idealist vision that the states provide and the grounds for the coming of the 
messianic age. Contrary to religious groups, non-religious entities that support civil laws view national 
laws as contextualised, relative and demonstrative of the local characteristics and demands of a given 
society. Connecting the ethics of the legal system to messianism opens the possibility for both 
revolutionary elites and religious leaders to establish their position as the exclusive mediators of national 
law. It also justifies the use of exegesis in legal matters as a means for understanding the law and 
responding to the divinely- determined history that could lead the state to a messianic age. 
 
In both the Jewish and the Shi’a traditions, the political rule of the messianic age is legitimized by its 
legal situation: the fulfilment of divine law. In Shi’a tradition the Messiah’s legal power is not limited 
and covers all aspects of the social, political and economic life of the community and the wider world. 
523   His ultimate and just legal approach creates a collective solidarity amongst members in his state. In 
 
the Jewish tradition the messianic age and the messiah have never been clearly distinguished. 524 The 
prophets in the Torah are vague about the exact conditions of the messianic age and refer to it solely as 
‘the day of religion’, ‘the day to come’, ‘the day of the justice’, or ‘the day of judgement’. 525   Therefore, 
 
contrary to Shi’a Islam in which only a person (Mahdi) can bring about the messianic age, in Jewish 
tradition both the messianic age and a messiah are incorporated in messianic theology. 
The focus of messianic ideology on justice adds another layer of complexity to the structure of the legal 
system in these security orientated states. For the religious groups who support a strong religious legal 
system in the states, the concept of justice is exclusively theological. They rarely support issues that 
could strengthen civil society or individual rights. For religious groups, religious laws are the only sets 
 
522 By uni-directional theology I mean a theology that views God as the ultimate power in the world and understands the 
responsibility of humans to be submissive to the rules that God has sent to them through his prophets. 
523 According to the Shi’ites, Mahdi (Mohammad ibn Hassan Asghari), was born in Samarrah (868 CE) and after the 
martyrdom of his father went to occultation (Ghaybah). Hamid Dabashi and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Expectation of the 
Millennium: Shi’ism in History (NY: SUNY Press, 1989), 8. 
524 Personal conversation with Professor Paul Morris, 18, May 2011, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. 
525 Ibid. 
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of laws that are legitimate and able to create a just society. The feeling of injustice emanates from 
implementing human laws, which are temporary and solely concern the interests of individuals. Divine 
laws, which are permanent and comprehensive, ensure social justice and could lead a society to a 
messianic age. God grants the community the advantageous position as loyal servants who have suffered 
a history of discrimination but stood fast in their faith to the coming of a messianic age. The violation of 
religious laws by individuals, thus, brings God’s wrath on the state and the people and delays the 
messianic age. Therefore, for religious groups the states’ legal system becomes the primary institution 
for the integration of the national collective identity and the promise of messianism. In real politics, this 
ideological position emphasises the supervisory power of the state in the implementation of justice and 
grants legal legitimacy to the body of Rabbinic/Jurisprudential literature on law. This theological 
position reflects the traditional kinship political system in which a system of agent-based law governed 
communal affairs. 
 
The Differences between National Law in Iran and Israel 
 
 
The conflict situation that Iran and Israel faced during the State-Building Phase introduced another 
factor to the complex relationship between religion and politics. Securitization of messianism during 
these times created a vacuum of civil institutions, which contributed more power to religious 
institutions as the sole civil agency inside and outside the government in Iran. The Iranian state rapidly 
modernised traditional religious institutions, used their network systems, and monitored their funding 
and connections. Through these institutions, the Islamic Republic could easily stigmatize and suppress 
opposing groups like Marxists or Mojahidin.526 Parallel to the war against Iraq Khomeini established a 
state sponsored religious monitoring militia with executive power in all political and legal areas. The 
ideological and practical involvement of religious institutions in security issues modernized religious 
institutions and politicized the religious leaders’ stance regarding urbanization, gender issues and 
participation in the military. The combination of religious and political power ended the era of 
theological plurality and bound Shi’a Islam to the state’s Securitized Messianism. 
Khomeini validated the legitimacy of Jurisprudential Leadership by affirming its legal status.527 Similarly 
to the Constitutionalist Ayatollahs, Khomeini strongly disputed a post-revolutionary passive messianism 
and argued that an Islamic state was a pre-requisite for ending tyranny in the age of occultation, a 
position that anti-Constitutionalists like Nouri rejected. Simultaneously, like the anti-Constitutionalists, 
 
 
 
526 MKO, (Mojahedin Khalq Organization) is an Iranian political party with a military branch that played a significant role in the 
success of the 1979 revolution but was soon abandoned by Khomeini. The Islamic Republic executed thousands of its followers 
and many escaped Iran and settled in Europe or in a camp in Iraq. R. Cohen, The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 
1987-1997: Their Survival after the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Oxford: Sussex Academic Press, 
2009), 52-71. 
527 Article 111 in Iran’s Constitution, A. Ehteshami, After Khomeini: the Iranian  Second Republic (London: Routledge, 1995), 40. 
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Khomeini rejected the establishment of a legislative system that was focused on protecting the interests 
of individuals. He argued that introducing these political systems to the Middle East were strategies that 
the colonising powers employed to usurp Iran’s national resources and religious identity.528 Fanatically 
concerned with the future of religious institutions, Khomeini’s view of an Islamic state was that of a 
political state that would guarantee the persisting dominance of Shi’a ulama over Iran’s political, 
educational, and judicial systems. In order to achieve this objective he used the language of modern 
politics and excluded any law, regulation, or group who supported civil law from Iran’s political scene. 
 
The Islamic Republic legal system referred to Khomeini as the ultimate authority in managing Iran’s 
affairs and the Constitution became the secondary source of authority.529 Khomeini’s theory suggested 
that replacing a monarch with an alim (pl. ulama) and religious institution created an unsurpassed model 
of just leadership for Iran.530 The ulama, who had maintained their status as the agents of decoding the 
secret messages of the divine into everyday political affairs by their theological accomplishments, became 
national decision makers.531 Prior to his death, in a revision of Iran’s Constitution, Khomeini added the 
word “absolute” to Articles 111 and 57 and extended the limits of the power of Jurisprudential 
Leadership.532 The end of the war diverted the conflict from the front line to domestic 
issues and revived debates over state legitimacy that had been quieted during the first decade of the state. 
The charismatic leadership that cemented the secular foundations of Iran’s politics to Shi’a messianism 
died with Khomeini and the institutionalization of the leader’s legitimacy over Iran’s legal system 
proved challenging. 
 
According to Article 111 of Iran’s Constitution, an absolute Jurisprudential Leader delineates Iran’s 
policies and supervises the proper execution of the general policies of the system. 533   He is the supreme 
commander of the armed forces and declares both war and peace. He has the power to appoint or 
dismiss Clergy members on the Guardian Council, the country’s supreme judicial authorities, the head 
of the radio and television network, the joint chief of staff, the chief commander of the Islamic 
Revolution Guards Corps, and the supreme commanders of the armed forces.534 He signs the decree 
formalizing the election of the President and can dismiss the country’s elected president. He regulates 
the relations between the three wings of the armed forces and has the final verdict in problems that are 
 
528 Ruhollah Khomeini, op. cit.., http://www.al-islam.org/islamicgovernment/, accessed 10/11/2011. 
529 Translation of Iran’s Constitution: 
http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/Constitution.html, accessed 10/11/2011 
530 The first chapter of Khomeini’s book is dedicated to arguing for the necessity of establishing an Islamic state during the 
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not resolved by “conventional method”.535 Within the framework of Islam, he can pardon or reduce the 
sentences of convicts in a recommendation to the head of judicial power.536 According to Article 57 the 
powers of the state in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive 
powers, all of which function under the supervision of the absolute Jurisprudential Leader. These 
powers are independent of each other.537 This institutionalization of Jurisprudential Leadership in the 
Constitution reduced Shi’a messianism to a nationalistic security ideology. In Khomeini’s discourse, 
those who did not conform to his political translation of Shi’a uni-directional theology were represented 
as “anti-revolutionaries” who threatened “Islam” and should be excluded from any legal protection. In 
Iran, sustaining an Islamic Republic based on the authority of Jurisprudential Leadership after Khomeini 
could only be possible if people would place the protection of the position itself as the goal of a new 
securitization project. Khamenei and his circle became the agents of a new project that focused on 
strengthening their power bases in Iran’s legal system in order to stop Khatami’s de-securitization 
attempt.538 While Khomeini considered the Islamic revolution as an ideological religious state with 
unlimited executive power formed to provide the ground for the Mahdi’s revolution, while Khamenei 
re-defined Jurisprudential Leadership as the main factor that facilitated the coming of the Mahdi.539 
 
 
As the result of changes in the politics of the state in the post-war, post-Khomeini context, the Securitized 
Messianism that established Khomeini’s legitimacy became a potential security threat to the power of 
Jurisprudential Leadership. The ideological source of Khomeini’s legitimacy was the first challenge 
Khamenei faced in establishing his legitimacy. Khomeini legitimized his rule after a revolution. 
540 Whether, as secular Iranian scholars argue, Khomeini high-jacked Iran’s national revolution or 
 
whether he was truly the leader of the majority of revolutionaries, does not negate the fact that his 
legitimacy relied on public support for the revolution.541 On the contrary, Khamenei obtained his 
position as the result of a political decision and lacked theological legitimacy for the position. 
The lack of revolutionary legitimacy diverted Khamenei and his supporters’ attention to mystic schools 
of messianism. Gradually, the new fundamentalists separated the source of legitimacy of the 
Jurisprudential Leadership from the public and made it an exclusively divinely ordained position. 
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Khamenei supported this view, which advocated an active political role for the Mahdi in the legitimacy 
of Jurisprudential Leadership and diminished the importance of legitimation through public 
participation.542 The tension between the legalist and mystical schools of Shi’a messianism did not 
surface during Khomeini’s time it did, however, result in the ideological confrontation between 
reformists (who believe in the supremecy of the Constitution) and fundamentalists (who believe in the 
ultimate rule of the Jurrisprudential leader) over the source of legitimacy for the Jurisprudential 
Leadership during Khamenei’s time.543 The neo-fundamentalist messianic narratives affirmed that a 
JLwas one who is directly elected by the twelfth Imam and like him, has divine attributes. Therefore, 
submitting to the rule of a Jurisprudential Leader is the crucial means to understanding Shari’a. 544 
 
The other radical change in Khamenei’s project was the shift in the mythical symbol of the revolution. 
During the time of Khomeini when Ayatollahs Motahari, Montazari, and Taleqni were the revolution’s 
ideologues, the story of Hossein and his martyrdom in Karbala by Yazid’s army constructed the myth of 
the revolution.545 Shari’ati, Khomeini and other revolutionary thinkers used the Ashura myth to mobilize 
people for the war.546   After the war, however, Hossein’s myth lost its social function and was 
substituted by Shi’a messianism which magnified the role of a leader in a divinely ordained political 
system. The relationship between the Shi’a Imams, Hossein and Mahdi, during the time of the Mahdi is 
depicted in a Shi’a prayer called Nudbah. The prayer says that when the occultation is over the Shi’a 
third Imam, Hossein, will come back from heaven to confirm the Mahdi’s leadership. This relationship 
between Hossein and the Mahdi is mirrored in the way neo-fundamentalists view the relationship 
between Khomeini and Khamenei’s leadership.547 While in Iran, studying the power of the 
Jurisprudential Leadership institution and its relationship with other leadership institutions helps to 
explain the new securitization project, in Israel the focus of Zionism on the messianic age and the 
structure of the Knesset has formed a different arrangement for the relationship between political and 
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religious groups. The secular structure of the state of Israel creates various political spaces for the 
development of debates about the goals of securitization or the de-securitization of messianism. 
 
Supreme Court,  Rabbinic Courts, and Civil Courts548 
 
 
In their study of the historical background of the Supreme Court (High Court of Justice) in Israel, David 
Levi-Faur and others, explain that soon after the formation of the state, the High Court of Justice 
progressively achieved authority to be the ultimate reference in legal matters not only amongst the 
Jewish citizens of Israel, but also Israeli Arab citizens who viewed this legal system as “the last resort of 
hope”.549 They note that such a view is due to the professionalism of the court which results in more 
objective decisions.550 Gad Barzilai highlights the similarities between the United Sates Supreme Court 
and the High Court of Justice, particularly after the 1970s when the High Court of Justice became 
extensively involved in Israeli politics and extended its role in monitoring Knesset bills.551 The Court 
enjoyed a largely independent position during the Labor government of the early 90s when the Knesset 
passed three Constitutional laws “the Basic Law on Human Freedom and Dignity, the Basic Law on 
Freedom of Occupation, and the Basic Law on Government”.552 In the late 1990s, the increasing power 
of religious parties like Shas in the Knesset challenged the Supreme Court’s independence.553 Their 
independence was particularly undermined in negotiations amongst the political parties, when Shas 
agreed to a coalition with the Labor party only if those Court rulings that violated the “religion-secular 
status quo” in the agreement were removed.554 In 2000, the Knesset also joined the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). All of these initiatives were in 
conflict with some of the decisions of the Rabbinic Courts. Although the Supreme Court is adoptive of 
progressive democratic decrees, its struggle with the Chief Rabbinates over the accepting of conversion 
to Judaism in under the auspices of reform synagogues, the sponsoring of reform synagogues, and the 
citizenship status of non-Jewish citizens of Israel have continued. In 2009, Rabbinic Courts strongly 
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Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories (München, Germany: GRIN Verlag, 2008), 109-111. 
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552 Ibid. 
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judicial reviews and both have been criticized for replacing political debates with judicial activism. Ibid. 
554 Ibid, 48. 
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opposed the Supreme Court when it passed a law for funding conversion to Judaism under the auspices 
of reformed Jewish synagogues.555 
 
Rabbinic Courts functioned as community courts under the British Mandate prior to the formation of the 
state in Israel. During the mid 1950s Israel’s Knesset passed a legislative decree according to which the 
communal Rabbinic Courts became a subcategory of the national legal system.556 Since 1955, Rabbinic 
Court judges, like civil judges, have received a salary from the Israeli legal system.557 They service the 
Heredi communities who follow a Rabbi and refer to Rabbinic Courts for settling diverse local legal 
matters, including domestic issues such as marriage and divorce.558 Since that time the courts have been 
in disagreement with the secular legal establishment over civil laws. 559   Although, as they note, some 
level of conflict is inevitable in the legal settlement of civil issues such as divorce and marriage, settling 
issues can become more complicated due to the coexistence of legal systems. This is evident particularly 
in cases such as the case on the powers of the Rabbinic Courts in which the Supreme Court overruled the 
decision of a Rabbinic Court and favoured the wife’s right to a divorce, or in cases where the Supreme 
Court has accepted the citizenship of a homosexual partner. Both these examples highlight these 
complications but also indicate the Supreme Court’s power in Israeli society.560 
 
Institutionalization of Securitized Messianism in Israel’s Legal System 
 
 
Until the 1980s, the Israeli political scene was divided into statist and non-statist parties.561 Categorizing 
parties in Israel into these groups is based on their orientation toward the state. Until 1997, there were 
left and right parties who all acknowledged the state and its legal and political legitimacy. The non- 
statist parties were those who were ambiguous about the state or had theological objections to the state. 
The latter groups operated as political parties but did not participate in state processes. The statist parties 
were mainly consciously messianic; they considered the successful formation of a sovereign Jewish state 
to be an indispensible condition of redemption for Jews. The non-statist religious parties, 
on the other hand, argued that the Jewish people still lived under the conditions of exile and the state 
 
was not a precondition of messianism. For example, until 1977 the traditional Agudat Yisrael refused 
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to participate in any coalition government because they thought it would legitimise a secular state in the 
Holy Land. Ashkenazi European Zionists who constituted the majority of the Jewish population in the 
state and were strongly nationalist, attributed messianic characteristics to the state of Israel and 
dominated the country’s political scene until the emergence of political parties like the Shas. 
 
Agudat Yisrael was originally a religious non-statist party in Israel. It was formed in May 1912 out of the 
 
Chabad movement of Eastern Europe.562 For decades the party was the only Heredi party until the 
 
1980s, when Rabbi Elazar Shach formed his new party called Degel HaTorah (Flag [of] Torah). 
Lithuanian Heredi Jews formed the majority of the party’s politicians and constituents.563   The spiritual 
leader of the later Shas party, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, was a member of Agudat before he formed the 
Sephardic (Middle Eastern/Eastern) religious party (Shas) in 1984.564 The Shas party became 
increasingly involved in secular party politics in the Knesset after its formation. In the late 1980s, the 
party was separated from the United Torah Judaism voting block and candidate lists.565 The growing 
power of religious parties, specifically the Shas party, influenced the legal system and undermined the 
Supreme Court’s secular foundations via the Rabbinic Courts who managed the affairs of the Heredi 
communities. In the 1980s, the Shas party achieved great political success.566 Studies on Shas suggest 
that some of the reasons for this success were (and continue to be) its strong opposition to Zionist 
Ashkenazi elitism, and discrimination against Sephardim cultural and Halakhic traditions, as well as the 
poor economic conditions of the Sephardim.567 The following section discusses the success of the Shas 
party in lobbying with other religious parties over the expansion of the power held by the Rabbinic 
Courts over Israeli society which is a means for the party to gain political authority and demonstrates 
their views on the messianic goals of the state of Israel. 
 
To a great degree, the change of security policies in Israel and the rise of political parties like the Shas 
were the result of the de-securitization of the Cold War environment, which terminated the bipartisan 
security arrangement in the region. De-securitization instigated the breakdown of traditional military 
alliances and the rearrangement of the regional security map. In Israel, the end of the Cold War, as well 
as the end of Israel’s conventional wars with Arab countries reshaped the balance of political power. 
The Securitized Messianism during the time of conflict in Israel could not be sustained by the 
 
revolutionary elites in the post-war context. Although the Israel Defence Force’s sporadic fights with 
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Palestinian armed groups and the Lebanese Hezbollah continued, the end of the Cold War ended the 
possibility of a Soviet sponsored attack on Israel for being the United State’s strategic ally in the region. 
In addition, the war between Iraq and Iran de-securitized the idea of a war between Israel and a united 
pan-Arab force. However, the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza and the expansion of Israeli 
settlements led to more violent attacks against Israel from Palestinian groups. Thus, the de- 
securitization of Israel’s securitized Zionism and the lack of security in the new settlements gave rise to 
new tensions and sporadic wars and Israel moved from one securitization project to another in which 
Palestinians, instead of Arabs, became the dominant security threat. 
 
Within the state, the growth of the Shas party and their political success signalled the end of the 
hegemony of Ashkenazi Zionists over Israeli domestic politics. The forming of the Shas party 
demonstrated the success of the state’s securitization project in establishing its legitimacy as an inclusive 
centre of legal decision-making that both secular and religious political groups accepted. The defeat of 
the Labor party in the parliamentary elections of the late 80s affirmed the change that religious Zionism 
created in Israeli political culture. Religious Zionism motivated Sephardim to participate in state politics. 
Contrary to traditional Heredi communities, who refused to join the army and rarely became involved 
in state politics outside their community interests, the new religious Zionists considered themselves an 
integrated part of Israeli society and joined the Israeli Defence Forces. They were mainly educated in 
Ashkenazi Kookist schools, had completed their military service, and entered parliamentary party 
politics as an ethno-religious nationalist party. 
 
A Council of Torah Sages that includes Rabbinic Councils of prominent religious leaders of the Heredi 
communities designates, supervises, and confirms the policies of the Shas party.568 The Rabbinic Council 
and prominent members like Yosef fiercely criticize the “morally deprived” way of secular life, basing 
their party’s politics on anti-secularism.569 Their disagreement with the Supreme Court is due to some 
of the court’s decisions which have undermined the power of Rabbinic Courts over issues of marriage 
and divorce. The power of the Rabbinic Court is a crucial issue for the Council of Torah Sages and 
Heredi communities. While the former enjoys economic benefits, such as state remuneration, from the 
Rabbinic Courts in Heredi communities, the latter increase their power within the legal system by 
training theologian politicians for Rabbinic Courts in Yeshivot.570 Having access to financial resources 
from the state has enabled Shas to expand its constituency, and take advantage of coalition opportunities 
in the Knesset for extending its influence in the Ministry of Justice and the Rabbinic Courts. In spite of 
their pragmatic politics within the Knesset, they remain an exclusively authoritarian and hierarchical 
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party. The Shas’ emphasis on the Sages’ Council is an indicator of their theological position in relation 
to political and religious authority in the state. They use their power in the Knesset to minimise the 
influence of secular parties like the Meretz within the legal system.571 The institutionalization of Rabbi 
Kook’s Zionist messianism in the post-war Yeshivot created a political ideology in which economic, 
social, and political developments were discussed in relation to the religious identity of the state and 
politicians.572 
 
In Israel, as the result of Sephardim’s political participation and the growth of their political party, the 
Shas followers’ economic networks and connections have expanded. Ironically, the party owes its 
success to the support of lower class Sephardim who rely on the Shas’ lobbying power for greater 
financial assistance from the government.573 The party achieves its political power in the parliament by 
using anti-secular and anti-elitist policies. In parliamentary election campaigns they use populist 
economic slogans and emphasize the protection of the religious tradition of Sephardim communities.574 
Their strong emphasis on family institutions guarantees the inheritance of land in Heredi communities 
and has strengthened the legitimacy of local religious leaders in Rabbinic Courts. In rural Heredi 
settlements, communal work and social life reinforce the merging of individual identity into collective 
religious identity. The residential proximity of the religious communities intensifies the ritualistic 
observance of religious regulations. The power of the Shas party among its constituents relies on 
maintaining traditional trust relations that involve the mediation of a rabbi in the political and legal 
decisions of the party. 
 
For religious parties like the Shas, the responsibility of a Jewish state during the age of absence is 
articulated in their commitment to implementing religious laws.575 Rabbis in the Shas council share this 
messianic belief with other Hasidic parties. According to religious parties, it is only through the absolute 
commitment of the state of Israel to its Jewish identity that the coming of the messianic age is 
possible.576 The Heredi religious parties share a foundational philosophy of Judaism that connects the 
institutions of rabbis to Jewish identity.577 Religious parties in Israel consider commitment to Halakhah 
to be the main source of state legitimacy and proof of its commitment to Jewish identity.578 As Esther 
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Benbassa notes, theologically Jews are chosen to serve God and fulfil his commandments. 579 Without 
this definition it would be problematic to define Judaism. However, she argues that the Heredi’s 
definition of Judaism does not satisfy the multi-cultural fabric of Israel.580 
 
Although the religious parties have not achieved enough Knesset seats to control Israeli politics, they 
have achieved extensive power in forming coalition governments. Shas leaders deal pragmatically with 
other parties in the Knesset.581 Their interparty politics is similar to other religious parties, where a 
Rabbinic Council of Sages decides party politics and the relationship between rabbis and politicians is 
hierarchical and authoritative.582 In Shas, Rabbi Yosef is the spiritual leader and none of the party’s 
decisions are implemented without his advice.583 In fact, Shas’ strong criticisms of the Supreme Court 
are partly due to the inconsistencies between the sources of legitimacy in Rabbinic and Civil Courts.584 
Lobbying the Knesset to increase the power of the Rabbinic Courts allows religious parties to use their 
parliamentary positions to extend the power of rabbis in civil matters such as marriage and divorce. 
 
The legal system in Israel consists of two parallel systems of Rabbinic and Civil Courts. As a secular 
institution, the Supreme Court is the highest court in the country and mediates between rabbinic and 
civil courts in legal debates over national laws and in judging controversial cases. In each city and 
kibbutz there is a Rabbinic Court, which mainly consists of three learned Jewish men who address 
communal issues.585 Religious Sephardim and Ashkenazim have their own national chief rabbis and each 
community has its own Rabbi and settle their matters in the Rabbinic Courts.586 Civil Courts settle civil 
matters for the non-religious population, whether they live in urban centres or rural kibbutz.587 The 
existence of two parallel legal systems makes it legally impossible to decide whether an issue is secular 
or religious. Besides, amongst religious communities, who refer to Rabbinic Courts for all their claims, 
the religious courts have authority to validate the ritual of circumcision (Shechita) and burial practices, 
certify the kosher status for food manufacturers and restaurants, supervise animal sacrifice (Mohelim), 
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accept or reject conversion (Giyur), monitor and supervise the status of ritual baths (Mikvah) and 
determine whether one is a true Jew.588 
 
The rabbinic decisions on each of these matters and the conditions of their power have generated lasting 
political debates in the Knesset. 589   Shas party Knesset members accuse the Supreme Court of 
interfering in religious affairs when it makes final decisions over citizenship cases for those who are 
converted in reform establishments, or asking the public to keep a record of their genealogy. 590   The 
issue of increasing the authority of the Rabbinic Court is such a pivotal matter for the religious parties 
that presenting a bill in parliament for increasing their power was discussed during the coalition 
negotiations between religious and non-religious parties.591 Politicians in Israeli religious parties use 
national symbols such as the flag, currency, the national anthem, and religious myths and language to 
gain religious and political authority. Their national identity relies heavily on constructing and 
maintaining beliefs in religious Zionism as an alternative governing model.592 The successful 
institutionalization of Securitized Messianism into progressive Politicised Messianism has played a 
significant role in the construction of Shas political identity. The nationalist sentiments incorporated in 
progressive messianism are manifested in the party’s use of religious language in legislative debates, 
legal procedures, and the categorization of law. 
 
During the securitization process, the states’ legal systems in Iran and Israel developed rapidly into 
exclusivist legal powers. They mainly protected the interests of the post-revolutionary elite class and 
became a site of fierce competition between the developing political factions, each of which presented a 
different ideal about the relationship between religion and politics in the religio-political states. 
Securitization in Israel made rabbinic legislative institutions an indispensible component of the national 
legal system and gave rise to political groups such as Israel Beiteinu, Meretz and Shas who differ in their 
views about the role that religion should play in state politics. Moreover, the inherent tension between 
secular and religious sources of law in the Israeli legal system is evident in the limits and conditions of 
the power of Rabbinic Courts in the state, as well as in differences between the Supreme Courts and 
Rabbinic Courts over some legal decisions such as conversion, and the conflicts between parties over 
bills that address the limits of the power of Rabbinic Courts. The roles and policies of the religious 
Zionist parties in the Knesset are conditional upon their success in political debates and increasing their 
influence in the legal system. 
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Theologically, if the religious identity of the legal system, as fundamentalists in both states argue, is 
necessary and sufficient requirement for the implementation of justice, the existence of a secular source 
of legitimacy in the form of a Constitution or Basic Laws is unnecessary and ineffective. In addition, the 
inclusion of secular concepts such as freedom of speech, civil rights, and political participation, which 
are all modern western political concepts, depends on the social and political acceptance of individual 
rights. In Iran the framework of the Constitution includes phrases like “freedom” or “civil rights”, 
however, the dominance of the rule of Islamic Shari’a over the Constitution and the centrality of the role 
of Jurisprudential Leadership in the legal and political systems has created a convoluted document in 
which these phrases become meaningless. In Israel, the Rabbinic Courts’ influence over civil issues such 
as marriage and divorce challenge the secular structures of the Basic Laws. These unclear areas make 
defining the concept of democracy in Iran very problematic. Specifically, such a definition becomes 
challenging when issues such as consensual harmony, equality, and the common good are defined in 
relation to a divine promise. Contrary to democratic Constitutions in which the source of reference for 
democracy is the society, the Islamic Republic defines democracy theologically. 
 
In Israel, the state’s structure of political power distribution and election supervision allows political 
parties to efficiently negotiate their differences in elections. According to section 4 of Israel’s Basic Law, 
which was re-enacted in 1958, members of the Knesset should be elected in “general, country-wide, 
direct, equal, and proportional elections” based on a proportional party list system.593 An all-party 
central committee administers the election, from country-wide candidate lists, to counting votes. A 
Supreme Court judge, a member of the party, and a representative from District and Polling 
Committees chair the central committee. The parties are permitted to appoint representatives to 
polling committees.594 Ideologically, the emphasis of religious Zionists on the messianic age, rather than 
 
a messiah, as well as in supporting progressive messianism rather than esoteric messianism, forms a 
pluralistic approach to party politics. In Iran, the failure of the securitization process is the result of 
adopting an agent-based narrative of Revolutionary Messianism that emphasizes greatly the central role 
of clergy in political, social and economic decision-making and creates an authoritarian exclusivist 
political system that can be vulnerable to any social change. 
The institutionalization of state legitimacy in the form of an agent or institution based legal system 
shapes the relationship between the major political decision-making, legal, and religious institutions. 
The incorporation of religious regulations into modern law conflicts with the modern law’s intentional 
restriction of religious institutions in state administration. In non-religious states, the limitation placed 
 
 
593 Ibid. 
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political positions in public media. 
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on religious institutions explains the boundaries between religion and national law. These limitations 
also dictate to what degree the legal system investigates legal issues as purely legal matters separate from 
theological debates and how the state differentiates between the spheres of religion and law. However, 
the integration of national and religious laws in Israel and Iran de-constructs the notion of separation 
between the power of state agencies and religious institutions within the legal system. 
 
While in non-religious states, the administrative agencies are autonomous from religious institutions, in 
Israel and Iran the legal system is dependent on religious institutions both ideologically and 
pragmatically. This dependency not only deconstructs the boundaries between law and religion but also 
between religion and politics. In Israel, these issues underline political debates in the Knesset and 
significantly influence the structure of coalition governments. After the 1980s, when Israeli religious 
parties increased their political influence in various coalition governments, the Knesset has fiercely 
debated the role and power of the Rabbinic Courts in the legal system, especially in the Supreme 
Court’s legal decisions over civil issues such as the growing number of religious schools funded by 
religious parties. As the main centre of political decision-making, the Israeli Knesset creates a political 
sphere where political factions could compete. Therefore, the state’s political decisions are made based 
on the outcome of the debate within the Knesset or ultimately between the Knesset and the Supreme 
Court. By contrast, in Iran, the centralization of Jurisprudential Leadership has encouraged many 
political tensions between reformists, fundamentalists, and neo-fundamentalists, which has resulted in 
the neo-fundamentalists’ hegemony over religious and political institutions.595 
 
Legal Authority and Religious Institutions 
 
 
In both the Jewish and Shi’a traditions, prior to the Revolutionary Phase, identifying an absent divine 
individual as the only legitimate voice for interpreting divine law had encouraged a pluralistic system 
because there were many interpretations of the nature and goals of a messianic age. Apolitical 
messianism allowed the clergy to apply comparable hermeneutical methodologies in their studies of the 
sacred texts in order to minimize the threat of deviation while also encouraging a conditioned plurality 
within the socio-political context. According to these traditions, those sanctioned to interpret the sacred 
texts must accept monotheism and place the will of God as the rationale for all the laws they infer from 
sacred texts. In their hermeneutical studies individual clerics used faith as a mechanism that made the 
authority of an interpreter dependant on a divine determination and correct understanding of 
sacred texts. Relying on a system for understanding the laws based on contextualization has constructed 
the theological structure of legislative theologies in Jewish and Shi’a traditions, both of which emphasise 
human logic with a pragmatic view of society. 
 
595 “Karroubi Accuses Guardian Council of Partiality,” Press TV, Tue, Apr 07, 2009, 
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As discussed in previous chapters, Jewish and Shi’a apolitical messianism acknowledged a non-religious 
space for the economic and social engagements of individuals. Apolitical messianism is a survival 
strategy which has enabled both traditions to deal with changing political environments throughout 
history. Accommodating political changes would be a matter of survival for both individuals and 
communities and a responsibility for individual clerics whose legitimation was necessary for any 
accommodation but their legitimization was based on their spiritual status rather than political authority 
within the governing system. The State-Building Phase changed religious institutions into subordinates of 
the state and obliged them to participate politically. As a consequence, both political theologians and 
apolitical theologians needed to gain legitimacy from the states instead of solely relying on religious 
institutions. 
 
This politically made authority attributed to them was conditional on the power to appropriate state 
laws for religious regulation, but their power was dependent on the success of the institutionalization of 
Securitized Messianism.596 From this new condition, there emerged a complex web of political relations 
that deconstructed the traditional system in which the legitimacy of a cleric was established solely based 
on his individual commitment to religious obligations. Exegeses and religious literary comments thus 
became infused with political notions and religious institutions involved themselves in lobbying for 
more financial support from the state. This association fostered a pragmatic political approach to the 
state within religious institutions. However, within the theological schools, this pragmatic approach 
narrowed the scope of theological debates. As the future of the religious communities became an 
associated topic with the future of the state, the institutionalization process bonded the future of the 
state to the future of religion. 
 
In post-revolutionary Iran, there are very few theological positions or critiques published on the theory 
of Jurisprudential Leadership in theological schools. Groups of Ayatollahs with connections to the 
Leadership Institution monitor the main theological centres in Qom and Mashhad. Moreover, until the 
early 1980s, the ulama had autonomous sources of income from the religious taxes of Khums, Zakat, 
and Sahm-e Imam (the Share of the twelfth Imam). Khomeini’s theory of Jurisprudential Leadership 
institutionalised Iran’s Shi’a theological schools, terminated their financial autonomy, normalised their 
functions, and diminished their elite status in Iranian society.597 
In Iran, contrary to the situation in Israel, the reformist and fundamentalist Ayatollahs do not argue 
whether or not the government should support religious education or have religious education included 
 
 
596 The Leadership Institution receives large amounts of money from the Sahm-e Imam (the share of the Twelfth Imam). R. 
Khomeini, op. cit., 33-52. 
597 The “Imam Khomeini’s Assistance Committee” offers direct aid to about one million households in Iran (2.6 million 
individuals) that are identified by the Committee to be economically underprivileged. See: A. Gheissari, Contemporary Iran: 
Economy, Society, Politics (NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 15. 
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in school curriculums.598 There is no parliamentary based monitoring system to supervise the allocation 
of finances to religious schools or review their financial reports. Although individual clerics may side 
with the reformists or the fundamentalists, the centres are closely linked to the Jurisprudential Leader 
and predominantly fundamentalist. Neo-fundamentalist clergy have established politically orientated 
theological centres, like the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in Qom, to 
unconditionally support the Jurisprudential Leadership, theorize his power in their religious 
publications and seminaries, and train neo-fundamentalist politicians. 599 The Institute and its associated 
offices hold public seminars and regular meetings with both the leadership office and prominent neo- 
fundamentalist politicians, and are actively involved in election campaigns. They train clergy for 
political posts within state bodies, the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij, and neo-fundamentalists mosque 
networks. 
 
Religious education and monitoring dietary regulations have always been primary concerns for Israeli 
religious political parties. The Agudat Yisrael, the United Torah Judaism, and the Shas strongly support 
an increase in government funding for their religious Yeshivot. In fact, many of the members of the Shas 
party were educated in Government sponsored Mafdal Yeshivot that promoted the study of the Torah 
and strengthened the party’s support amongst its Heredi constituents. 600 Since its formation in the1980s, 
 
the Shas party obtained control over the ministerial position and has strived to insure increased 
government funds for the Sephardim and the Shas educational centres in election campaigns and 
lobbying with main parties for coalition governments.601 For instance, in Sharon’s government in the 
1990s, the Shas party benefited from the integration of their Yeshivot into the national curriculum.602 
 
Their growing involvement in state politics and in Sharon’s government enabled Shas to be more active 
in ministerial positions, increased their power in Rabbinic Court elections, and influenced the passing of 
religious laws on topics such as the observance of Sabbat and Kashrut. 
State funding for religious schools and the supervision of their curriculum have been controversial issues 
in Israel and have led to tensions between the secular Meretz and the religious Shas parties. In 2000, 
comments by Rabbi Yosef caused the conflict between the two parties to intensify. Following an inquiry 
by the Ministry into the Shas's Ma'ayan Hahinuch Hatorani school system, the Ministry concluded that the 
 
 
598 Interestingly, only in the fundamentalist government did an issue about religious institutions and publications arise. 
599 This, however, does not necessarily include students or employees of the centres. The lack of statistical data in this area 
makes any estimation regarding the support of their audience unscientific. The situation about quietist Ayatollahs or centres 
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shapes the social fabric of the Sephardim and argue that it should be projected in the state ideology because it can protect the 
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134 
 
schools lacked transparency and their education curriculums lacked secular subjects, therefore the 
Minister decided to cut their budgets. In response to this decision, Yosef cursed Yossi Sarid, the Meretz 
leader and Education Minister at the time, and wished him the same fate of Amalik and Haman (biblical 
Jewish enemies). Sarid reacted to Yosef’s curse, sent a complaint to the Supreme Court, and explained 
the reasons for the Ministry’s decision to cut the funding of Shas schools in details revealed during a 
press conference.603 When the Supreme Court decided to investigate the case, Yishai and Health 
Minister Shlomo Benizri (another Shas Member of the Knesset) called the decision racist. 604 
 
Some months later when debates between the Shas party and the Ministry of Education continued, 
Benizri accused Meretz of using similar tactics reminiscent of the ones the Nazis used against Jews.605 In 
both cases, the Shas Members of the Knesset used their anti-secular and Sephardim identity to block 
ministerial investigations and change their curriculums. The Shas made no effort to comply with the 
ministry’s order to present records or guidelines for schools. They called both enquiries conspiracies 
aimed at the Sephardi religious population.606 These disagreements over Yeshivots’ budgets hindered the 
alliance between the Shas and Labor. In 2001, Shas refused to support the government’s economic plan 
and temporarily broke their alliance with the government.607   In a meeting that Sharon held to resolve the 
issue with the Shas party, the party demanded that the government continue to support the Yeshivot and 
to offer additional support for its schools.608 Only after Sharon’s government accepted the Shas and their 
demands did the party return to the coalition and the coalition government remained in power.609 
 
In 2005, the issues of funding for the Shas Yeshivot and the reduction of child support once again created 
fierce conflict between the Shas party and the secular party of Shinui. 610 While Yishai criticized Shinui for 
demanding 700 million shekels ($US160 million) for the defence budget and higher education, he made 
the participation of Shas in the coalition conditional on the restoration of government 
sponsored child support and the continuation of funding for the educational Yeshivot.611 In his critique 
 
of the Shinui, Yishai stated:"Shinui was founded on the basis of hatred and incitement. No anti-religious 
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party ever has been established in a Christian or Moslem country."612 Educational institutions also 
became good avenues for attracting constituents. Haar and Busuttil note that children of poor Sephardim 
families join the Shas’ schools because they are the only public schools with bus services, hot lunches, 
and longer teaching hours. However, they also indicate that these sexually segregated schools have a 
narrow and religious focus in their curriculum and in the content of their textbooks, which mainly focus 
on religious education.613 
 
The Shas’ Yeshivot expanded quickly during the 2000s. In 2009, the Ha’aretz newspaper published a 
report where it noted that one in three children in Israel attended a Heredi kindergarten.614 Referring to 
a report by the Education Ministry, the article stated that the Heredi schools have been growing steadily 
at the expense of the secular public schools.615 Most of the religious schools receive funding from the 
government, which makes up fifty to one hundred percent of their expenses.616 The report indicates 
that religious schools are not transparent in their reports and monitoring their activities at the 
institutional level is problematic for the government.617 The aforementioned political disagreement 
between the parties points to a deeper ideological difference. The non-religious parties refer to secular 
judiciary institutions as the legal source of legitimacy and pressure religious parties to comply with the 
rulings of the Supreme Court. In contrast, religious parties oppose the secular framework of national 
laws and follow their religious leaders as their primary source in legal matters. The different legal 
structures of the traditional communities encourage different criteria for inter-communal politics, 
which, in many cases, reflect their party politics. 
 
The Rise of Neo-fundamentalism in Iran 
 
 
The presidency of Mohammad Khatami in the late 1990s encouraged the advent of the de-securitization 
of Revolutionary Messianism in Iran. The reformist government attempted to limit the power of the 
Jurisprudential Leader and to establish a governing system similar to a Constitutional Monarchy. During 
the eight years of Khatami’s presidency, the reformists revitalised the ideals of the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1908 and its debates, such as civil rights, freedom of speech, and the Constitutional 
power structure of domestic politics. Arjomand argues that the “rule of Law” was one of the distinct 
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characteristics of Khatami’s presidency.618 Ironically, his presidency began during a period of unlawful 
activities such as attacks on universities, closing the newly opened reformist newspapers, and 
assassinating reformers like Said Hajarian, that the fundamentalists, Khamenei’s supporters, and the 
neo-fundamentalists in the Revolutionary Guards planned and executed.619 While securitization during 
 
the time of Khomeini demanded the obeying of his rule and the demonstration of absolute loyalty and 
devotion to revolutionary ideals, Khatami’s attempt at de-securitization required the de-sacralization of 
the position of the Jurisprudential Leadership. A major effect of this was the overt acknowledgement of 
the limits of his executive power.620 The fundamentalists strongly opposed Khatami’s reforms and 
claimed that the de-securitization of the leadership position would result in the collapse of the Islamic 
Republic. 
 
Khatami’s attempts led traditional fundamentalist and reformist factions to redefine their understanding 
of the role of religion in Iran’s national security. 621 Fundamentalists argued that national security was as 
important to the security of the Jurisprudential Leadership position as the ideologies of Revolutionary 
Messianism.622 They promoted an ethical-cultural view on securitized Jurisprudential Leadership, 
claiming it to be the ultimate achievement of the revolution.623 They maintained that this achievement 
has been under attack by the West especially by the United States of Amercia. For the fundamentalists, 
the religious source of legitimacy of the Islamic Republic was the only factor that separated Iran’s 
revolution from others and one that could guarantee its continuance.624 They acknowledged the 
existence of a Constitution but viewed it as an ineffective source of legitimacy without a Jurisprudential 
Leader. Their opposition implies a rejection of the authority of the Constitution over religious groups 
that the leadership finances and supervises which negates the legitimacy of the state institutions. 
Contradictions within the Constitution, as well as the centralization of power in the Jurisprudential 
Leadership position made it almost impossible to resolve tensions between the two factions in the 
Islamic Republic. 
In both Iran and Israel, prior to the Revolutionary Phase, the tension between the state and the religious 
institutions was limited to communal and institutional interests. Whether in Israel, where the Hasidic 
parties only discussed politics when it concerned their communities, or in Iran, where fundamentalists 
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and reformists debated the relationship between the Constitution and the leader, securitization 
hegemonized post-revolutionary politics. Debates between religious and non-religious groups during 
this phase were rarely extended to debates over the political and the religious sources of state legitimacy. 
In Iran, the hegemony of religion over every day politics brutally excluded non-religious voices from 
any debates. In Israel, by contrast, Ashkenazi Zionism excluded the non-Zionist Sephardim from 
political decision-making. However, during the State-Building Phase each system faced different 
challenges. For Israel, the involvement of the Sephardim and the de-securitization of the war increased 
tensions between the non-religious and the religious parties. These tensions were extended to security 
issues, such as territorial concessions and peace with the Palestinians. In Iran, the institutionalization 
process that started during Khatami’s presidency introduced relatively inclusivist politics that allowed 
for voicing different views that indirectly targeted the legitimacy of the Jurisprudential Leadership 
position. The victory of the reformists in the sixth parliament strengthened the government’s ability to 
implement fundamental changes in the country’s political structure. In Israel, as debates between non- 
religious and religious parties intensified, the Supreme Court gained more power in mediating political 
tensions as an autonomous and legitimate institution. The lack of such an independent agency in Iran 
resulted in a larger rift between reformists, fundamentalists, and neo-fundamentalists. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter examined the ideologies that underlie the institutionalization of Securitized Messianism and 
their role in the forming of the states’ legal systems. It aimed to explain the conditions through which 
the institutionalization of Securitized Messianism in national laws could be successful in these religio- 
political states. The legal system in both states is the most influential agency in establishing the state 
legitimacy in the State Building and State-Maintanence Phases. These states construct their legitimacy 
via the institutionalization of Securitized Messianism and the incorporation of religious laws and 
revolutionary messianic ideals into national laws. Through this process, the central legal system faces 
many challenges emanating from contradictory sources and methods by which religious and modern 
political systems define national laws. Their incorporation of religious laws into national law increases 
the dependency of the state on religious educational institutions for social networks and the recruiting 
of new forces. The priority that legal systems have in these states reflects their ideological understanding 
 
of Securitized Messianism. 
 
 
In each state, the history of the revolution replaces the traditional religious narrative of history, thus, 
Securitized Messianism articulates the role of the state in the revolution’s messianic history. The 
integration of national and religious laws also poses political challenges in both states as they attempt to 
identify boundaries between politics and religion within a legal context. National laws determine the 
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limits of freedom for religious and ethnic groups within the borders of a nation state. In order to resolve 
challenges between religious and political sources of law in these states both rely on political theologians 
and theologian politicians. The securitization of Revolutionary Messianism directs the states’ legal 
systems towards rightwing conservative policies and reduces the power of the liberal leftwing parties. In 
political debates over national laws the religious identity of these states is emphasised as the power and 
influence that separates conservative religious factions from others. 
 
There is a disagreement between religious and non-religious parties in Israel and between the 
fundamentalists and the reformists in Iran over the source of legitimation for national laws. According 
to religious groups, the sovereignty of God is a transcendent law that is permanent and non-negotiable. 
This separate source of law from the human and the material world provides a comprehensive legal 
system for the state. To religious groups, the state legitimacy is not based on a social contract or its 
political history. It is based on its religious identity, thus, should express practical commitment to 
religious laws. Society is divided between religious and unbelieving groups and the state’s policing of the 
individual commitment to religious laws is not solely its religious obligation. Non-religious parties in 
Israel argue that regardless of the role that religion has played in the construction of the state, the laws 
of the country should be secular and pluralistic. Connecting state laws to religious responsibilities in 
supervising religious obligations creates problems in the differentiation of the public from private 
spheres. To them, the relationship between religious institutions and bureaucratic systems, in their 
disagreement on the source of national law, should not be solely based on religious criteria, but should 
include political history for creating an inclusive and just state for all its citizens. 
 
The view of the ruling party or the coalitions on the messianic nature and goals of the state plays a 
decisive role in Israeli and Iranian politics. In the State-Building Phase and SMPs, responses from 
political parties and religious institutions in these states have been equally important in political debates 
and demonstrate the integration of religion and politics in their legal system. The following chapter 
examines whether the institutionalization of Securitized Messianism into the states’ political system 
could be successful and further legitimize these states, or whether it could develop into a potential 
security threat not only to the state but also to religion. Thus, religious institutions consider their 
involvement in politics as an indispensible religious duty. The success of the institutionalization of 
Securitized Messianism into the state’s political structure determines the legitimacy of the Politicised 
Messianism. 
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Chapter 5- Politicization of Messianism - State Messianism 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Securitized Messianism undermines political pluralism and elevates the unifying force for changing 
revolutionary idealism into a political institutional ideology. It heavily relies on the power of a unifying 
force that strengthens with sacrifice and absolute political commitment. The fulfilment of a divine 
promise in institutional or agent-based Securitized Messianism is conditional on the success of the states 
in deterring security threats in the State-Building Phase. In this phase, securitization limits political 
pluralism to a competition over supporting the state and striving for the fulfilment of its military goals. 
In the State-Maintenance Phase, the unity of the securitization period fragments and political parties 
present radically different ideas about Politicised Messianism and the path to a messianic utopia. This 
chapter argues that during the State-Maintenance Phase, political factions in these states define their 
identity in their specific definition of the messianic goals of the state. As the revolutionary momentum 
decreases and the conflict situation ends the founding revolutionaries redefine the messianic goals of the 
state and, out of their disagreements, a new form of fundamentalism emerges. In both states, the 
emerging group perceive their political goals to be changing the political culture of the State-Building 
Phase. Nonetheless, like revolutionary elites they support security-orientated and ideological policies in 
order to mobilize groups for their strategic goals. Contrary to these groups, the liberal and leftwing 
factions who support negotiating security issues within the political context rather that in an exclusively 
security environment, view the success of any institutionalization conditional on political development. 
The central issues in the debates between these groups, create a framework for the neo-fundamentalists’ 
understanding of the concepts of secularity and religion in the political environment in Israel and Iran. 
 
In the State-Maintenance Phase, the relationship between political parties in both states is constructed 
through their methodological differences. This chapter argues that the implementation of religious laws 
(instead of state institutions), the formation of religious groups that police public behaviours in society, 
and religious education centres that pursue the strengthening of the states’ religious identity, all 
contribute to the de-construction of revolutionary unity. However, as the state begins the process of de- 
securitization these debates extend to the limits of the power of the state and its source of legitimacy. 
The Shas party in Israel gained popularity by questioning the dominance of Ashkenazim as the agent of 
Zionism.  In  Iran  the  neo-fundamentalists  questioned  the  legitimacy  of  revolutionary  elites  like 
Rafsanjani as the agent of Islamic Revolution ideology. Both the Shas party in Israel and the neo- 
fundamentalist faction in Iran affirm the legitimacy of the revolution but disagree on the methods that 
the revolutionary elites used to fulfil their messianic goals. 
140  
Neo-fundamentalist parties emerge in the State-Maintenance Phase and develop their policies parallel to 
the de-securitization of messianism. This chapter argues that there are three factors that connect this 
parallel development to the state legitimacy. First, as an ideology, Revolutionary Messianism needs a 
specific political context. Secondly, the mobilization of all the groups can only materialize if there is a 
coercive power that has blocked any channel for communication and negotiations. Finally, there is a 
possibility of revolt against a political situation when it poses a threat to the population’s wellbeing, 
identity, survival, or economy. Without the securitization of a political situation in this manner neither 
revolution nor institutionalisation is meaningful. In the State-Maintenance Phase when no military 
threat targets territorial borders and the oppressive system is disestablished, political problems in these 
states intensify. The changing of Securitized Messianism into Politicised Messianism also depends on a 
specific political context in which there is no sense of urgency attached to domestic political issues. 
 
In order to legitimize their political stance the neo-fundamentalists have to de-legitimize the legislative 
and administrative policies of the revolutionary elites during the State-Building Phase. Not only their 
legitimacy as a political group depends on the policies of the revolutionary elites, their ideological 
position could only exist based on rejecting these policies. The position of the neo-fundamentalists 
asserts  that  as  a  political  system,  Revolutionary  Messianism  resists  de-securitization  and  the 
normalization of politics. Therefore, the end of the conflict era and the beginning of de-securitization 
gives rise to a new form of fundamentalism that reproduces the security-orientated discourse of the 
second  phase  in  the  political  environment.  While  during  the  State-Building  Phase  disagreements 
between political factions are limited to economic and domestic policies of the existing government, 
during the State-Maintenance Phase, they disagree over the political institutionalized ideology of the 
states and attempt to regenerate the dominance of the revolutionary messianic themes. 
 
By studying the debates between political parties and the neo-fundamentalists over the nature of a 
messianic state and their strategy for attaining its goals this chapter aims to explain three elements that 
contribute to the success or failure of de-securitization in Israel and Iran. First, the political structure of 
these  states  in  which  parties  interact  determines  the  success  or  failure  of  de-securitization.  The 
particular narrative of Revolutionary Messianism in each case constructs this political environment. 
Secondly, debates between political parties in these states do not include the separation of religion from 
politics or propose the decline of the supervisory role of religion in national identity. Thirdly, debates 
over the dynamics of the relationship between religion and politics are limited to the power of 
conservative religious forces in the states’ institutions. 
 
Politics in Israel and Iran are centralised around securitization or de-securitization of Revolutionary 
 
Messianism  in political and social institutions. From defending the country against a military attack to 
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political debates over public holidays, political parties contest, decide, and implement all political 
activities of the state in this binary context. Politicised Messianism is formed in the constant clash 
between political forces over security. Defining the messianic goals of the revolution in security terms 
limits the scope of theology to state politics. As an inevitable consequence of securitization the states 
change the reference to history from religious or political to revolutionary and further politicize 
theology. Therefore, neo-fundamentalists in both states stigmatise any apolitical theological approach, 
use theology as an effective instrument for political legitimacy, and attempt to present a model that 
could successfully adopt the messianic goals of the state in politics. 
 
The chapter examines the political goals and activities of the Shas party in Israel by analysing their 
position on settlement and peace in national politics during the 2009 parliamentary election. The 
Parliamentary election and associated debates highlight the challenging aspects of Politicised Messianism . 
It focuses on the Shas party as an example of a neo-fundamentalist party with growing power and 
significant influence in the settlements in order to explain the particular messianic ideology that the neo- 
fundamentalists consider to be the main source of state legitimacy. In the international context it 
discusses the Shas position regarding Israel and diplomatic ties with the United States of Amercia and 
how their position on international issues relates to their view on Israel’s messianic goals. In Iran’s case 
it  examines the rise of neo-fundamentalists and their position on Iran’s national politics in the 2009 
presidential election and discusses their relationship with the leadership, Revolutionary Guards, and 
other political forces within the state. In the international context this chapter analyses the faction’s 
view on Iran’s political ties with the United States of Amercia and nuclear policies. Examining the 
interaction between the parties explains the neo-fundamentalists’ view on the messianic responsibilities 
of the Islamic Republic. 
 
Ultimately, the failure or success of the de-securitization and institutionalization of Revolutionary 
Messianism affects the direction of politics in Israel and Iran. This chapter studies the characteristics of 
Politicised Messianism in  the  relationship between political  parties in Israel and  between political 
factions and leadership in Iran and argues that in the State-Building Phase the political factions within 
these states can be ideologically categorised into two groups of nationalists and theocrats. In Israel, 
traditionally  religious  statist  parties  considered  the  goal  of  Zionism  to  be  the  establishment  of  a 
theocracy which will achieve the messianic goals of the revolution by using a human-made political 
system as a means for the development of a progressive messianic state. Non-religious statist parties by 
contrast have understood Zionism as a national revolution and Judaism to be the cultural and religious 
identity of the post-revolutionary state but disagree over the state’s decision regarding territorial 
expansion and political developments. In Iran the fundamentalists argue that the identity of the 
revolution was Islamic, thus attempting to present a model for a messianic Islamic state. The reformists 
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however consider the goal of the revolution to be creating a just and progressive political and economic 
state based on Islamic teachings in order to make Iran a powerful state. 
 
Israel: Religious and Non-religious Politics: Shas - Coalition with Kadima 
 
 
The ethnic diversity of Israeli society has significantly influenced the structure and ideologies of the 
political parties in Israel in the last decades. Avigdor Liberman’s party, Yisrael Beiteinu, and Rabbi 
Yosef’s Shas party both present good examples of the transformation in the political culture of the 
parties in the State-Maintenance Phase. Both parties rely on ethnic support - the Russian community in 
Israel for Yisrael Beiteinu and Sephardim for Shas. The politics of these parties are also a sign of the 
growing influence of these communities in Israeli society. Thomas Banchoff notes that the influence of 
ethnic diversity in Israel is not limited to domestic politics and is extended to the relationship between 
American Jews and Israel. He argues that Shas’ disagreement with Yisrael Beiteinu on the conversion 
issue and the attempts of the Shas party to establish the power of Heredi rabbis over conversion in the 
1990s shows that conflict over the Jewish identity of the state is at the heart of the argument between 
religious and non-religious statist parties.625 
 
Banchoff also considers that the roots of decline of traditional Zionism are to be found in changes 
wrought in Israeli society, particularly during and after the Oslo peace process when peace with the 
Palestinians seemed imminent.626 For him these political changes have widened the gap between the 
religious and non-religious statist parties over the issue of the Jewish identity of the state. In the 1980s 
and in opposition to the non-religious statist parties, the religious non-statist Sephardim established a 
new party based on their views of a Jewish state under the rule of Halakhah. The new religious statist 
party sought to “replace secular Zionism with religious Judaism and hegemonic ideology in Israeli 
society and presents this as the remedy for both socio-economic and cultural grievances”.627 As Ravitzky 
notes, the Shas party of the 1980s, was a new form of religious party that did not take the traditional 
religious non-statist view of the state, and thus, could be involved in cooperating with the state at 
ministerial level. The break from tradition, Ravitzky argues, has provided them with many national and 
communal advantages that they can negotiate in coalition governments.628   The culture of party politics 
is well established in Israel and the main political parties enjoy significant influence in the Israeli national 
and international political scenes. 
Presenting a share list for coalition government requires pragmatism and compromise and the alliance 
between the parties highlights their differences about the nature, goals, and behaviour of the state. The 
 
 
625 Th. F. Banchoff, Democracy and the New Religious Pluralism (NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 92. 
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid. 
628 A. Ravitzky, Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 175-177. 
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structure of both right and left political parties in the recent election was fundamentally different from 
the pre-1990s situation. The growing power of the neo-fundamentalist parties in the Knesset and the 
necessity of political alliance for forming the government in 2009 have contributed to a fundamental re- 
arrangement of politics and security discourse in the country. In the recent election, religious parties 
presented three lists. Shas, United Torah Judaism, and The Jewish Home were the main political parties 
in alliances that won seats in parliament. Following Labor, Shas became the sixth party in parliament 
and together the religious parties won nineteen seats in the Knesset. The following section examines the 
difference between religious and non-religious parties in their definitions of Politicised Messianism . 
 
Israel’s Parliamentary Election in 2009 
 
 
In September 2008, Tzipi Livni won the leadership election in the Kadima party after Ehud Olmert 
resigned from his post as Israel’s Prime Minister.629 Livni did not succeed in gaining enough support to 
form a coalition government in the parliamentary election.630 Although she convinced the Labor party to 
join the government, the government was not formed due to strong opposition from the religious 
parties. Livni was successful with the leftwing social democrat parties like Meretz-Yachad, but failed to 
convince the religious parties to participate in the coalition government.631 After months of negotiations, 
in October Kadima proposed a bill asking President Shimon Peres to call an early election. When the 
three week period for an alternative, decreed by Peres, was over without any specific solution, the 
Knesset chose the time of election for February 2009. Thirty three political parties participated in the 
election, out of which twelve parties won seats in the parliament and participated in negotiations with 
Likud to form a coalition government.632 In a very close competition with Kadima, Likud won the 
election. Benjamin Netanyahu began negotiations with other parties to form a coalition government that 
could gain a confidence vote from parliament in the six weeks following the election, as the law 
provided.633 
The three main religious parties in the Knesset, although different in their policies and political aims, 
share similar characteristics. They are run by Rabbis, attempt to appropriate the laws of the state to 
 
 
629 In 2005 the Kadima party split from the Likud under the name of "Achrayut Leumit". 
630 Olmert resigned from his post due to allegations of economic corruption. The election was supposed to have been held in 
2010 but it was held in early 2009. 
631 In 2005, the Meretz-Yachad party (Democratic Choice) was formed from a coalition between Meretz and Yachad. 
632 The names of the parties are arranged based on the seats each party won in the 2009 parliamentary election. Kadima (28), 
Likud (27), Yisrael Beiteinu (15), Labor Party (13), Shas (11), United Torah Judaism (5), United Arab List–Ta'al (4), 
National Union (4), Hadash (4), New Movement-Meretz (3), The Jewish Home (3), Balad (3), The Green Movement– 
Meimad (0), Gil (0), Ale Yarok (0), The Greens (0), Yisrael Hazaka (0), Tzabar (0), Koah LeHashpi'a (0), Da'am Workers 
Party (0), Yisrael HaMithadeshet (0), Holocaust Survivors and Ale Yarok Alumni (0), Leader (0), Tzomet (0), Koah 
HaKesef (0), Man's Rights in the Family Party (0), HaYisraelim, Ahrayut (0), Brit Olam (0), Lev LaOlim (0), Lazuz (0), 
Lehem (0). The parties that are named after “Balad” did not achieve any seat in parliament in the election. 
633 Gil Hoffman, The shape of the next Knesset?, Jerusalem Post- Jerusalem, Nov. 6, 2002 
http://www.jpost.com/GreenIsrael/KKLJNFWorldLeadershipConference2011/Article.aspx?id=214272, accessed on 
10/11/2011 
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Halakhah, and believe that the root of political problems in Israel is secularity. These parties tend to ally 
themselves with the rightwing non-religious parties rather than centre-left or left parties. In the recent 
elections none of these parties agreed to align themselves with parties like Meretz or Hadash in a 
leftwing government run by Kadima.634 In the 2009 election Shas staged successful negotiations with 
Likud for their participation in the coalition government. Although the head of the party, Eli Yishai, 
negotiated with Kadima about coalition after the election, he changed the party’s coalition overnight 
from Kadima to Likud.635 The disagreement between Shas and Kadima arose over tax increases on child 
support, and Kadima’s sympathy towards dividing Jerusalem in the process of peace negotiations with 
the Palestinians. Due to rapid population growth, the formation of more religious settlements in the 
West Bank and their political coalition with the right, the Shas party has taken a more conservative 
position about the settlements in the recent election and supported the Likud party against Kadima’s 
peace plan and actively supported the basic law “Jerusalem, Capital of Israel”.636. For Shas, the security 
of the communities is a matter of concern but they are not fervent supporters of expanding settlements. 
As is clear from the examination of the Shas party’s policies, to them, the secularization of Israel is a 
more problematic issue on the path to redemption than peace. 
 
In their negotiations with Kadima, the representatives of the Shas party rejected Kadima’s proposed 
national budget, specifically the Value Added Tax, which they argued, directly influenced their 
communities.637 Yishai (Shas) welcomed Netanyahu's policy to cancel budget cuts that he argued would 
affect the disadvantaged populations. He also clarified that this would not satisfy his party and demanded 
an increase in child allowance.638 The new budget included NIS 1.5 billion to cover child allowances and 
NIS  800  million  for  Yeshivot. 639  The  two  other  religious  parties  have  also  benefited  from  their 
negotiations with Netanyahu. The United Torah Judaism, an alliance of Agudat Yisrael and Degel 
HaTorah, is another religious statist coalition. This political party, formed in 1992, won four seats in 
the 2009 election.640 Rabbi Yosef Sholom Elyashiv, the leader the Degel HaTorah’s party is one of the 
prominent Heredi Rabbis. He is a Rabbi and an ultimate guide of law for the Lithuanian Heredi 
 
 
 
634 For instance, in Knesset 2002 election: Likud (21), Labor (25), Shas (17), Meretz (10), Arab factions (10) Like United 
Torah Judaism, Arab parties, National Union/Yisrael Beiteinu (7), Shinui (6), National Religious Party (5), Center (5) 
United Torah Judaism (5), Am Ehad (2), Gesher (2), Herut (1). Ibid. 
635 Since the time that Deri was imprisoned for fraud, Yishai has been leading the party. He has held other senior positions in 
the Shas party as the party’s Secretary General and the Director General of the Shas educational network (El Ha'maayan) in 
the 1990s. 
636 The USA abstained from voting in favour of the Security Council’s condemnation of the law. 
637 Hillel Fendel, “Budget Passes, Budget Director Resigns,” Israel News 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/131336, accessed on 10/11/2011. 
638 Roni Sofer, “Shas Wants Child Allowances Increased,” Israel News, August 05, 2009, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3712792,00.html, accessed on 10/11/2011. 
639 Ilan Marciano, “Shas to Receive 4 Portfolios, NIS 1.8 Billion”, Israel News, April 30, 2006, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3245689,00.html, accessed on 10/11/2011. 
640 In 2005, the collapse of the United Torah Judaism gave rise to Agudat Yisrael and Degel Hatorah who remained allies in 
their lists for the 2009 election. United Torah Judaism (תדחואמה הרותה תודהי, Yahadut HaTorah HaMeukhedet) 
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community. His party is vehemently anti-secular and the focus of its policies is targeting non-religious 
statist parties. 
 
In  the  2009  election,  Agudat  Yisrael,  the  religious  party,  with  Hasidic  and  Heredi  supporters, 
negotiated  with  Likud  for  more  funds  for  their  Yeshivot  and  communities  following  which  two 
members of the party received governmental positions. Meir Porush became Deputy Minister of 
Education, and Yakov Litzman, gained the position of Deputy Minister of Health.641 Both are critical 
positions  for  Agudat  Yisrael  who  aim  to  implement  Kashrut  on  a  national  scale  and  spread  its 
Yeshivot.642    It is their common dislike of the secular identity of the state that unites the two Heredi 
parties as a voting bloc in each election.643   The two other members, Uri Maklev and Menachem Eliezer 
Moses hold positions in associated government organizations.644 
 
Another successful faction in Likud’s coalition government was the National Union Voting Block. It is a 
rightwing Zionist faction that includes two religious and two secular parties. The most religious party in 
this block is Eretz Yisrael Shelanu (Our Land of Israel).645 In contrast to the members of the United 
Torah Judaism (who only have religious education and refrain from participation in military services), 
members of the Eterz Yisrael Shelanu have a secular education and hold ranks in the army. The party, 
which gained four seats in the 2009 election, includes two secular and two religious members. Yaakov 
(Katzeleh) Katz is the leader of the religious statist party of Moledet and Michael Ben Ari is from the 
Eterz Yisrael Shelanu party.646 Uri Yehuda Ariel is a member of the Tkuma and Arieh Eldad from the 
secular Zionist party HaTikva. Katz is one of the founders of the Gush Emunim movement. Along with 
other  party  members  he  rejects  the  formation  of  a  Palestinian  state  and  opposes  the  2005 
Disengagement Plan. 647  It is a party with a strong military focus and its members are involved in 
 
providing medical care and support for military servicemen. They negotiated with Likud over the 
increasing military budget and the expansion of Israeli settlements. 
In the 2009 election, the left political parties - Meretz and Tnu'a HaHadasha - presented a joint list, and 
Tarabut joined Hadasha. This alliance focused on peace negotiations and the freedom of religion, as well 
as a strong emphasis on environmentalist policies.648 Just a month before the election the two Arab 
 
 
641 Amnon Meranda, “United Torah Judaism, Likud Sign Coalition Deal,” Israel News, January 04, 2009, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3695618,00.html, accessed on 10/11/2011. 
642 http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=216, accessed on 10/11/2011. 
643 http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=35, accessed on 10/11/2011. 
644 Maklev is the Directorate of Jerusalem Municipality and Deputy Mayor. 
645 (ונלש לארשי ץרא, Eretz Yisrael Shelanu) official website in English and Hebrew, http://www.sos-israel.com/en.html , 
accessed on 10/11/2011. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Ibid. 
648 (צרמ-השדחה העונתה), previously known as Meretz, then Yachad, and later Meretz-Yachad (Hebrew: דחי-צרמ, 
Vitality-Unity). Tarabut is a new peace movement which opposes the separation fence in the West Bank. 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3637894,00.html, accessed on 10/11/2011. 
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parties of Balad and United Arab List (Ta’al) were disqualified as political parties. 649  The Central 
Elections Committee announced that their disqualification was based on the parties’ failure to recognize 
the state of Israel. They were also blamed for promoting armed struggle against the state and supporting 
Palestinians attacks. The Supreme Court however, rejected the ban and the parties were allowed to 
participate in the 2009 election.650 
 
The main political parties in the Likud government became Shas, Israel Our Home (Yisrael Beiteinu), 
and the National Union (Ichud Leumi).651 Their representatives, who have close ties with the spiritual 
leaders of Heredi and Hasidic communities, achieved cabinet posts in negotiations. The victory of Israel 
Beiteinu in the government as the third party has revived tensions between the religious and non- 
religious parties over the issues of conversion and citizenship. Yisrael Beiteinu, whose constituent base is 
Russian Jews, and mostly non-religious voters, challenged the Heredi definition of state identity by 
recognizing commitment to the state as the main criteria for citizenship. The religious parties insisted 
on increasing the power of Heredi rabbis in validating conversion to respond to the Yisrael Beiteinu’s 
emphasis on an oath of alliance to the state. The religious parties have also expressed opposition to the 
“pluralist Judaism”, American Reform and Conservative movements in Israel in strong political 
statements.652 
Religious  Parties  and  Secular  Messianism  -   Ashkenazim  and  Sephardim  in  the 
 
Construction of the Party’s Political Identity 
 
Changes in the political environment after the 1967 Six Days War, and as the result of securitization, 
religious parties such as Agudat Yisrael changed from a non-statist religious party to a statist religious 
party which is active in seeking ministerial positions.653 The Shas party, by contrast, has been active in 
both legislative and ministerial positions since its inception.654 Shas members in ministerial positions 
 
 
649 Aviad Glickman, “Arab Parties Disqualified from Elections,” Israel News, January 1, 2009, 
http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3654866,00.html, accessed on 10/11/2011. 
650 Ibid. 
651 Yisrael Beitenu split from the Ichud Leumi in 2006. Ibid. 
652 Banchoff uses direct quotes from the Sephardi Chief Rabbi Bakshi-Doron, who called these movements “more dangerous 
to the Jewish nation than the Holocaust” to show the extent of their opposition to these movements which attract many post- 
Soviet immigrants as well as Americans. Ibid. 
653 In 1990, Moshe Gafni (UTJ) became the Deputy Minister of Religious Affairs. In 1996 and 2001, Meir Porush (UTJ) 
became the Deputy Minister of Houzing. In the 2009 election, the UTJ received two government positions and Yakov 
Litzman became the Deputy Minister of Health, and Meir Porush, the Deputy Minister of Education. Both have only 
completed Yeshiva studies. http://www.knesset.gov.il/ 
654 Ariel Atias from Shas became the Minister of Communications in 2006 and the Minister of Houzing and Construction in 
2009. David Azoulay, became the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in 2002. Yitzhak Cohen became the Minister of 
Religious Affairs in 2000, the Deputy Minister of Finance in 2001, the Minister of Religious Services in 2008, and the 
Deputy Minister of Finance in 2009. Yakov Margi became the Minister of Religious Services in 2009. Meshulam Nahari 
became the Deputy Minister of Education in 2000 and the Minister without portfolio in 2009. Yitzhak Vaknin became the 
Deputy Minister of Communications in 2000 and the Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in 2001. Eliyahu Yishai 
became the Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in 2000, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs in 
2001, the Minister of Industry, Trade, and Labor in 2006, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Internal Affairs in 
2009. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il/main/eng/home.asp 
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have ensured the increase of funding for the Sephardim. Shas’ involvement in high profile government 
positions introduced new political complexities in defining secularity and religion in the political sphere, 
as the gap between political and religious laws narrowed. 655   More significantly, the shift of power into 
the hands of Rabbis created a new elitist class that had an advantaged position in negotiating their 
particularistic  view  of  religion.  This  elitist  discourse  is  ironically  constructed  as  an  oppositional 
discourse to Ashkenazi elitism. 
 
The Shas emphasis on ministerial posts in the Ministry of Religious Affairs is due to two reasons. First, 
the Ministry is at the centre of decision making regarding religious affairs and through the ministry the 
party can keep control of religious affairs in the hands of Rabbis with Heredi/Hasidic connections. 
Secondly, the party can use their position to bargain potential political alliances and have more power 
over Rabbinic Courts.656 According to Magnus Norell, control over the religious courts has three main 
functions: through it, the party can monitor and promulgate religious communal life, participate in the 
legislative process, and influence the selection of staff for religious institutions nationwide.657   The 
attention of the Shas party to religious issues, not only as a party ideology but as the main fabric of state 
and  society, has  encouraged  the  party  to  demand  a  ministerial  post  in  the  Ministry  of  Religious 
Affairs. 658  Their  involvement in  this  ministry,  in  addition  to  their  view on  politics,  reflects their 
messianic views. Most of the religious parties, including the Shas party, do not view the state as 
messianic in nature but rather view it as a state with messianic potential. Yosef clearly states in his 
comments on Israeli politics that the implementation of Halakhah is a priority in steps towards the 
coming of the Messiah. Power in the political environment and their influence over the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, Shas believe, could activate the state’s potential. 
 
This understanding of messianism and the state has also altered the religious non-statist parties who did 
not view the state as being messianic in nature, abstained from military service, and relied on the 
religious budget. For religious Jews, the messianic age would come when its theological preconditions 
are fulfilled, thus, they are concerned about the observance of Sabbath and any Jewish business in Israel 
functioning on the day.659 Legally, monitoring the observance of the Sabbath is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs. Members of the Druze community monitor the observance of the Sabbath 
which requires the employment of a large number of public servants. The Shas party, for example, has 
 
 
655 Some of the criteria that determines whether a business is kosher are; refraining from work on Shabbat, investments in 
the corporate bonds, and selling of non- kosher foods in Israel. 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/169728, November 19, 2009. 
656 Norell argues that preserving the Millet system enabled the Sephardim (Sephardim) to establish their religious court 
system and an institutional base. M. Norell, A Dissenting Democracy: the Israeli Movement "Peace Now" (NY: Routledge, 2002), 
58. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Haim Shapiro, “Yishai: Religious Affairs Ministry will 'flourish',” Jerusalem Post – Jerusalem, Mar 13, 2001, 4. 
659 The Holy Bible, op. cit., Isaiah , Jeremiah, Hosea 
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expressed its concern over respecting the law of the Sabbath on various occasions. The issues of public 
transport on the Sabbath, travelling in any motor vehicle and the sexual segregation of buses in 
Jerusalem has created tensions between the Hasidic communities and non-religious populations in 
Jerusalem. The difference between the two sub-cultural groups is particularly evident in Jerusalem and 
also to be found in Tel Aviv. 
 
Jerusalem, with a more conservative population and home to many pilgrimage sites, has witnessed the 
increase in the power of the Hasidic Rabbis on city politics. With a growing number of community 
members and Yeshivot they have been able to organize demonstrations opposing those rules that violate 
the laws of the Sabbath or for the lack of sexually segregated buses for the Hasidic communities.660 They 
have successfully used the city’s religious significance and its conservative atmosphere for establishing 
networks and pursuing their political goals. The success of their networks is directly related to the 
continued growth of Hasidic communities and changes in the demographic population. They, however, 
needed to revise their communal position on participation in politics, and the observance of Halakhah 
by refraining from political engagement, which they viewed to be an activity that could pollute their 
religious observance. To Hasidim, Halakhic marriage laws determine the identity of the state and are 
therefore of the highest priority. Consequently, in the ministry, they attempted to further integrate 
religious ritual on public holidays, dietary laws, and even in allowing daylight saving.661 
 
Contrary to the non-religious statist parties, such as Likud, that understand Israel as a messianic state 
that will progressively create a utopia, the Sephardim consider the religious identity of the state to be a 
pre-condition of a messianic utopia. Shas presents this ideology in their election campaign 
advertisements in sentences like: “Who is on Hashem's side, come to me”, a verse from Exodus spoken 
by Moses when he returned from Sinai with the Ten Commandments. 662 Placing this motto next to 
Yosef’s portraits indicates that, for the party, it is through political participation and through the 
political process that the ultimate goal of the divine hope for the Jewish people is determined. 
Yosef’s belief in government as a utility for the coming of the messianic age is so significant that the 
issue of voting has become an exclusively religious issue for the Shas party. In a statement he made after 
casting his vote in the 2006 election, he called voting a mitzvah (religious duty) and in his remarks 
suggested that Kadima supporters would go to hell and Shas supporters to heaven.663 His comments 
 
 
 
660 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uI-BSl8N1k8&NR=1, accessed on 10/11/2011. See debates on lunching a sexually 
segregated bus line for the Haredi neighbourhoods in Jerusalem. 
661 In June 2009, a new cemetery in Kfar Saba opened and offered “alternative” burial services. Although alternative burials 
to hevra kadisha were accepted in the Burial Law in 1996, the first of such facilities opened in 1999. Some of these facilities 
have been subject to attacks by the Hasidic who consider alternative burial services against the Halakhah. H. R. Gur, “New 
Cemetery Brings Personalized, 'Alternative' Burials to Kfar Saba,” Jerusalem Post-Jerusalem, August 06, 2009, 
662 Ariel Jerozolimski, “A Shas Campaign Poster,” Jerusalem Post- Jerusalem, Nov 30, 2005, 2. 
663 Ilan Marciano, “Rabbi Ovadia: Kadima voters going to hell,” YeNet, Mar 24, 2006, 1. 
149  
about Yossi Sardid in early 2000 and later about parties on the left on many occasions indicate that for 
Yosef and his supporters, the boundaries of political responsibilities, either from the state or from the 
citizens, are in nature religious and selectively beyond national law. The combination of the two is not 
expressed with such intensity by other religious parties. Further, during times of political upheaval 
Yosef has shown no reservations in expressing outrageous comments directed at Ashkenazim. In 2000, 
when Aryeh Deri was accused and on trial for embezzlement charges, Yosef created a national scandal 
by calling the victims of the Holocaust “the reincarnation of sinners”.664 A year later Yosef demanded 
separate prayer sessions for Sephardim in the military. 665 Although he supported his argument by asking 
the Israel Defence Force to recognize diverse styles of prayer rituals, it was a move to affirm the party’s 
political position in a dominantly Ashkenazi environment. In the 2009 election it was due to the 
position of the religious statist parties like Shas, and United Torah Judaism, that the non-religious statist 
party of Yisrael Beiteinu achieved a stronger position in the Knesset. 
 
Iranian Messianic Symbols and Khomeini’s Jurisprudential Leadership Theory 
 
Political parties in Iran cannot be distinguished merely by their left and right political stands in national 
or international politics.666 Khomeini created a political environment in which those who undermined 
the power of state institutions for the benefits of leadership achieved more political power in state 
institutions. In 1995, parliament passed the “Political Party Legislation Act” and outlined the limits of 
activities of political parties. The Act provides that the formation of any non-religious political party is 
an anti-revolutionary act and a threat to Iranian national security. According to the Act, political parties 
are permitted to be active in the Islamic Republic only if they express their loyalty to the Islamic 
Republic and the definitive rule of the Jurisprudential Leader.667 Moreover, according to Article 57 of 
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Iran’s Constitution, “The Powers of Government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, 
the judiciary, and the executive, functioning under the supervision of the absolute Valayat al-‘amr 
(religious authority) and the leadership of the ummah, in accordance with the forthcoming articles of 
this Constitution. These powers are independent of each other”.668  Paradoxically this article indicates 
that loyalty to the leadership is a pre-condition for political participation in any government body. It 
states that these three powers act independently of each other, but it does not stipulate how such 
independence is possible when they all function under the absolute rule of a leader. 
 
Establishing the rule of behaviour for political parties in this authoritarian style makes any attempt to 
observe the dynamics of religion and politics in the Islamic Republic a challenging task. The one party 
politics that Khomeini created through sets of imagery and discourse left no place for the development 
of secular politics.669 Unlike Israel’s democratic political system, the political doctrine of the parties in 
Iran does not allow the process of politicization and considers any attempts in politicization as a threat 
to its survival. Secular political discourse is non-existent amongst political factions due to the brutal 
suppression by the state.670 However, the lack of data about secular ideas and politics does not mean 
there is a lack of such ideas in Iran or that Iran is a harmonious society in the support of the religious 
ruling system. On the contrary, reactions from fundamentalist parties in recent years and the issues that 
reformists addressed in the last two presidential elections demonstrate the growth of secular political 
ideas in the public sphere. In Iran, even the political parties who pass all ideological and practical filters 
and become legitimate political parties in the system become vulnerable if their relationship with the 
Jurisprudential Leader is disturbed. The electoral system of the Islamic Republic, similar to its party 
politics, is an agent based system in which individuals are accepted as candidates for any election only if 
they affirm ‘practical commitment’ to the leadership - rather than for their professional capabilities.671 
The Jurisprudential Leadership and their supporters struggle in the establishment of pre-modern trust 
 
relations in bureaucratic, military, and educational systems. This demands that the political parties 
compete in passing oppressive policies rather than working to constrain the power of the leadership by 
establishing legal limits and democratic policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
668 Iran’s Constitution text in English: http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/Constitution-5.html, 
accessed on 10/11/2011. 
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Khamenei in a fatwa (decree) affirmed that a Jurisprudential Leader has equal rights to a prophet as both 
are only agents for implementing the Shari’a. 672 It is evident from his fatwa that he does not recognize 
any attempts in the politicization of the authority of Jurisprudential Leadership to be legitimate. 
Khamenei and his supporting Ayatollahs, absolutely oppose the boundary between politics and religion 
in their circles. This further highlights the inherent political and theological problems of the position. It 
was, however, only by attaching some divine attribution that Khamenei could achieve such legitimacy. 
Gradually, and specifically after 1997, he became more dependent on those fundamentalists who argued 
that a Jurisprudential Leader is installed by God (installation theory), rather than those who believed 
that he is chosen by people.673 
 
The view of the fundamentalist Ayatollahs on Jurisprudential Leadership has produced excessively 
patriarchal politics. They transformed the state’s institutions to a private utility for the leader. Those 
institutions that play the mediatory role between people and the leadership, like the Guardian Council, 
had a crucial role in establishing their political rule.674 As the political culture of Iran changed during the 
time of Khatami, Khamenei’s dependency on Basij, the Revolutionary Guards and religious institutions 
intensified.675 Just a year after his presidency in 1998 Rahim Safavi, a commander of the Revolutionary 
Guards, announced the formation of this party in a speech. He stated in a gathering of the Revolutionary 
Guards that some of the reformers’ policies were threats to the Islamic Republic and that the Guards 
would “cut the throats and break the pens” of those who pose any threat.676 Their political party relies 
heavily on the relationship between individual politicians who are somehow connected to the leadership, 
and the Guards. Patrimonial politics is evident in their administrative policies under Ahmadinejad’s 
government. The presidential election in 2009, in which all candidates were involved in the power 
politics of the Islamic Republic that have existed since its inception, demonstrated the closed political 
system which such a definition of Politicised Messianism  produces and its political implication on the 
institutionalization of state legitimacy. 
Since the rise of the neo-fundamentalists in 2004 the government and the fundamentalist parliament 
have structured their policies around an “installation theory” as the source of legitimacy for 
Jurisprudential Leadership. As a consequence, Iran’s politics has been dominated by a small group of 
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influential politicians who manage public relations and state policies.677 The underlying difference of 
neo-fundamentalists (who are committed to the installation theory) to fundamentalist (who believe in 
the supremecy of a jurisprudential leader) and reformist clergy is not only their view on the source of 
legitimacy for the Jurisprudential Leadership but also the limits of its authority. The former group 
believe in the absolute power of a Jurisprudential Leader and acknowledge three characteristics for the 
leadership. First, his power has no geographical border and the leader’s rule is absolute for all Shi’ites in 
the world. Secondly, its power is not limited to specific groups of law and covers all aspects of human 
life. Finally, his verdict is final and non-negotiable. The neo-fundamentalists similarly believe that the 
Jurisprudential Leadership, as the representative of the Mahdi, receives its legitimacy from God and not 
from the people. The responsibility of the Expediency Council is thus solely to discover a leader and not 
to supervise his actions.678 All supporters of the installation theory refer to the Shi’a theory of God’s lutf 
(blessing) to justify their argument. 
 
According to the installation theory, people’s decisions and votes have no effect on the legitimacy of the 
leadership and elections function rather as a decorative act. In reality, they declare, it is the state that 
requires legitimizing by the leader.679   The neo-fundamentalists argue that Khomeini aimed to establish a 
theocracy with the 1979 revolution in which the legitimacy of the leader was disassociated from and 
positioned above the Constitution. The reformists, on the other hand, believe that Khomeini was the 
founder of an Islamic Republic, not of an Islamic totalitarian regime.680 In their view, Khomeini believed 
in the supervisory role of the Shi’a ulama but did not approve their absolute rule. On the contrary, he 
strongly emphasized the importance of elections and never undermined the legitimacy of the 
Constitution.681 
 
The 2009 Presidential Election 
According to data presented in parliamentary archives before 1996, there is hardly any record of party 
politics  in  Iran. 682   Since  the  1996  election,  parties  have  gradually  formed  and  allied  in  new 
fundamentalist and reformist parties.683 All candidates in 2009, except Ahmadinejad, have been at times 
involved in both factions. The complicated net of relations between the revolutionary “elites” is 
interlinked to their relationship with these two political factions. Tensions between the political factions 
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in   the   2009   presidential   election   demonstrate   a   mounting   breach   between   reformists   and 
fundamentalists and a division within the fundamentalist camp over the issue of state legitimacy. 
Candidates in these camps are nominated by one of the main parties, the “Society of Combatant Clergy” 
and the “Society of Combatant Clerics”.684 The former is a fundamentalist religious party with strong 
influence in the traditional Bazaar and with the claergy and has members in all political institutions. The 
latter was formed in the final year of the war when the “Islamic Republic Party” was abolished.685 The 
fundamentalists, who formed the Society of Combatant Clergy, had a close connection with the Bazaar 
political party “the Allied Islamic Society” and fundamentalist clergy in Qom, “the Society of Qom 
Seminary Teachers.”686 The support of privatization in this context benefited those with connections to 
the ruling circle and thus the combination of these economic policies in two decades has led to the 
dominance of the neo-fundamentalists over economic activities.687 
 
From the two reformer candidates in the 2009 election, Hossein Musavi achieved significant success in 
mobilizing public support. He was Iran’s Prime Minister during the Iran-Iraq war and resigned from his 
position following a dispute with Khamenei (the president at the time) but returned to his position 
when Khomeini supported him and his cabinet.688 After the death of Khomeini, Khamenei became the 
Jurisprudential Leader and removed the Prime Ministerial position. 689  Musavi then left politics and 
became the president of the Academy of Arts of the Islamic Republic in Tehran until the 2009 election 
when he became a candidate for the presidential election. He announced that his candidature was due to 
the threats that neo-fundamentalists’ policies posed to the country and the ideals of the Islamic 
Republic.690 He criticized the existing economic situation, the government’s management of public 
policies, and the closing of the government’s budgetary institutions such as the Centre of Public 
Management and  Planning. In the hope of attracting votes from the moderate fundamentalists he 
refused to announce any radical reformist policies. 691  Throughout the campaign he emphasised his 
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loyalty to the ideals of the revolution and blamed the government for a lack of transparency, lying, and 
the economic deficit of the national budget.692 
 
Mahdi Karroubi, the other reformist candidate, was the speaker of parliament during the reformist 
government. He started the National Confidence Party (Hezb-e Etemad-e Melli) after the 2005 election 
and has adopted a reformist position since. 693 During the time of Khatami, however, Karroubi belonged 
to both the central factions. At times, even the reformists criticized him harshly. One example was 
when he sought Khamenei’s decision in a case where there was disagreement between the Guardian 
Council and Parliament over reforming the law on freedom of the press, undermining the power of the 
reformists completely. 694 In the 2009 presidential election, however, Karroubi adopted a radical left 
position as he supported  civil rights for Bahai’s, optional wearing of Hijab, and criticised the control by 
the state of broadcasting institutions.695 
 
The two fundamentalist candidates, Mohsen Rezai and Mahmmud Ahmadinejad, disagreed over the 
practicality of the government decision for economic development. Mohsen Rezai was the Chief 
Commander of the Revolutionary Guards during the Iraq-Iran war. Rezai, supported by a small group 
within the fundamentalists, announced in his campaign that Ahmadinejad’s economic policies would 
lead Iran into economic disaster.696 He focused on economy but also strongly criticized Ahmadinejad for 
his foreign policies and comments on the Holocaust. 697  The fundamentalists who supported Rezai 
generally disagreed with Ahmadinejad’s lack of compromise but even before the election Rezai knew 
that he had little chance of beating Ahmadinejad. Rezai, with a long history in the Revolutionary Guard, 
became the representative of the traditional fundamentalist politicians who had lost significant influence 
in the first round of Ahmadinejad’s government in 2004. 
Ahmadinejad, the neo-fundamentalist candidate, has been the great promoter of populist policies and 
nepotism, and has been devoted to the establishment of Islamic rule rather than a republic. He began his 
political career in the 1980s as the governor in Khoy and Maku, two cities in Iran’s Kurdistan province. 
He was later appointed governor general of this province. In the late 1990s, he was replaced but 
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continued his activities in the Tehran City Council as a member of the Alliance of Builders of Islamic 
Iran. The faction was formed from various rightwing groups and fundamentalists who won nearly all the 
elections in Iran between 2003 and 2009.698    Returning to politics in 2005, he became the mayor of 
Tehran and a year later became a candidate in the presidential election.699 The goal of politics and 
religion in the Islamic Republic, neo-fundamentalists argue, should be the creation of an ideal messianic 
state. They believe that the signs and symbols in messianic texts that outline the politics in the time of 
Mahdi and the Shi’a utopia, should be deciphered and idealised as the political goal of the Islamic 
Republic. This ideology eradicates the plurality of Shi’a jurisprudence and ironically undermines the 
absolute rule of the Jurisprudential Leadership, which claims its legitimacy to be directly from Shi’a 
messianism. This claim also makes the global aims of messianism a subservient aim for the state’s 
nationalistic and economic developments and reduces the political power of Ayatollahs as Sources of 
Emulation.700 
 
The concept of Marja’yat-e Vahed (One Source of Emulation) that Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi introduced 
threatened the semi-independent status of religious institutions and established the power of leadership 
over other ayatollahs. This politicization of the clerical role in Politicised Messianism  has alienated the 
traditional religious institutions from the neo-fundamentalist government and made the leadership into 
a  threat  to  their  legitimacy. 701  The  position  of  Mesbah Yazdi  has  enabled  the  neo-fundamentalist 
government in Iran to minimize the role of parliament and other state institutions in political decision- 
making and the economy and ignore the concerns of the dominantly fundamentalist parliament over the 
undermining of the power of parliamentary Acts. As a result, in the 2009 election, the fundamentalist 
parties were more divided in introducing Ahmadinejad as their unanimous candidate and fundamentalist 
parties such as the Alliance of the Builders of Islamic Iran refused and did not support Ahmadinejad. 
When, prior to the election, the reformists asked for an independent supervisory system from the 
Guardian Council, their demand indicated the rising tension between the reformists and the neo- 
fundamentalists over the trustworthiness of existing monitoring institutions that are responsible for 
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protecting the credibility of the election. 702 It further illustrated the inefficiency of trust relations that 
the leadership has propagated since the time of the reformists. Both reformist candidates claimed that 
their presence in the election was due to their grave concerns over Ahmadinejad’s national and foreign 
policies, which they argued, were threatening the existence of the Islamic Republic and Jurisprudential 
Leadership.703 All presidential candidates emphasised their loyalty to Khomeini’s leadership and the 
Islamic Republic (to establish their legitimacy for standing as candidates), none however approached the 
issue of Jurisprudential Leadership and its unlimited powers. The reformists blamed the neo- 
fundamentalists for failing to implement the Constitution and the neo-fundamentalists blamed the 
revolutionary elites for establishing ineffective policies. 
 
The participation of religious forces in a democratic nation state is conditional upon and limited to the 
secular structure of its institutions. But the nature of a religio-political state eradicates such a limitation. 
In both Israel and Iran the neo-fundamentalists that emerged from the political tensions in the State- 
Maintenance Phase are radically different from the fundamentalists in the Revolutionary Phase and the 
SBPs. Although strongly religious, they not only accept the rules of state institutions but they also 
concentrate  their  attempts  on  achieving  political  advantages and  positions  in  them.  In  fact,  their 
ideology is to develop their powerbase in the state’s bureaucratic system. Neo-fundamentalism has 
reshaped messianism from an apocalyptic revolution into a stable and egalitarian governing system as 
they depend for their success on the strengthening of the states’ religious identity. For neo- 
fundamentalist and reformist parties, the states’ failure in implementing economic justice has roots in 
the post-revolutionary elitism. In addition, they both define their political goals based on reactionary 
and populist politics and use messianic symbols in their political discourse to advocate their political 
identity. This broad and flexible use of messianic language and symbols has limited the neo- 
fundamentalists’ messianic discourse to political matters. 
 
Millennialism, belief in the end time following the coming of the Messiah, has almost disappeared from 
this politicised account and the messianic goal is altered from ending history to perfecting the existing 
political  state.  The  fundamentalist  parties  still  maintained  a  link  with  Revolutionary  Messianism 
regarding human involvement in the divine plan and in changing the course of history. Although they 
united to form a state and practiced active messianism they did not claim to mirror the policies of the 
ideal messianic time in their state. In the State-Maintenance Phase, the state changes from a preparatory 
phase of messianism to a necessary condition for messianic time. Contrary to the Revolutionary Phase 
and SBPs, when revolutionaries understood utopia in terms of economic and political developments the 
 
 
702 Th. Erdbrink, “Ex-Iranian President Criticizes Ayatollah; Open Letter Faults Supreme Leader for Not Censuring 
Ahmadinejad Over 'Lies',” Washington Post Foreign Service,  June 10, 2009, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2- 
20392465.html, accessed on 10/11/2011. 
703 Ibid. 
157  
neo-fundamentalists view the state as a pre-condition for changing the course of history as the result of 
its  central  role  in  the  development  of  religious  laws.  This  ideology  in  a  political  context  limits 
messianism to a political instrument for opposing the development of secularism and resisting the 
acknowledgment of any distinction between state politics and its messianic obligations. The neo- 
fundamentalists’ messianic discourse instigates the emergence of multiple discourses on messianism in 
political competitions. 
 
The fact that neo-fundamentalism in both these states is expressed by political parties with economic 
and educational goals verifies that, at least politically, religious forces have conformed to the rules of a 
nation state by forming political parties to participate in elections. The public atmosphere that a 
Revolutionary Messianism provides is the prerequisite for the conformity of neo-fundamentalism. 
Moreover, the growing political power of the neo-fundamentalists in Iran and Israel increases their 
authority for coercing a strong religious identity on the state. The neo-fundamentalists’ emphasis on 
populist politics indicates their utilitarian view on political parties which is radically distinct from 
traditional fundamentalist and religious parties in the following ways. Inconsistencies between the 
traditional religious parties and the neo-fundamentalists’ view on the state and the role of political 
parties in Israel has resulted in the increasing power of religious parties, specifically Shas, who consider 
themselves as an integrated part of Israeli politics. Their conformity to parliamentary politics has made 
them pragmatic politicians in the national context who participate with non-religious and leftwing 
parties  in  coalition  negotiations.  In  Iran,  on  the  contrary,  Politicised  Messianism  solely  aims  to 
strengthen the power of the Jurisprudential Leadership over politics. The failure of the 
institutionalization process has instigated an alienation of internal political forces. Neo-fundamentalists 
in Iran are thus very idealistic in their national politics and rather than using pragmatic and diplomatic 
initiatives they support the exclusion of reformists from the political scene. The position of the neo- 
fundamentalists and their power in politics affects the states’ international politics. 
 
Foreign Policies – Politicised Messianism Underlying Religious Discourse 
 
 
This section examines the attitudes of neo-fundamentalists in both cases towards the states’ foreign 
policy in the elections, for three reasons. First, in both states for neo-fundamentalists, foreign policy is 
not an isolated issue and has numerous political and social consequences for their legitimacy and success. 
In Iran, the Iran-United States of Amercia political ties, is one of the determining political factors that 
separate the reformists from the fundamentalists. The neo-fundamentalists in Iran claim their political 
legitimacy partly based on their analysis of Iran/United States of Amercia’ political ties and partly based 
on their stand on the issue. In Israel, the position of the neo-fundamentalists on foreign policy indirectly 
crystallises their position on domestic issues, particularly allowing us to understand their stance on 
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territorial concession, the future of settlements, and peace with the Palestinians. In Israel, all Jewish 
parties place emphasis on the Jewish identity of the state in the Knesset regardless of their debates over 
territorial concessions and the expansion of Israeli settlements. This emphasis takes the Arab parties’ 
opposition to the state beyond merely political opposition and gives them a theological dimension. In 
the State-Building Phase, territorial issues connected Politicised Messianism to everyday politics and 
strengthened Ashkenazi political dominance.704 The militarization of Israeli politics that followed the 
conflict situation alienated religious parties like Agudat Yisrael who abstained from participating in 
military service for theological reasons. In the State-Maintenance Phase, however, the neo- 
fundamentalists’ attitudes towards military service changed and many of their supporters join the army 
after their studies.705 
 
In spite of their support of the Yeshivot and in sponsoring more educational centres, the issue of the 
state legitimacy’s theological claim over land for Shas has not been as challenging as Agudat Yisrael’s. 
The Shas party has successfully addressed the social issues that concern the Sephardim in the military, 
expressed their response to the state’s territorial policies and has increased their role in those policies.706 
For instance, in 2001 Yosef proposed that Sephardi soldiers be allowed to perform different prayers to 
 
those of the common military format. 707  The involvement of the Shas in territorial decisions is a 
response to the traditional dominance of the Ashkenazim over security policies. In the 1990s the Shas 
party considered territorial compromise for peace a possibility to such an extent that Israel's Chief 
Rabbinate prohibited acting according to Yosef’s idea of concessions, and renounced any compromise 
over territorial issues.708 Moreover, in his speech Yosef announced that in his meeting with President 
Mubarak of Egypt he had expressed his concern over Syria and Iraq’s hostility towards Israel which 
indicated the Shas determination for being involved in Israel’s foreign politics.709 
The Shas, however, adopted a different position regarding the Oslo Accords as part of Rabin’s cabinet. 
As Deri, who was the party leader at the time announced many years later, Yosef had ordered the party 
to abstain from voting regardless of Rabin’s attempt to negotiate the support of the Accord with them. 
Deri criticized Yosef for not ordering the Shas representatives to vote against the accord and also for 
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running negotiations about the accords with Rabin in secret so that even Deri himself was unaware of 
the details.710 In 1997 in a proclamation Rabbi Moshe Maiya, an influential Rabbi in the Shas party, 
described the theological view of the Shas party on the Six Days War, territorial concessions, and 
Intifada as following the Oslo Accord.711 He argued that the physical liberation of Jews to return to 
Israel was the miracle and disagreed with the idea that transferring parts of the territories would negate 
the existence of the miracle. To him, the “great unity” amongst Jews made the miracle of victory in the 
Six Days War possible. Thus he  linked a  miracle to  the secular concept of national unity which 
facilitated a military victory. 712 
 
The political stances of religious and non-religious parties over Israel’s security policies regarding 
Jerusalem is a clear example showing how embedding revolutionary and messianic ideologies shape 
debates and policies of the neo-fundamentalists in the State-Maintenance Phase. The Heredi were 
traditionally  against  expanding  settlements  but  the  neo-fundamentalists  have  adopted  a  more 
conservative position regarding the evacuation of settlements.713 They temper this conservative position 
with their lenient position on peace which has enabled them to negotiate the possibility of alliance with 
non-religious statist parties in the Knesset.714 While there are different views amongst the religious and 
non-religious parties regarding the expansion and evacuation of the settlements, the majority of political 
parties agree upon the centrality of Jerusalem, as the capital of the state, in any peace negotiations. For 
the  neo-fundamentalists  the  protection  of  Jerusalem’s  borders  is  a  religious  duty  as  the  city  has 
significant theological importance in Jewish theology and messianism. In addition to its theological and 
national significance, Jerusalem is home for the majority of Hasidic suburbs which are the main 
constituents for religious parties. Similarly to the Ashkenazi Heredi suburbs, Sephardi suburbs strongly 
oppose any negotiation with Palestinians about the future of Jerusalem. Their position was reflected in 
the political stance of the Shas on the 2004 Disengagement Plan. 
 
Rabbi Yosef’s power as a rabbi intensified when he became the prominent voice for Sephardim on the 
issue of the Golan withdrawal referendum.715 He also harshly criticized Ehud Barak just before his 
departure for the Camp David Summit for the concessions Barak had offered at Camp David for 
Jerusalem. For the Shas party was furious about the idea of settling Arabs in East Jerusalem. During his 
speech against Barak Yosef called Arabs “snakes” who were interested in killing Jews and called any 
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attempt to reach a permanent peace with Palestinians senseless. 716  The referendum united twenty 
Heredi Rabbis associated with the Heredi-leumi (Heredi-nationalist) parties who voted against the 
withdrawal, declaring the withdrawal from any part of Eretz Yisrael, forbidden.717 The position of the 
neo-fundamentalists, however, did not reflect the position of the majority of Rabbis who considered 
withdrawal a political rather than a Halakhic decision and adopted a pragmatic approach..718 The lack of 
theological significance limited the Rabbis’ reaction to non-religious statist parties but the Shas party 
questioned the guarantee of peace in exchange for land transfer.719 
 
The day Ariel Sharon achieved the majority vote to form a government in 2001, Arafat in a letter 
congratulated his sweeping victory and said he hoped for the continuation of peace negotiations.720 A 
month after the formation of Sharon’s government in his Passover sermon Yosef called for the 
“annihilation  of  Arabs”  and  “wasting  their  seeds”. 721  Israeli  Justice  Minister Meir  Sheetrit and  the 
Palestinian Authority strongly criticised the sermon and called it “racist”. 722 Later Yitzhaq Suderi, a Shas 
Member of the Knesset, claimed that Yosef only targeted Arab criminals and terrorists in his sermon 
and his comments were not inclusive of all Arabs.723 While these comments signalled the increasing 
power of the Shas party, it was the Disengagement Plan that opened the door for Yosef. He adopted a 
radical oppositional and in a sermon said that “God should strike the Prime Minister over the 
Disengagement Plan”.724 He, along with other Rabbis wrote letters and held speeches to unite world 
Jewry to stop the Plan. In one of these letters signed by Yosef and other influential Rabbis they accused 
the government of rejecting the “desirable land and the Torah” and called the media emissaries of 
“ancient spies”.725 In the following months Yosef publically continued to support anti-evacuation camps, 
asked the government about peace guarantees, and participated in mass prayers for the “nullification of 
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the uprooting decree.”726 During this united front against the Disengagement Plan at each opportunity 
the Shas party blamed secular parties and ideologies for the failing plans of the government. Specifically 
their targeting of the non-religious was due to the fact that most of these settlements were lived in by 
religious communities. Rabbi Moshe Kempinski defined Yosef’s decision for voting against the 
referendum as “withstanding the stench and the onslaught of the dung of the donkey that the Messiah 
will be riding on, even if that donkey may have been elected to be the Prime Minister of Israel. All the 
indignities inflicted by that donkey will be as naught when all will be made right.”727 His statement 
implies that Yosef’s attempts and the Shas party’s stance are based on their messianic view in which the 
state is the vessel through which the messianic time will eventuate. 
 
The statements of Yosef and other neo-fundamentalist Rabbis demonstrate how they have utilised 
biblical narratives to explain Israel’s political situation and to justify their political stances on military 
and foreign policy. By using biblical literature, they have theologically legitimized the decisions of the 
neo-fundamentalist parties over the state’s involvement in peace negotiations, the future of the 
settlements and political ties with the United States of Amercia. For instance, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, an 
influential  Rabbi  in  the  National  Religious  Party  who  supported  the  army  in  the  evacuation  of 
settlements during the Disengagement Plan proposed a unique view of Israel’s politics by explaining the 
meaning of ‘suffering’ in messianic redemptive theology and relating it to the state decision.728 He 
argued that the response to all suffering is the coming of the messianic age but emphasized that the state 
of Israel is a pre-condition of the messianic kingdom. The beginning of the age of redemption, he stated, 
began in 1881 by the return of Jewry to Zion and has been progressively developing towards the 
messianic kingdom.729    To him the state of Israel is the “small scale regime” which is promised in the 
Prophet Michah’s writings (Michah 4:8) and will progress to be the “kingdom of the daughter of 
Israel”.730 The inefficiency of Israel for attaining peace, for Aviner, is the reality or characteristic of a 
small scale regime which is described in the sacred texts. Nevertheless, he considers the state to be a 
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preparatory phase for the messianic age.731 The position of the neo-fundamentalist Rabbis encouraged 
the incorporation of esoteric messianism into party politics. 
 
Yosef, and David Batzri, a Kabbalist Rabbi, in separate sermons in September 2005 called Hurricane 
Katrina a divine punishment for President George W Bush for pursuing the implementation of the 
Disengagement Plan. 732  In 2002, with the support of Deri, Rabbi Kadouri, a prominent Kabbalist 
scholar formed the Sephardim Kabbalist political party, Ahuvat Israel, under his spiritual leadership.733 
In 2005, Kadouri issued a declaration and by connecting the natural disasters to the coming of the 
Messiah,  suggested  that  when  natural  disasters  happen  more  frequently  Jewry  understand  the 
importance of the return to Zion and the re-building of the temple.734 He presented this declaration to 
Sharon, who was travelling to the United States of Amercia, to be read to the American Jewish 
community in order to encourage them to migrate to Israel.735 In the same speech he claimed that the 
Messiah was already in Israel and predicted huge calamities before the messianic age. Referring to 
Sharon’s Disengagement Plan he called the Plan a reason for the continuation of a disastrous situation.736 
He predicted that Sharon would be the last Prime Minister of the “old era” in Israel and a new era would 
begin. He announced that he would reveal a secret about the Messiah on Yom Kippur day. On that day, 
in a prayer meeting and after a long meditation he announced that “With the help of God, the soul of 
the Messiah has attached itself to a person in Israel.”737 The neo-fundamentalists’ strategy of directly 
linking the state decision to messianism created another political alliance which was rooted in the Six 
Days War. 
 
 
 
 
The Six Day War 
 
 
The Six Day War intensified the theological value of Jerusalem. The evidence for this intensification is 
the  emergence  of  a  messianic  political  group  that  demanded  the  re-construction  of  the  Temple 
Mountain in Jerusalem for its significance in Jewish messianic theology. The Temple Mount Faithful is 
an  extremely  nationalist  group  and  receives  considerable  support  from  the  American  Jewish 
community.738 They view the outcome of the 1969 war as a great victory because of the return of 
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Jerusalem and in its centre, the Temple Mount, to Jews. 739 As the head of the group, Salomon, believes 
two of the three theological conditions of the messianic age have been fulfilled and by reconstructing the 
Temple the third condition will be completed. He refers to the three theological conditions for the 
messianic age which are Aliyah or the return of Jews to Israel, the re-establishment of the state, and the 
re-construction of the Temple.740 During the 2003 commemoration day, the Temple Mount Faithful 
condemned creating a Palestinian state based on Bush’s “Road Map” and called its content “un-godly and 
sinful”. 741  Their negotiations also fostered a strategic alliance between the Rabbis and the “Temple 
Mount Faithful” who also rejected the peace policies of the leftwing parties and blamed the supporters 
of secularism for the failure of peace negotiations with the Palestinians. During Yosef’s campaign against 
the “Disengagement Plan” he and other leading Rabbis gathered at the foot of the Temple Mount to pray 
for the evacuation to end.742 The significance of this strategic unity between the Temple Mount Faithful 
and Yosef’s campaigns is that for the first time in Israeli politics the neo-fundamentalists criticized the 
state particularly because, according to them, the state plays a central role in the fulfilment of messianic 
theology.743 
 
Yosef’s anti-disengagement position further involved him in security issues when in 2006 he organized 
and  blessed  a  meeting  between  three  Rabbis  and  Hamas  representatives  that  aimed  to  reach  a 
ceasefire.744 By organizing the meeting neo-fundamentalists aimed to blame the secularists for the failure 
of  peace  negotiations. Yosef’s blessing statement, further  affirming  this position,  he  noted  that a 
possible ceasefire was to be initiated between Palestinians and the Jewish people rather than the state 
and Palestinians. This is echoed by broad opinion, as evident in a commentary on the reasons for the 
meeting, Rabbi Jakobovits referred to the common fear of secularism for both Jewish and Muslim 
religious  leaders  as  a  reason  for  unification  and  their  opposition  against  secularization  was  a 
commonality for negotiations.745 This fear and opposition, he indicated, could play a significant role in 
dialogue between the West and the Muslim world. 
Between 2006 and 2008, the political stance of the Shas party strengthened the role of religious figures 
like Yosef and provided them the legitimacy for initiating negotiations with other rabbis over the 
conditions  of  peace  with  the  Palestinians,  the  possibility  of  evacuation  plans,  and  debates  over 
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Jerusalem.746 In accordance with Yosef’s position, the Shas party disagreed with the Olmert government 
plan to include Jerusalem in peace negotiations. In 2007, following a meeting with a delegation of rabbis, 
Yosef even threatened to order the Shas party to leave the coalition with the Olmert government if he 
were to concede to the division of Jerusalem.747 Although Yosef participated in rabbinic peace initiatives, 
Shas opposed the Kadima government plan for resuming negotiations with Syria and insisted on placing 
conditions for such negotiations. They considered the negotiations a threat to Israel’s security which 
attributed to Hezbollah a strategic advantage. During the debates in the Knesset over the issue Yishai 
expressed this opposition in security terms.748 In Netanyahu’s government, Shas joined other parties, 
except Labor, to send a message to Netanyahu and warn him about the idea of creating a Palestinian 
state. In addition, they rejected his decision to remove settlements in the West Bank.749 Rabbi Yaakov 
Katz  (Ketzaleh),  the  head  of  Ichud  Leumi  Party,  also  criticised  Netanyahu for  destroying  Jewish 
settlements by calling them “outposts” while rocket attacks had turned some towns like Sderot into a 
“ghost town”. 750 
 
The issue of settlements continued to be a primary challenge for Israel when President Barak Obama 
came to office in the United States of Amercia and insisted on closing down of settlements in the West 
Bank. In a rally authorized by the Israel Defence Force, Yishai addressed the audience in a letter and 
emphasized that the 2004 Disengagement Plan was a “mistake” and affirmed that through determination 
and courage the previous residents could re-build the Homesh settlement in Gaza.751 Yosef in another 
fiery speech opposed the freezing of settlement construction and took a more evident anti-western 
political position.752 
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In May 2009, the Knesset passed the “Jerusalem, Capital of Israel Bill” upon which both coalition and 
opposition factions agreed. It was submitted as an amendment and stipulated that making any decisions 
about the future and borders of Jerusalem required the presence and participation of eighty members of 
the  Knesset  instead  of  the  sixty  members  in  the  present  law. 753   Their  vote  on  the  Bill,  their 
disagreement with Netanyahu over settlement issues, and their opposition to his visit to the United 
States of Amercia in May 2009 for negotiating the settlement issue with Obama, has brought the Shas 
party closer to the centrist and rightwing parties. This alliance has been much stronger since the victory 
of Likud in the 2008 election and Shas opposition to closing the watch posts.754 After both Shas and Ichu 
Leumi disagreed with Netanyahu’s plan, the strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya'alon supported them. 
 
Even when, under the pressure of Obama’s office, the government considered freezing the expansion of 
settlements, Ariel Attias, Housing Minister and a Member of Knesset from the Shas party, also rejected 
the idea and announced that the construction would be merely postponed until an agreement was 
reached with the United States of Amercia. Yishai, the Interior Minister in Netanyahu’s government, 
announced neither people nor the state could tolerate the freezing of the construction.755 The Shas 
policies on territorial issues and Israeli foreign policy in the State-Maintenance Phase have followed two 
goals. The party has attempted to establish a separate but unified Sephardi religious identity that could 
contribute to the success of the party in elections, and to establish Yosef’s legitimacy as the ultimate 
authority, reflecting the Sephardi communities. The examination of Shas position in the last election 
allows us to see the transition of Politicised Messianism from the traditional national religious parties 
like Mafdal to Shas. Mafdal gained legitimacy by placing emphasis on the central role of the pioneers and 
settlers in Israel, which is still evident in settlers’ ideology. For Shas, on the other hand, political 
legitimacy does not exclusively rely on this issue. The change from the language of Mafdal to that of 
Shas demonstrates the development of Securitized Messianism into Politicised Messianism. 
In Iran, reformists believe Iran’s national interests and economic progress could improve with the 
increase of foreign investments and by activating the private sectors. For them, the prerequisite for any 
economic improvement is the termination of Iran’s economic embargo which is interconnected with the 
complex net of political problems between Iran and the international community, especially the United 
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States of Amercia.756 Although it is not the purpose of this study to discuss the nature and conditions of 
Iran’s nuclear situation, or evaluate their argument, the debates and diplomatic solutions presented by 
the reformers, fundamentalists, and neo-fundamentalists on the issue clarify their approach towards 
foreign policy and the messianic obligations of the state. Debates over Iran’s motivations and the 
progress  of  its  nuclear  programme  have  been  the  central  issue  for  both  reformist  and  neo- 
fundamentalist governments. Since 2003, the aims and the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme have 
involved these political factions in fierce arguments about the future of Iran-United States of Amercia 
political ties. In the course of negotiations all the main political powers in Iran have led formal 
negotiations with the European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency at some time. Since 
their views on the issue are shaped by their understating of Politicised Messianism their strategies reflect 
their views on the state’s responsibilities in the “age of absence”. 
 
During the first round of negotiations between Iran and the European Union in 2003, and when 
reformers had  administrative power, Iran  voluntarily stopped  its  uranium enrichment programme 
during the negotiations and attempted to cooperate with EU-3 representatives to solve the enrichment 
issue. Iran acknowledged faults indicated in the IAEA’s reports, accepted their mistake in reporting to 
the agency, and announced their readiness for further negotiations. But months later in 2004 the first 
round of Iran-EU-3 negotiations failed to lead to further meetings. In June 2004 Ahmadinejad became 
the president in Iran and the neo-fundamentalists became the main nuclear strategists. Ahmadinejad 
used the reformists’ discourse on economic independence and introduced Iran’s nuclear programme as 
an example of national independence. He advocated for his nuclear strategies by using populist politics, 
staging public ceremonies and excessive messianic language in order to connect the messianic 
responsibilities of the state to technological independence and Iran’s nuclear programme.757 
 
The neo-fundamentalists’ first government adopted a harsh diplomatic language and rejected the 
agreements of the reformists. Ahmadinejad in his speeches called his nuclear policy a success for Iran’s 
foreign affairs. The neo-fundamentalists justified their harder position by pointing to the existence of a 
military situation outside Iran’s borders under the Bush administration. The presence of coalition forces 
and the fall of Saddam Hussein were to neo-fundamentalists sufficient reasons for the improvement of 
Iran’s military capabilities. Equipping forces, including security forces, had for the government, other 
economic and political benefits, which later became evident in the events after the 2009 presidential 
election.758 As many scholars, such as Anoushiravan Ehteshami, argue the militarization of politics was 
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further developed following the success of the neo-fundamentalists in the 2003 Municipal Council 
election.759   The neo-fundamentalist government created a symbolic image of Iran’s nuclear programme 
as a sign which indicated that in his presidential term the era of colonization and imperialism would 
come to an end.760 In his speeches during the first round of his presidency Ahmadinejad claimed that 
opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme was fabricated by the “bullying powers” who attempted to stop 
Iran from developing technological capabilities.761 Iran’s nuclear programme, which during the time of 
Khatami was solely for infrastructure projects, became the symbol of Iranian national pride and 
celebrated by the government. The more Iran was pressured to stop its programme the more ritualised 
the celebration of the programme became.762 
 
Neo-fundamentalists oppose the reformists’ negotiation strategies and their view on Iran’s national 
security. Reformists disagreeing with the militarization of national security argue that adopting harsh 
international policies is against Iran’s national security interests in the long term. In 2002, Khatami 
stated in Washington and later in London that elevating Iran’s political status in the international 
community  was  the  main  factor  for  ensuring  Iran’s  security. 763  While  the  reformists  stress  the 
importance of forming a balance between the European parties involved in negotiations, and Russia, the 
neo-fundamentalists have  relied  heavily  on  Russian  support  in  the  process  of  negotiations. 764  The 
Ahmadinejad government attempted to link the future of Iran’s nuclear negotiations to Russia’s regional 
interests and hoped that Russia would not halt its nuclear deal with Iran for the sake of better political 
ties with the United States of Amercia. The Neo-fundamentalists also involved China as another party in 
negotiations by increasing the volume of trade. Tensions between Russia and the United States of 
Amercia during the Bush administration, the presence of coalition forces in Iraq, and the growing 
market for Iran’s exports in the East all instigated the emposing of further sanctions on Iran. In April 
2007, months after Ahmadinejad had promised “good nuclear news”, he announced Iran’s completion of 
the nuclear enrichment programme, by up to three and half percent. The news was celebrated in a 
ceremony with a highly messianic tone.765 Although Ahmadinejad publically announced that his hardline 
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policy  will  be  uncompromising  during  his  presidency  he  has  never  rejected  the  possibility  of 
negotiations. 766    His nuclear strategies are however related to a more problematic challenge for the 
Islamic Republic, and that is Iran’s political ties with the United States of Amercia. 
 
Most scholars of Iran’s foreign affairs agree with Amir Hussein Alinaqi in identifying Iran’s political ties 
with the United States of Amercia as the ideological core of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.767 The 
issue of the future of political ties between Iran and the United States of Amercia became a public 
debate between Khamenei and Khatami when in January 1998 Khatami accepted an interview with the 
CNN news agency. 768 Khamenei’s supporters launched demonstrations and harshly criticized Khatami 
in rightwing newspapers.769 In February 1998, in response to many attacks, Khatami announced “Two 
groups have been concerned about my speech, those who genuinely oppose negotiation with America 
and those who have attempted for many years to establish negotiations, and today they think they have 
lost their position as initiator or have been left with no place for further activities. I promise to the two 
that I have no intention to negotiate or establish diplomatic ties with America. The first group should 
not be concerned and the second group can be assured that they have the monopoly of negotiation and 
establishing diplomatic ties with America.”770 
 
Khatami  referred  to  the  neo-fundamentalists  and  Khamenei  who  believed  that  the  ideological 
foundations of the Islamic Revolution radically contradict any attempts to establish diplomatic ties with 
the United States of Amercia. Conversely the reformists argue that establishing political ties based on 
mutual  understanding  and  respect  in  the  long  term  benefits  Iran’s  national  interests.  From  the 
perspective of Khamenei and his supporters, the power of starting or preventing any diplomatic ties 
with the United States of Amercia should be solely in the hands of Khamenei. As a strongly patrimonial 
faction the neo-fundamentalists prefer to establish secretive political ties with the United States of 
Amercia while at the same time maintaining their ideological position in the national context.771 Both 
fundamentalists and neo-fundamentalists promulgate a negative portrayal of western countries in which 
all foreign countries constantly plot against the Islamic Republic. These threats target all political, social, 
and cultural ideals of the state. Khamenei is specifically concerned with what he calls “the Soft War” 
against the Islamic Republic’s cultural achievements. He refers to the ‘de-Islamization’ of Iranian society 
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through the spread of western values. Both neo-fundamentalists and fundamentalists recommend a close 
political and social national environment as the solution for the “Soft War”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter examined the process of the politicization of messianism and the challenges between 
political parties over the nature and characteristics of Politicised Messianism through the analysis of the 
last elections in Israel and Iran. Throughout it discussed the views of the neo-fundamentalists on states’ 
politics in national and international contexts in order to explain the political structure of these states as 
indicated in debates on the messianic goals of the states. It demonstrated that during the State- 
Maintenance Phase rather than parties’ views on the existence or lack of a boundary between the secular 
and religious identity of the state, it is the messianic goals of securitization that form political debates in 
these states. Political parties and their interactions in the Knesset in Israel and the relationship between 
political parties and the Jurisprudential Leader in Iran determine the success of a faction and the 
dominance of a specific narrative of Politicised Messianism over politics. In both cases while in the 
State-Building Phase, leaders of political parties were limited to revolutionary elites, in the State- 
Maintenance Phase the leadership is transferred to new political factions and the post-war generation. 
 
In political debates in these states, rest two non-reconciled concepts of traditional communal politics 
and factionalist party politics. It is in these tensions that the embedding of Revolutionary Messianism 
functions as a unifying force. The emergence of neo-fundamentalism in both states indicates that both 
reject the fundamentalists and reformist interpretations of Revolutionary Messianism as hegemonic 
narratives. In both states neo-fundamentalism undermines the efficiency of revolutionaries in managing 
political and economic affairs. For them, crucial foreign policy issues and their position within the 
international community are interlinked with their understanding of Politicised Messianism. Their 
vision on foreign policy relies on a complex web of religious ideology and political history in which 
religious values, group interests, and the state’s messianic obligations are determining factors. In their 
view, the states’ foreign policy extends the social implications of Politicised Messianism to domestic 
politics, thus the states’ decision becomes not only a measure for its political orientation but also a 
signifier of its religious committment. Neo-fundamentalists use religious symbols to explain the states’ 
ideology in relation to foreign policy and their view on religious identity of the state and its foreign 
policy. 
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In both cases, the neo-fundamentalists use foreign policy as an instrument to decrease the power of 
reformists and secular forces by undermining the effectiveness of their national security policies. They 
connect this inefficiency to their failure in fulfilling the responsibilities of the state in the pre-messianic 
time. Both consider specific roles for the state in the fulfilment of messianic history and refrain from 
minimizing Politicised Messianism to philosophical or religious discourses. For them, the messianic age 
is a just political system that will be established for the fulfilment of the law thus protecting the state’s 
interests in relation to foreign policy is ideologically related to the success of the state. Their strong 
anti-liberal position further intensifies their view on foreign policy. In Israel, the Shas party has accused 
the secular parties of failing to guarantee Israel’s security in the Oslo Accord negotiations, the 
Disengagement Plan and later settlement issues. In Iran, the neo-fundamentalists have condemned the 
reformists’ policies for the continuation of challenges to Iran’s nuclear programmes. 
 
Shas is pragmatic in its national policies, but is idealist in its foreign policy (particularly Israel’s political 
ties with the United States of Amercia), and the political consequences of settlement negotiations. In 
Iran the neo-fundamentalists adopt a more pragmatic approach to their foreign policy. Through the 
integration of religion and politics and due to the potentially changing nature of the political situation, 
political acts based on ideological positions oblige the parties to adopt a compromising position for 
survival. Changes in the political scene, thus, could transform this environment and further involve neo- 
fundamentalists in Politicised Messianism and discussions over its nature and conditions in a political 
context. The intense involvements of the Shas party in Israel, their understanding of Politicised 
Messianism, and their view on the responsibilities of the state have posed challenges to traditional 
Zionism of the secular Likud or Kadima parties. Their position on the integration of politics and religion 
in the state’s foreign policy, this chapter has argued, politicises messianism and further makes theology 
dependent on politics. The rise of neo-fundamentalism in Iran is the result of extending the authority of 
the Jurisprudential Leadership to all aspects of public activities. Cooperation between fundamentalists, 
neo-fundamentalists and Khamenei aimed to formulate a system of rationality that connects Shi’a mystic 
messianism to Jurisprudential Leadership. In the neo-fundamentalists’ view, the authority of a 
Jurisprudential Leadership is the inevitable outcome of a form of contact between the Mahdi and his 
representatives. 
 
The immense ideological shift in the politics of Jurisprudential Leadership after Khomeini has 
transformed the arrangement of religion and politics in the state. The political ramifications of the 
changes have created tension at various levels of state politics and surfaced dramatically in the 2009 
presidential election campaigns and the brutal aftermath of the election. During the campaigns the most 
contested social and political issues were directly or indirectly interlinked with this ideological shift and 
the political implications of neo-fundamentalist discourse on Iran’s national and international politics. 
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This  ideological shift has  transformed a patriarchal Securitized Messianism to  a patrimonial authoritarian 
ideology. The  politicization of messianism, therefore, affect<; elections and  the  interactions  betvveen 
political parties in  both  states. Politicization is the  prior phase of establishing new policies in society and 
establishing the  legitimacy of neo-fundamentalist<; as the  agent of progressive messianism in social life. 
The next chapter discusses the  social issues that  arise  in this  process and  analyses the factors that 
determine the  success or failure of their attempts. 
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Chapter 6 - Institutionalised Securitized Messianism and Society 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The end of the Cold War and the reshaping of the security map of the region led to new security 
policies in Israel and Iran. In addition, the end of the wars between the united Arab forces and Israel and 
between Iraq and Iran further de-securitized Politicised Messianism. After the Cold War, the presence 
of the United States of Amercia military in the region could no longer be justified as a defence strategy 
against communist Russia. As the result of this change, many of the traditional security threats to the 
Islamic Republic and the state of Israel decreased. The end of the bipartisan security arrangement in the 
Middle East resulted in a vacuum which was filled by new security threats and regional alliances. Iran 
and Israel both defined their post Cold War security policies regionally, and regarded one of the 
regional states or a group of states as their ‘enemy’ and an ultimate threat to their national security. For 
example, between 1948 and the late 80s Israel considered the united Arab forces as its main security 
threat, but in the post-Cold War era Palestinian militias and the Middle Eastern states which supported 
them became the main security threat for Israel. In Iran, the end of the Cold War coincided with the 
end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Khomeini. The end of these wars reshaped the political 
structure of the Islamic Republic and the state called all who criticized it its security threats.772 
 
During the Cold War period, in Iran and Israel alliances between the revolutionary elites and traditional 
religious forces were based on their attempts to secure the revolutions and the states. In this State- 
Building Phase, the states were less concerned with redefining the concepts of religion and secularity 
than with the balance of political power in their societies. The end of the Cold War challenged the 
status quo and instigated new ideological positions about the distribution and centralization of political 
and religious powers within the framework of Politicised Messianism. Influential religious voices, which 
had been one of the main motivators of Securitized Messianism and nationalism, now challenged the 
legitimacy of each state due to their increasing de-securitization of Revolutionary Messianism. 
Consequently, secularism and its political implications became the focus of the political debates within 
these states. The two concepts of messianism and nationalism, which had previously legitimized 
Politicised Messianism, now needed to be re-defined. Only through such a redefinition could these 
states give meaning to their social policies. 
This chapter studies the impact of the de-securitization of Revolutionary Messianism on Israeli and 
Iranian societies and argues that first, both of the states resist the de-securitization of messianism and 
secondly, that revolutionary messianic themes maintain their presence in all the states’ social policies 
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and everyday politics even during the process of de-securitization. As these states proceed from the 
State-Building Phase to State-Maintenance Phase, they produce a particular definition of citizenship and 
enforce civil policies that impact on religion and politics. In the State-Maintenance Phase, Politicised 
Messianism becomes an effective political ideology for these states because it eradicates the boundaries 
between the existing public and private spheres and ultimately strengthens their power. They are 
obliged to socially re-define these spheres in order to affirm their legitimacy in the new security 
environment. This necessity is the result of the transition of the states from State-Building Phase to 
State-Maintenance Phase as well as the development of new social groups. 
 
While civil identity is to a degree constructed through social background and interactions of individuals 
it is dominantly the outcome of a state’s intentional policies, such as educational policies or civil laws. 
This chapter explores the civil policies that these states employ in order to establish the dominance of a 
particular ideology in their societies. It focuses on the states’ national social policies through which 
citizens can obtain information and are regulated in terms of political behaviour. These political norms 
are conveyed to the public in various forms - such as the symbolic representations of national identity, 
supporting educational materials, civil laws and the construction of citizenship in relation to legal 
national identity. It is through these policies that citizens begin to identify with the political goals of 
Politicised Messianism. 
 
Nearly all other factors in the development of this collective identity, including the influence of 
educational institutions, the geographical area that a citizen chooses to live in, the media and the work 
place are shaped in association with what a state determines to be its national identity. This chapter 
addresses this process by examining the relationship between citizens and the state in the areas of 
citizenship, human rights, gender equality and education. It argues that during the two previous phases, 
the  securitization  process  reduced  the  likelihood  of  secularism.  By  contrast,  the  de-securitization 
process and the complimentary politicization of messianism during the third phase have increased the 
likelihood of secularism. Ironically, Iran and Israel’s successful political mobilization of citizenry relied 
on the creation of a symbolic relationship between religious messianic authority and the political 
authority of the state. This involvement of religion and politics in the states’ social policies can be seen 
to open a space for debates about core religious beliefs and a potential space for rebelling against 
religion. Religious and non-religious groups normalise the Securitized Messianism  by using it as a 
platform to express their own views on the goals and ideals of Politicised Messianism . Studying these 
policies, however, is a complicated issue as any definition and policy could be either the product of the 
states’ conscious decisions or the inevitable by-product of securitization. While in the State-Building 
Phase,  both  consciously  and  deliberately  determined  their  intentional  policies  because  of  their 
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involvement in a military conflict, in the State-Maintenance Phase their social policies are more affected 
by the changes in society. 
 
Dividing the development of these states into State-Building Phase and State-Maintenance Phase 
introduces an historical dimension to this discussion in order to explain the spectrum between the 
intended policies and the inevitable by-products of de-securitization. It also explicates the embedding of 
the  revolutionary  ideologies  in  the  states’  unintended  and  intended  policies.  The  importance  of 
exploring these ideologies and their societal impact is to demonstrate how, in both cases, messianic 
themes have achieved continuity in state politics, even in the State-Maintenance Phase, when the 
revolutionary momentum has decreased. These ideologies exist because they are embedded in civil laws 
and  are  the  outcome  of  the  state’s  security-orientated  policies.  In  the  State-Building  Phase,  the 
intentions of the states are clearer. For instance, in the case of national citizenship law in these states, 
the law is clearly intended to define the meaning of citizenship. These definitions, however, are 
influenced by the security environment. In the case of Israel, the state consciously and deliberately 
defined citizenship in political language but the religious symbols and tones are embedded in Israel’s 
Declaration of Independence and civil laws. 
 
In the State-Building Phase, creating a non-religious and political nature for citizenship in Israel was the 
intended policy but the religious tone of the texts was the unintended by-product of securitization. In 
Iran, while the state intentionally defined citizenship and civil laws in religious terms, the intended 
outcome of securitization such as non-religious and political compromises of the state were the by- 
products of securitization and the consequences of social reality. This is also the case for educational 
policies that are the main vehicle for setting the intended policies of the states’ as social norms. Many of 
the states’ educational policies in favour of religious education school systems have been the result of 
political compromises. The legal status of citizenship constructs a general institutionalised national 
identity through the symbolic language that obligates both religious and non-religious groups to take a 
position regarding gender equality, the spread of new communication technologies, and civil rights of 
the individual in these states. Studying the civil policies of these states in the State-Maintenance Phase, 
explains how the states’ management of the relationship between religion and politics, and changes in 
the regional security environment, shape Israel’s and Iran’s understandings of civil rights. In the last 
section this chapter discusses how these rights affect the role that religious and non-religious groups play 
in these states. 
 
In both cases, in the State-Building Phase civil laws were predominantly intended to frame religion in a 
security-orientated state and has resulted in a series of consequences for these societies. While the states 
determined directive conformist and civil policies to shape a particular form of state, each determined a 
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different approach towards these policies in the State-Maintenance Phase. In Israel from 1948-1977, the 
state decided powerful conformist and directive policies, such as excluding the Sephardim from political 
power, that were exclusive and suppressive of the Sephardi ethnic identity. These oppressive policies 
were embedded in the state’s military policies, school system, and national laws. After 1977, however, 
the state became more accommodating of various social and political groups. As Israel moved to the 
post Cold War era and entered the State-Maintenance Phase, various social and civil groups challenged 
the legitimacy of its coercive policies. The rise of women’s movements, a Sephardi party, and the 
further involvement of Agudat Yisrael in the Knesset are examples of these changes. In Iran, during the 
State-Building Phase, the state passed many coercive laws, which severely undermined gender equality, 
and excluded non-Shi’a voices, ethnic minorities, and political opposition. In State-Maintenance Phase 
the state adopted a no-compromise position and refused to admit or resolve any of the social challenges 
it faced. 
 
The significance of the examples used in this chapter in relation to gender and technology is to 
demonstrate how these states maintain these ideologies in the State-Maintenance Phase, even if their 
policies are not always consciously intended. In the case of Israel, these examples demonstrate that the 
Revolutionary Messianism sustains because of the accommodating position of the state regarding the 
new ideas and changes that affect it. This is so even if the security-orientated ideology is still present in 
the rhetoric of the settlers and in the language of the National Religious Party (Mafdal). In the case of 
Iran, these examples show that the state attempts to maintain Revolutionary Messianism by enacting 
coercive policies, excluding other political voices and social policing, as evident in the rhetoric of 
religious figures, political parties, and religious groups. These examples also clarify the social responses 
to  the  states’  re-definition  of  the  terms  ‘religious’  and  ‘secular’.  These  definitions  are  both 
sociologically and politically constructed and have a particular meaning in each case. 
 
The emergence of politician theologians and theologian politicians, the political participation of religious 
figures, and the influence of religion over national laws have created a social situation in which the 
definitions of secular and religious have clear meanings but in their Israeli and Iranian interpretations do 
not correlate with academic definitions of the terms. In academic use, the term secular refers to the 
political system or a public sphere in which religion does not play a determining role.773 This definition 
could not hold in either Israel or Iran. One of the main reasons for the failure of this academic definition 
is that the boundaries between religion and secularity in Israel and Iran respectively have behavioural 
meanings. In both societies, religious groups have particular constituencies that are identifiable by 
clothing, behaviour, political adherence and leadership. To be secular means to be not religiously 
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176  
affiliated in that way, but it does not mean to be secular in the western sense, which is founded based on 
privatisation of religion, and individualism. 774 
 
One of the main objectives of the states’ civil policies is to re-define boundaries between politics and 
religion in Iran and Israel. However, defining such boundaries in civil, political and social rights of 
citizens challenges the legitimacy of Politicised Messianism. Contrary to secular politics within which 
the civil laws aim to privatize religion, in these states, these laws further de-privatize religion. In a 
secular system, the state acknowledges a form of differentiation between the public and the private 
spheres, and encourages separation between religious and political institutions. This process rationalizes 
the privatization of religion and forms the political culture of western secular states. In Iran and Israel, 
religious institutions and figures are either directly involved in politics or have an alliance with a 
political faction within the state. Thus, it is religious coalitions and alliances that influence the states’ 
politics and undermine the acknowledgment of any form of differentiation between these spheres. 
 
Political participation is another factor that contributes to theological and political changes in Israel and 
Iran during the State-Maintenance Phase. The Securitized Messianism of the State-Building Phase 
prioritized the communal identity of individuals in order to foster unity amongst citizens for protecting 
the state. The states in this phase advocated individual sacrifice and absolute commitment to the states’ 
political goals. The development of an autonomous individual identity thus became a potential threat to 
these states in the State-Maintenance Phase. In both cases Securitized Messianism linked the fulfilment 
of the divine promise to the appropriation of individual behaviour to the post-revolutionary laws. The 
individuals’ political participation in both systems follows a set definition and is only accepted if the 
individuals support the revolutionary ideals and strive for the fulfilment of the messianic utopia. In both 
Jewish and Shi’a messianic theologies, the significance of messianism is in that the messianic age is a 
hope but is never fulfilled, therefore, the absolute implementation of God’s laws in the pre-messianic 
age becomes necessary and distinguishes the relationship between the citizens and the states from other 
political systems. Consequently, although they, like any other state, are obliged by virtue of their 
bureacracies to define some boundaries between the public and private spheres, they are incapable of 
separating religion from any of these spheres. 
 
For religious political parties, the acceptance of the free will of individuals, the notion of electoral 
politics, and civil rights cause major challenges as they face the political implications of the 
institutionalization process and encounter social reality. Specifically, the inconsistency between the 
Jewish and Shi’a messianic traditions and the notion of an autonomous individual defies their political 
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and religious legitimacy of Politicised Messianism. In these states, one of the fundamental changes after 
securitization is the deconstruction of the fixed social roles present in pre-Revolutionary Messianism. 
These states claim to foster egalitarianism but this idealistic revolutionary egalitarianism is theologically 
a potential threat to Jewish and Shi’a agent-based legal systems. It reduces the power of the clergy and 
excludes any apolitical method of interpreting sacred texts, as well as their formal status as a 
distinguished class in society. Neo-fundamentalists in both states accept the institutionalization of 
messianic doctrine but are less hierarchical. The deconstruction of their hierarchical structure is the 
result of the dislocation of religious institutions within secular politics which inevitably transforms 
religious institutions into political agencies that are less dependent on religious leaders. Both use 
messianic symbolism in their civil policies in order to overcome the challenges faced by Politicised 
Messianism from the non-religious dimensions of a modern nation-state. The success of these states in 
enacting their civil policies depends on the inclusivity of these policies and the states’ understandings of 
Politicised Messianism and civil society. 
 
Politicised Messianism integrates political ideology into religious discourse, prioritizes the notion of 
achieving individual salvation through political means, and specifically opposes private religion. The de- 
securitization of messianism affects the relationship between politics and religion within the social 
context and instigates both public admiration and condemnation of the direct involvement of religious 
figures in politics. In the State-Maintenance Phase, these states accept a form of differentiation and 
establish specialised state institutions. Politicised Messianism, however, instigates challenges between 
political and social groups over the objectives of Securitized Messianism , the nature of the states’ 
political and social programmes, and civil and individual rights. The de-privatization of religion initiates 
the involvement of religious institutions in both the public and private spheres and indicates a shift in the 
social understanding of religion from that of a solely transcendentally focused system to an overtly 
political one. Therefore, in effect, the state legitimacy relies on creating a balance between the 
involvement of religious institutions and the state in the public and private spheres. 
 
This political culture contradicts the secular system in which the state legitimacy relies on the successful 
creation of a boundary between political and religious values. In Israel and Iran this political culture has 
an impact on the relationship between citizens and obligates the states to re-define any form of civil 
relationship in the social context. The contextualization transforms any political disagreements between 
religious and non-religious citizens into theological disagreement. In Israel and Iran, religious citizens 
target non-religious citizens, attack their lifestyle, and blame them for the failure of state policies. Non- 
religious  citizens  accuse  religious  figures  and  groups  for  a  lack  of  tolerance and  blame  them for 
hindering peaceful social coexistence, because of their hegemony over politics. In order to mediate 
these disagreements for both religious and non-religious groups the states are obliged to create policies 
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through which they can inform the public about national political values, communicate the state’s 
political culture, and encourage political participation. 
 
Citizenship and Political Rights of Individuals 
 
 
As the result of the politicization of messianism, defining citizenship and institutionalizing the concept 
within national law becomes the most challenging issue for Israel and Iran. Like any other nation state, 
the concept of civil law in Israel and Iran is bound to the states institutional definition of geographical 
borders and national identity. In his study of the concept of citizenship in the West, Keith Faulks 
considers three factors determinative in a modern understanding of citizenship. He notes that although 
in theory citizenship is a global concept that attributes to all citizens of a state equal status free from 
geographical boundaries, in practice the notion of citizenship is bound to the legacy of the French 
revolution; it is determined by state institutions and acts as a state instrument for “closure”.775    He 
argues that the tension between the “ethnic and pre-political identity of nationality” and the “civic, 
political status of citizenship” are the factors that make the understanding of modern citizenship 
“ambiguous”.776 Therefore, presenting an account of the relationship between citizens and the states in 
Iran and Israel requires an examination of the way in which each state defines ‘an individual citizen’ and 
their relationship with religion and the state. 
 
In Israel and Iran, the ethnic and religious identity of citizens has intensified citizenship challenges for 
the states and their citizens. In Israel, the diversity of Jewish ethnic groups makes creating unity based 
on an ethnic commonality impossible. Thus the pre-state religious identity of the Jewish Diaspora and 
their ethnic diversity is mediated by a common political and national identity. The Zionist revolution 
and the conflicts the state faced after its formation intensified the state’s challenges of the integration of 
non-Jewish religious and ethnic communities, especially Israeli Arab citizens. The state of Israel was 
able to integrate various immigrant groups into Israeli society due to its centralization of religious 
identity as national identity. In Iran however, the centralization of religious identity as national identity 
created issues for the state in a country that contains diverse ethnic and religious groups. In order to 
overcome these tensions both states relied on their revolutionary identity in the construction of 
citizenship. In Iran the criteria for the state became the citizens’ devotion to the JLship. Although in 
Iran’s Constitution the rights of Iranian religious and ethnic groups are protected, the state has excluded 
non-revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries in its discourses on citizenship. 
 
 
 
 
775 K. Faulks, Citizenship; Key Ideas (NY: Routledge, 2000), 29. Riesenberg, in his study of citizenship, asserts that the 
concept of citizenship in the West in the late eighteenth century was transformed from the old elite and a passive citizenship 
model to a nationalist and active one. P. Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau (Chapel Hill, NC: 
UNC Press, 1994), 7. 
776 K. Faulks, ibid, 36. 
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The integration of religious and political identity has raised issues regarding the religious meaning of an 
autonomous individual as well as a civil identity in the state. The acceptance of the existence of an 
autonomous individual with certain undeniable rights precedes the notion of the civic political status of 
citizens. Conceiving of a civic political right for citizens relies on the modern notion of an individual. 
Rousseau’s theory of a “social contract” and all western political theories on the notion of citizenship 
after him consider an individual as a subjective entity. This view contradicts the Abrahamic notion of an 
individual who is born with some kind of religious and social contract with other members of the 
faith.777 A modern subjective individual is a secular being but a religious individual is in the image of 
God. The former is responsible for protecting their rights in relation to the rights of the other, while 
the latter is responsible for protecting God’s laws. The identity of a religious individual is based on 
connecting an individual’s identity to their religious community. These factors form a different 
mechanism for the state’s perception of citizenship identity and explain the criteria by which an 
individual’s civil rights are acknowledged and protected. 
 
Revolutionary Messianism, as a modern political narrative, views an individual’s identity as being connected to 
the revolutionary community and transforms the traditional relationship between an individual and their religion. 
In the State-Building Phase, the notion of a citizen is embedded with the religious obligation that any individual 
must uphold in order to participate in the facilitation of the coming of the messianic age. This embedding 
dimension undermines any enduring religious or political identity that exists separately from the state. The 
securitization process ended the era in which apolitical social and economic spheres allowed differentiation 
between religion and politics. Translating the responsibilities of the Messiah into Securitized Messianism has 
undermined the rights of citizens as autonomous individuals. In the agent-based system of Iran, transferring the 
responsibilities of the Mahdi and his status as the saviour to a Jurisprudential Leader precisely rejects the 
affirmation of the individual rights. In Shi’a messianism, the Mahdi is the infallible Imam, because his individual 
identity as a leader is the exact representation of how the Shi’a tradition recognized a perfect human being. The 
Mahdi’s individual identity is identical to his communal identity and this is what makes his rule just. In the 
institutional-based  system  of  Israel  the  progressive  messianic  identity  of  the  state  will  be  perfected  when 
protecting the religious identity of the state becomes the main priority for citizens.778 
 
The religious institutions and parties of both states insist on the equality of citizens under God. 
Therefore, those groups in the state which insist on the hegemony of its religious identity over its 
political  identity  argue  that  human  political  systems justify  the  imposition  of  individual  or  group 
interests over the rest of society. For them, modern laws address issues relating to an individual’s 
behaviour and actions in the public sphere, whereas synthesizing individual and collective religious 
behaviour guarantees the fulfilment of messianic hope. Merging individual and communal behaviour 
 
777 Anne-Marie Korte and Maaike de Haardt, The Boundaries of Monotheism: Interdisciplinary Explorations into the Foundations of 
Western Monotheism (London: BRILL, 2009), 115. 
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through the regulation of behaviour by means of dietary and purity laws, marriage, basic religious 
education, and compulsory religious charity is a key way by which the state can construct the identity of 
its citizenry. The accepting of individual identity creates a distinction between the private and public 
sphere that does not exist for one who observes religious obligations. This blurry line between the 
private and public spheres is a consequence of the doctrine of monotheism in which the individual’s 
observance of religious laws is crucial to asserting one’s religious identity. 
 
 
The institutionalised religious identity implemented in state politics constitutes a dominant narrative of 
citizenship; this narrative is religiously and politically exclusive. In addition, the extension of the legal 
authority of the state into religious institutions gives opportunities to religious groups to coerce others 
in the social context through the regulation of individual and collective social behaviour. In Israel and 
Iran, this involvement has targeted non-religious individuals and those who belong to other religious 
groups. Although less evident in Israel, these states have attempted to institutionalise the collective 
identity in political terms. Although the ideological foundation of Revolutionary Messianism  remains 
the main source of citizenship identity, it needs to incorporate the states’ eager adoption of certain 
generic characteristics of nation states, such as industrialization, urbanization, and technological 
advancement - all of which contribute to the integration of a secular way of life in these societies. 
 
 
Defining the meaning of citizenship poses challenges to religious and non-religious groups in both states. 
These challenges emanate from contradicting sources of legitimacy put in place by agents of religious 
laws (rabbis/ayatollahs), and agents of secular laws (judges).   The relationship between agents and 
sacred texts in these religious systems is based on observance and faith and relies on pre-modern trust 
relations. It contradicts the relationship between agents of law and national law, which is based on 
institutional   professionalism   and   trust   relations.   These   contradicting   relationships   make   the 
incorporation of religion into modern laws problematic. Thus, the state agencies that are responsible for 
mediating these tensions achieve greater political power. The institutionalisation of Securitized 
Messianism within the states’ legal system is a means through which pre-modern individual and 
communal religious relations are translated into individual and civil rights and responsibilities. A 
successful institutionalisation process de-securitizes messianism and transforms it into a politically 
applicable discourse that negotiates the revolutionary ideals within the legal system. In such a system, 
debates over civil rights, political participation, and citizenship take place in the political sphere rather 
than being categorized as security debates. The failure of the institutionalisation process results in the 
continuation of the securitization phase. This inevitably leads to the exclusion of other religious and 
ethnic groups and the violation of their citizenship rights. The following section discusses two case 
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studies in order to highlight these tensions and the methods that each state adopts for resolving these 
issues. 
 
 
Many elements influence the construction of the political identity of citizens in Israel and Iran. Besides 
family, social class and peers, the structure of a collective political identity in these religio-political 
states necessitates the engagement of both bureaucratic and religious institutions in the states’ decisions 
over civil laws including the freedom of expression and media. The involvement of religious and 
political  groups  in  the  states’ theological and  political  actions in  relation  to civil  laws affects the 
participation of the political parties’ constituencies and determines the future of the development of 
civil rights. During the State-Building Phase, these states regulate the political engagement of individuals 
and groups in the public sphere by laws. The national citizenship laws are not only the foundation of 
civil laws but they also shape the political attitude of citizens by categorizing and labelling them in their 
social discourse. The social implications of national citizenship laws are not limited to legal systems but 
indirectly  determine  the  relationship  between  religion  and  politics.  At  the  educational  level,  the 
political  ideologies of these states are directly and indirectly indicated in their national education 
programmes, from the arrangement of educational materials to the national school curriculum, teaching 
materials, and regulations. Through the enforcement of national laws, civil laws, and national education, 
these states attempt to regulate how their citizens understand the states’ messianic goals and control 
social demands for civil rights. 
 
In Israel and Iran, the influence of war over politics resulted in the dominance of a specific perception of 
religion and religiosity. While the states’ used theology and Securitized Messianism  during the conflict 
era, domestically, their war policies filled religious groups with a sense of divine responsibility. War 
attributed to them the ethical task of moral guidance and correcting the wrongs of the society. As these 
states celebrated both religious and national ceremonies with religious tones they increased the political 
power of more conservative groups who either performed or supervised the celebration rituals. This 
advantageous position enabled the religious groups in both societies to justify their opposition to any 
secular political groups or decisions. These groups play different roles in Iran and Israel. In Iran, they 
function as the state sponsored militias of Basij and Ansar whose loyalty is solely to the Jurisprudential 
Leadership. In Israel, Heredi/Hasidic communities organize groups and stage public demonstrations 
against secular parties and policies of the state that they consider to be violations of Halakhah. 
Nonetheless, in both cases, the rift between religious and non-religious citizens is an inevitable by- 
product of securitization that attributes ethical superiority to religious groups in debates over the state 
legitimacy. Political theologians who produce and disseminate responses to the states’ policies and 
mobilize the public to support or oppose the states’ civil policies are also involved in this process. 
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During the State-Building Phase the situations of religious groups in Israel and Iran were very different. 
In Israel these groups were either apolitical or refused to criticize the state due to the militarization of 
Israeli politics and the marginalization of religious groups. The transition of Securitized Messianism into 
Politicised Messianism  posed challenges to the institutionalization of trust relations in the state. While 
in the State-Building Phase, religious and non-religious groups were united against a shared enemy, new 
political and civil groups, such as Shas in Israel and neo-fundamentalists in Iran, emerged from within 
the de-securitized environment of the post- Cold War period. In Israel the continuation of the conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinians has maintained the legitimacy of the Securitized Messianism , 
effectively lessening conflicts between secular and religious groups over the nature of the state. In Iran, 
the state’s opposition to the development of any civil society of the State-Maintenance Phase has further 
fragmented the society. 
 
Historically, the birth of the notion of citizenship in Europe relied upon the hyper individualism in the 
western philosophical tradition that understood the concept of an individual with intrinsic rights 
independent of their connection with others.779 While the individual could adopt a religious identity, 
their religious affiliation bore no consequence to their civil rights.780 The concept of citizenship directed 
the coercive characteristic of the previous communal lifestyle into a new form of individual identity, 
which included the right of political participation.781 Moreover, the notion of a liberal individual negates 
the coercive power of religion in the formation of citizenship identity, underlies the notion of freedom 
of speech, and necessitates political participation and the development of human rights. This situation is 
radically different in a religio-political state where the integration of religion and politics facilitates the 
adaptation of modern political thoughts but hinders the establishment of liberal democracy. 
 
In both states, it is particularly the structure of civil politics and national collective identity in their 
nationality laws that highlight the challenges that these states face in balancing the rights of individual 
and in distinguishing the public from private spheres. Through these laws the states aim to structure 
political identity for individuals and determine educational policies, civil relationships, and social order. 
In Iran’s case, the Revolutionary Messianism rejects bestowing any undeniable and inherent rights to an 
individual. The embedding of revolutionary themes enforces the rejection of a non-religious or 
autonomous individual identity and the rights of an individual are subordinate to those of the state. In 
Israel, the embedding themes enforce externalism and associate the rights of an individual with Zionist 
ideals and their religious community. However, the religious communities and parties in Israel oppose 
the state’s civil policies that allow the development of an autonomous individual identity in their 
communities. They encourage, rather, those policies that enforce the submission of individuals to 
 
779 D. Shanahan, Toward a Genealogy of Individualism  (MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 4-6. 
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781 Pierre Birnbaum and Jean Leca, Individualism: Theories and Methods (London: Oxford University Press, 1990), 173. 
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Halakhah. In Iran, the concept of an autonomous individual is a potential security threat and limiting the 
rights of an individual, for the state, has become the state’s existential security threat. In placing the 
Jurisprudential   Leader   as   the   core   security   objective,   citizens’   political   submission   becomes 
indispensable to the state legitimacy. In Israel, to the contrary, religious political parties need public 
political participation for their legitimacy and success. 
 
What are  the Responsibilities of  a Citizen? Nationality, Policies and the Monitoring of 
 
Political Behaviour of Individuals 
 
 
In Iran and Israel, structuring national laws and determining civil policies has always raised challenges 
for religious and political groups. These challenges stem from the differences between the embedded 
revolutionary messianic ideology and modern political notions such as civil rights and equality. For 
example, redemption and divine justice are the central themes of Shi’a and Jewish messianism. The 
message of their messianism is unequivocal; it highly praises religious values and demonizes all that is 
non-religious.  In  contrast,  modern  political  language  is  alien  to  the  uncompromising  language  of 
religious regulations and is pragmatic. The tensions between religious absolutism and political 
pragmatism encumber the development of individualism as a blueprint for the development of civil 
society. Nationality laws in these states exclusively reflect the religious identity of the majority and are 
inevitably biased against the rights of other religious traditions. This bias not only affects the relationship 
between citizens and the states’ powers but shapes the responsibilities of citizens regarding their 
participation in the military. 
 
The different historical situations in Iran and Israel have attributed particular Iranian and Israeli 
connotations to the social understating of an autonomous individual. While in the Revolutionary Phase a 
philosophical tradition had motivated radical social changes prior to the formation of modern states, in 
the  State-Maintenance  Phase  the  state  laws  and  policies  instigate  social  change.  Also,  in  the 
Revolutionary Phase, revolutionary energy facilitated the development of a central state and promised 
the liberation of individuals, but in the State-Maintenance Phase, the states’ laws obligate individuals to 
protect the state. Therefore, the nationality laws rely on the embedding of ideologies that shift the 
power of political change from the divine to humans and involve religion in politics. Each of these states 
employs a particular strategy to balance the power of theology with that of individual citizens. The 
Islamic Republic considers the religious responsibilities of citizens to be an indispensable part of their 
civil duties and coerce adherence to Shari’a in order to overcome the inherent contradiction between 
the civil rights of citizens and their religious obligations that continuously pose challenges to the state. 
Nationality laws present a legal definition for citizenship that incorporates the states’ social objectives, 
delineate the framework for civil laws and indicate the states’ management of the relationship between 
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religion and politics. The embedding of revolutionary ideology establishes social norms between 
acceptable and unacceptable civil behaviours and negotiates this norm with citizens through a collective 
identity based on self-determination, a powerful central state, and the limiting of individual rights 
within its messianic goals. It strongly influences the social attitude towards democracy, freedom of 
speech, and the rights of individuals. 
 
Citizenship and Religious Identity 
 
 
The oath of citizenship in Iran and Israel goes beyond a social and political contract and has overt 
religious connotations. Limiting these ideologies to law conditions the fulfilment of messianic goals to 
the states’ policies and reduces it to normative politics. Therefore the fusion of religion and politics 
constrains the development of civil societies by the state’s revolutionary ideological position. This view 
on citizenship contradicts the western model, which considers the shift from an ideologically based 
political system to an agent based one to be the cornerstone of state legitimacy. 
 
According to the Israeli Nationality Law of 1952, a person is only eligible for citizenship if they meet 
one of the five criteria stated in the law.782 The Nationality law states that any Jewish immigrant, who is 
born in, returns to, or receives a certificate for returning to Israel, is a citizen of the state. This law 
applies to all Jewish immigrants who have returned to Israel prior to or subsequent to the establishment 
of the state and anyone with an Israeli parent. Those Palestinians who are born in Israel are included in 
the law. However, the law does not cover those Palestinians who were not registered residents in the 
state before the Nationality Law came into being. It also excludes their parents if they had made a 
declaration against the citizenship status, or rejected Israeli citizenship. Citizenship was only extended 
to Palestinians that already resided in the state, providing they had registered as an inhabitant, or resided 
in areas that later became Israeli territory.783 
 
Under the Naturalization Law, a person can be granted citizenship if they have lived in Israel for three 
years, has permanent residency permission, has some knowledge of the Hebrew language, and has 
renounced their prior citizenship status.784 In Israel, one is exempt from naturalization if they have 
served in the Israel Defence Force, or the Ministry of Defence and its associated institutions. Exemption 
also applies to those who have lost a child in military service and Palestinians who are married to an 
Israeli citizen. The state confers Israeli nationality upon the underage children of a citizen.785 Any citizen 
 
 
 
782 “Laws of the State of Israel: Authorized Translation from the Hebrew,” (Israel: Jerusalem, Israel Law Resource Centre 
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aged eighteen and over, can demand the renunciation of their citizenship status. They can also do this on 
behalf of their children.786 However, underage citizens remain citizens so long as one of their parents 
remains a citizen. The state can revoke one’s citizenship if the naturalised citizen commits an act of 
disloyalty, makes an application based on false evidence, or if the person has been away from Israel for 
an extended length of time. Renunciation of prior citizenship is only required for those Palestinians who 
apply to be naturalised citizens but Jewish citizens are not required to renounce prior citizenship.787 
 
The Civil Code of 1928 articulates Iran’s naturalisation laws.788 According to Article 976 of the Code, 
“all persons residing in Iran except those whose foreign nationality is established are citizens.”789 All 
children born in Iran are instantly Iranian citizens; this includes minors with unidentified parents as well 
as those who are the progeny of non-Iranian parents.790 Children born to an Iranian mother and a non- 
Iranian father can only become citizens if they reside in Iran for one year after turning eighteen years old, 
while  non-Iranian  women  who  marry  men  with Iranian  nationality  are  not  automatically granted 
citizenship; they must apply for it.791 Iran’s naturalization laws also allow a person to become a citizen if 
they are eighteen years old, have resided in Iran for at least five years, have not deserted military service 
and not been convicted of a crime in any other country.792 If a person has either conducted notable 
services for  the  country  or  its  people, or has married an Iranian wife, or  has  a  high intellectual 
distinction they can become an Iranian national without the requirement that they have lived in Iran for 
a set amount of time.793 
 
According to the Act, naturalised citizens enjoy all the rights of Iranian nationals. However, they may 
not contest or hold strategic positions such as the presidency, a position of cabinet or diplomatic 
roles.794 Until 10 years after their citizenship, they cannot hold positions in the Islamic Consultative 
Assembly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the provincial, district and municipal councils. Iranian 
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nationals can renounce their citizenship only if they have permission from the Council of Ministers, have 
completed their military service obligations and are over twenty five years of age.795 
 
Therefore, in both cases the nationality laws emphasize the central role of the state in accepting or 
rejecting one’s citizenship and attributes executive power to the states’ institutions as the law 
enforcement agencies. They give power to the state to determine civil policies as the sole authority that 
regulates nationality laws and produces national political culture. The nationality laws are the primary 
vehicle for the states to establish the Securitized Messianism  as the blueprint of the country’s political 
culture. The nationality laws at the same time obligate the states to recognize certain rights for their 
citizens  and  increase  the  power  of  individual  citizens  in  political  decision-making.  A  voting  and 
politically responsible populace places limitations on a state institutional power. Within these states, 
political participation is a significant foundation of the citizens’ revolutionary identity. In Israel, 
participation creates the possibility of forming political alliances that shape the political direction of the 
state. Due to the pluralistic structure of the state’s electoral system, where various political parties 
strive for political control, there is space to introduce various and often-contradictory political doctrines 
and goals. This characteristic of the state creates a pragmatic political atmosphere within the country. 
In Iran political participation is solely accepted if one accepts the mono-party political system of the 
state and submits to the absolute rule of the JLship. Due to the homogenous and closed structure of the 
electoral system, political participation is a sign of affirmation rather than participation. 
 
Political Participation and Civil Rights 
 
 
In the social context, encouraging political participation is associated with the flourishing of varieties of 
ideas about the roles and responsibilities of a state. In the cases of Israel and Iran these ideas are 
predominantly about the role of religion in the politics of the state. Non-religious groups in Israel and 
reformists  in  Iran  view  the  policing  and  management  of  national  assets  to  be  the  paramount 
responsibility of  the  state.  By  contrast,  religious  parties  such  as  Agudat  Yisrael  in  Israel and  the 
fundamentalists in Iran, insist on the states’ control of religious laws because, to them, the state’s 
primary responsibility is safeguarding religion from violations by foreign enemies and the secular public. 
In both states, they criticize the non-religious for the states’ lack of efficiency in creating a theocracy by 
legal coercion and enforcing policies that obligate citizens to adhere to religious laws and stop the spread 
of non-religious culture. Their non-compromising position is a sign of their religious commitment. 
They publically express their criticism of the states’ lack of commitment to religious regulations. In Iran, 
religious groups gather in white shrouds to remind the reformists, or the students, or women, that their 
uncompromising support of the religious identity of the state is part of their religious duties. In Israel, 
 
795 The citizenship of the wife and children of a male national who renounces his citizenship are not affected by his decision. 
Ibid. 
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the religious neighbourhoods stage lamenting rituals to demonstrate against the opening of a car-park 
facility on the Sabbat, or to chastise women who are not dressed according to their religious laws.796 
 
In Israel and Iran, there are specific behavioural characteristics through which one is recognized as a 
“religious” or “non-religious” person. There are various terms in Hebrew and Persian that refer to an 
individual’s commitment to their religious beliefs which demonstrate the diversity of the religious fabric 
in these societies. In both countries the term non-religious refers to people who do not live their lives 
based on religious commandments and are less observant of religious rituals.797 Individuals still identify 
themselves as members of their religious communities, even if they do not live their lives based on 
religious laws or rituals. There are also those who do not observe religious rituals, those who observe 
some of their religious rituals, those who observe all the rituals, and those who are orthodox in their 
religious observance. When differentiating between religious and non-religious individuals in Israel and 
Iran, the term “non-religious” does not refer to an atheist population. The majority of the population is 
monotheists and believe in a God, but the non-religious are less religiously expressive in their 
appearance. 798  The  religious  groups  discourage  communication  with  the  other  religious  and  non- 
religious communities in order to preserve their identity. In Israel, nearly all Hasidic communities 
discourage marriage between members of two different Hasidic communities and people from non- 
Heredi communities. 
 
In the State-Building Phase, the self-imposed isolation of the Heredi communities became the rationale 
for the traditional religious non-statist parties to avoid taking any executive or administrative positions 
in the government. For decades, they predominantly operated as ethnic and religious parties that solely 
protected the interests of their communities. Within the multicultural Israeli political environment, 
they used strong language to draw a clear boundary between their community and the non-religious. 
Ironically, their isolation has increased the power of the Heredi groups in state policies regarding 
citizenship, specifically in relation to the issue of conversion. These interactions demonstrate that the 
power of the religious within Israel’s democratic state is based on the success of democracy, particularly, 
in  the  State-Maintenance  Phase  even  as  they  re-define  it.  Only  in  this  condition  Revolutionary 
Messianism can be successfully institutionalised only in a secular nation state. 
 
Conversion and Citizenship in Israel 
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In  the  State-Maintenance  Phase,  the  majority  of  the  religious  parties  adopted  a  more  politically 
pragmatic position, allied with the rightwing non-religious parties and advocated patriarchal policies. In 
the social context, however, many religious communities still identify themselves with a specific 
theological tradition and refuse to engage with the centres of secular economic activities like Tel Aviv, 
where religious rituals  are  downplayed or  considered to  be  private matter and  non-religious and 
religious citizens coexist. The Hasidic prefer isolation from the non-religious society and trust their 
religious leaders to monitor the public sphere. Their Rabbis advocate individual religious commitments 
by supporting religious education. Their isolation creates tensions between religious and non-religious 
residents in Jerusalem, reflected in the difficulties of the extremely ritualistic Hasidic communities in 
developing a pragmatic approach towards civil rights and the implementation of secular laws. 
 
Conversion has been a major concern for the religious parties and has created tension between the 
rabbinic and Supreme Court authorities in Israel.799 Controversy over the Jewish identity of Israeli 
citizens and  converts has a  long history in debates between religious and non-religious parties. 800 
Accepting those who have converted to Judaism under the auspices of reform Jewish authorities as 
citizens, challenges Heredi communities who consider conversion valid only if it occurs under the 
supervision of Beith Din (religious courts).  Reform conversion limits the power of Heredi in the Israeli 
legal system, especially in affirming one’s individual religious identity. They have strongly opposed this 
undermining of the power of the Heredi rabbinate in society. In 2002, the Supreme Court passed a law 
according to which the state accepted Reform conversion only for the purposes of Aliyah (immigration). 
The Court ordered the Ministry of Interior to implement the law but the Ministry refused.801 The 
Ministry announced that the problem of conversion was not limited to reform or conservative courts 
but also conversion after or before migration.802 
 
Shlomo Amar, the Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, expressed concern over the Supreme Court’s decision.803 
The Shas party joined other religious parties and argued that accepting reform conversions would 
benefit those who use the law to be awarded citizenship and accused the Supreme Court of interfering 
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in Rabbinic affairs.804 This position of Shas regarding Jewish identity and citizenship has not always been 
the same. In the 1980s, when a number of Ethiopian migrants called for the right of return, Yosef 
welcomed them and in a decree announced that they were the descendants of the “tribe of Dan”.805 He 
did not, however, share the same view about those who were converted under the auspices of reform 
Jewish authorities. As Yishai noted, Reform conversion could result in the influx of Palestinian 
immigrants to Israel, therefore, Shas disagreed with the law for placing political conditions on 
citizenship. In 2009, after a meeting between religious parties at the offices of the Chief Rabbinates, 
Shas rejected the Supreme Court’s decision that the Knesset must fund Reform conversion.806 All the 
ministers of the Shas and the Deputy Minister from United Torah Judaism attended the meeting and 
“unanimously” demanded that the Chief Rabbinates have full control and supervision of conversion.807 
Together,  the  United  Torah  Judaism  and  Shas  prepared  a  bill  attributing  the  exclusive  right  of 
 
conversion to the Chief Rabbinates.808 
 
 
The insistence of religious groups and parties on limiting conversion to Rabbinic Courts has alienated 
those immigrants who are strongly patriotic Israelis but are not recognized as Jewish by the Heredi 
community. It has benefited Rabbinic Courts, Heredi communities, and Heredi authorities who have 
successfully maintained their authority in validating conversion and ultimately the converts’ citizenship 
status. In response to the religious parties’ bill on conversion, Israel Beiteinu made its acceptance of the 
bill conditional on state supervision and control over conversion regulations such as the right of 
conversion for city Rabbis.809 They, instead, proposed the “Allegiance Law” or “Citizenship Law” to 
oblige citizens to pledge alliance to the state and to serve in the military. The Shas, Likud and Labor 
parties all rejected the bill.810 For Shas, accepting this condition undermined its influence in Rabbinic 
Courts, had potential to weaken its political alliance with United Torah Judaism, and alienated the 
Sephardim from the party.811 
Religious parties have reacted negatively to the granting of citizenship rights to homosexuals and to the 
debates over the possibility of a legalisation for civil marriages and divorces.812 In 2006, after Shas 
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achieved strong representation in the Knesset, Eli Yishai called homosexuals, “sick people.” 813 This was 
a similar position to Shlomo Aviner, an influential Heredi rabbi who rejected the possibility that 
homosexuals  could  be  included  in  Jewry  and  announced  that  their  punishment  should  be  death 
according to the Torah.814 In the same year, the Heredi community of Jerusalem came out in force to 
protest the city’s Gay Pride Parade. Both Muslim leaders and Heredi rabbis called the parade a threat to 
the citizens of Israel and suggested that the parade should be held in Sodom.815 In 2009, the most violent 
attack on the homosexual community occurred. Shas and other religious parties condemned the attack. 
Nonetheless, the  gay  community  saw  the  attack  as  the  result  of  a  long  term  condemnation  and 
incitement  by  the  Heredi  communities. 816   The  strong  opposition  of  the  Heredi  community  to 
homosexuality mirrors their stance on the issues of gender equality and women’s rights in Israeli society 
and politics. 
 
Religious Groups and Gender Equality in Israel 
 
 
The Shas party, like other religious parties, has no women members in the Knesset. They follow 
traditional  Jewish  gender  roles.  They  fund  the  expansion  of  Mikvah  (ritual  baths)  for  religious 
purification and harshly oppose non-religious parties for their support of civil marriage. In 2001, soon 
after the Ministry of Religious Affairs came under the control of a Shas Minister, the Ministry set rules 
for sexual segregation at sites of pilgrimage as well as buses in the Heredi section of Jerusalem.817 On 
the contrary, within the Heredi community, the Shas party and Rabbi Yosef have adopted a more 
moderate position regarding women’s education and their social engagement. For instance, the opening 
of  the  first  Heredi collage  by  Yosef’s daughter, Adina  Bar-Shalom, was a  deviation  from  Heredi 
tradition of Yeshivot and created a controversy within the Heredi community.818 The power of the 
Hasidic parties has enabled the Heredi communities in Jerusalem to enforce strong religious laws in 
their communities, which in some instances has resulted in physical abuse and the beating of women in 
the  street. 819   Although  Israel  has  signed  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of 
Discrimination against Women, and emphasises gender equality at the state level, among the Heredi 
communities, religious sexist laws are maintained. An Israeli woman can join the army, become a pilot, 
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and even a Supreme Court Judge but remains subject to traditional religious rituals and laws for 
marriage and divorce. They enjoy equal political rights and are active in public life, the welfare system, 
healthcare, and education but are not members of the Knesset in the religious political parties.820 They 
are well represented in the Judiciary system but not in the Rabbinic Courts. 
 
In summary, the case of conversion demonstrates that in Israel civil legislation and laws that obligate 
citizens to obey religious rules correspond to those that make the public obey civil rules. In Israel, the 
reaffirmation of the authority of the state is discussed in religious debates over ethnic relations, 
conversion, and the autonomy of religious communities. These debates are vital for the engagement of 
ethnic and religious communities in Israeli politics and for providing a public space for negotiating 
national and group interests. For instance, the Heredi communities oppose the state’s secular policies 
such as secular education for Hasidim, conversion, and participation of Heredi students in military 
services. Conversely, their lenient position on peace negotiations enables them to negotiate with the 
secular centralist parties, demonstrates their pragmatism in Israeli domestic politics, and expresses their 
loyalty to the state. In Iran and Israel the existence of an official religion creates civil inequality between 
the observant members of the official faith and the non-observant members. It also attributes an 
advantageous position to the members of the official faith over the followers of other religions. These 
civil inequalities can foster economic inequality and limit the political possibilities of the non-observant 
members of the official faith and also for the members of other faiths, which on occasion can result in 
the use of violence against some communities or the implementation of coercing civil politics. These 
coercive policies confer a beneficial social position on the observant followers of the official religion and 
create classes of first class and second class citizens. 
 
Although, in both Israel and Iran, the national law acknowledges the rights of religious communities in 
managing their legal affairs, both legal systems at the national level, exclusively address Jewish and Shi’a 
citizens. In Iran, the political ideology of the state has severely oppressed the Baha’i faith and limited the 
rights of other non-Shi’a citizens. Jurisprudential Leadership as the main security discourse can justify 
the restriction of citizenship rights and silence sceptics, atheists, secularists, and feminist voices. In Israel, 
the comparatively objective position of the Supreme Court plays a reconciliatory role in cases that deal 
with the rights of the country’s religious minorities. The welfare and interests of the Jewish population, 
however, whether religious  or  non-religious, remains  the  state’s priority.  Although  national  laws 
restrict the power of state officials, in both cases, the existence of an official religion with a narrow 
interpretation of civil rights is discriminatory against other citizens and could stigmatize any citizen as a 
potential threat to the security of the society and religion. In Iran, the Baha’i’ community, atheists, and 
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religious sceptics are the targets of state violence, while the Jewish and Christian communities enjoy 
relative freedom in expressing and practicing their faiths.821 In Iran, through implementing coercive 
policies, the state has instigated an irreconcilable social position in relation to the involvement of 
religious institutions and Shi’a clergy in politics. 
 
Neo-fundamentalism and Civil Policies 
 
 
The birth of neo-fundamentalism in Israel and Iran seems to be a by-product of securitization. The neo- 
fundamentalists in both countries consider religion to be the only source of legitimacy for the state and 
insist on prioritizing the protection of the states’ religious identity in any national political decisions and 
civil policies. The neo-fundamentalists attract supporters for their political parties and advocate their 
political values and ideals in their criticism of the traditional Heredi and rightwing parties. To them, 
Politicised Messianism remains the source of legitimacy that grants actual authority to the states and 
enables them to implement religious civil laws. They are communalists and support the limiting of 
individual freedom. Their focus on community makes their policies inevitably populist and promotes 
the establishment of a community based politics. 
 
During the State-Building Phase, the inherent instability of Revolutionary Messianism instigates the 
emergence of hostile political factions, as well as the advent of new political ideologies. A new form of 
fundamentalism dissociates itself from the traditional political camps of the revolutionary and SBPs. 
They express their political and economic goals in relation to the failure of Securitized Messianism to 
bring about the messianic promises of the revolution and blame the weakness of the states in managing 
religious, political and economic affairs on their normalisation of religious values. Although they view 
Revolutionary Messianism as the core ideology of the state, they differ from the traditional rightwing in 
criticism and ideology. The neo-fundamentalists disagree with the traditional conservatives over the 
success of the states in materializing the revolutionary ideals. Their criticism of the states’ policies 
targets both civil and foreign policies. Specifically, they criticize the revolutionary “elites” for deviating 
from the revolutionary ideals and creating an economic and ethically corrupt network system to 
guarantee their individual and group interests. 
The rise of neo-fundamentalism indicates the challenges that Iran faces in maintaining state legitimacy in 
the State-Maintenance Phase. The neo-fundamentalists in Iran disagree with the reformists for their 
liberal policies and with fundamentalists for their economic corruption. They strongly support the 
categorization  of  citizens  into  first  and  second  class  citizens  and  highly  admire  the  Basij  and 
Revolutionary Guards for imposing religious laws on society. Their negation of the revolutionary elites 
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is a direct consequence of the closed social environment that the state gradually established in the State- 
Maintenance Phase. The public uprising against the results of the 2009 presidential election attests to 
the failure of the state in maintaining its legitimacy. The demonstrators opposed diverse political and 
economic issues, from the Revolutionary Guard’s monopolization of economy to the absolute rule of 
the Jurisprudential Leadership and the unlimited power of those institutions that function under the 
supervision of the leadership. 
 
The advantageous position that the neo-fundamentalists gave to religious citizens divided Iran’s citizens 
into two groups, “insiders” and “outsiders”. The state considers those who encourage or ignore the 
undermining of civil rights, support the monopolization of the economy, and submit to the decision of 
the Jurisprudential Leader as insiders and the rest of the citizens as outsiders. The combination of 
political, civil, and economic factors have united various groups around short-term strategic goals and 
fostered the formation of the “Green Movement” that includes both religious and secular groups. They 
insist on reforming the political system and demand social and political freedom. 
 
In Israel, the exclusivity of the early Zionist narrative resulted in the enforcement of many coercive 
policies but instead of monopolization the state has encouraged economic activities in various 
communities. Israel’s post-Cold War economy has focused on reducing the government’s economic 
intervention  and  transforming  the  state-orientated  market  into  an  open  market  economy. 822  The 
unprecedented growth of Israel’s information technology, military, and tourism industries has reduced 
the wage gap between various economic classes. 823  The growth of these industries, as well as the 
increase in the number of Israeli enterprises, has made the total economic inclusion of religious 
communities an inevitable social reality.824 The state encourages political participation and the growth of 
the  job  market  both  of  which  require  human  resources  and  economic  security.  Within  a  secure 
economic environment, both religious and non-religious citizens enjoy better economic conditions 
which foster more beneficial encounters between these groups. 
 
Israeli neo-fundamentalists, like Shas, criticize the agents of Politicised Messianism , the Ashkenazi non- 
religious Zionists, for the depressed economic and political situation of immigrant communities and 
accuse them of deviating from the religious goals of Zionism. In Iran, the neo-fundamentalists indirectly 
affirm the failure of the Jurisprudential Leadership in establishing the revolution’s promised utopia. 
These common characteristics show that the politics of neo-fundamentalism in both cases are directly 
connected to the politicization of messianism and changes in the security environment. 
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In the State-Maintenance Phase changes in the economic and political strategies in Iran and Israel have 
created two parallel, though routinely oppositional, political ideologies. In Iran, the tension between 
nationalist and religious ideologies became worse when the Revolutionary Guards and Basij lost their 
exclusive status as protectors of national security. The Iran-Iraq war that had unified these forces against 
an external security threat ended and the state designated a number of new and complex security threats. 
It introduced the public sphere as the new front and organized its forces to coerce the citizens to submit 
to the absolute rule of the Jurisprudential Leader. During the de-securitization process, through this 
intentional  reconstruction  of  the  security  threat  the  state  maintained  unity  amongst  these  forces, 
reduced the rate of unemployment, and followed its Islamization project by militarizing the public 
sphere. The imposition of the state’s messianic ideology on a securitized public sphere, however, 
reduced religion to theological statements that justified the state’s coercive civil policies. In order to 
reinforce the significance of their role in protecting religion and the purity of the society, the state has 
given  these  forces  unlimited  access  to  national  resources  and  encourages  them  with  economic 
compensations. 
 
In Israel, the continuation of the Palestinian conflict has marginalized civil debates concerning the state’s 
position on freedom of speech, freedom of religion, gender equality, civil rights and information 
technology. Gender equality and equal rights are clearly stated in Israel’s national laws. The neo- 
fundamentalists, however, demand more direct involvement of the state in citizens’ private lives. For 
instance, for Heredim, the main issue in conversion is the lack of state commitment to monitoring the 
private life of the converts in order to ensure their commitment to their new faith. Their demands are 
affirmend by the states’ social policies. Both states express their national identity through religious 
symbolism and  rituals.  They affirm  the  legal  framework  of  citizenship and  advocate the  patriotic 
political culture through the public celebration of political ceremonies, such as war commemorations 
and memorial services for fallen soldiers, in a religiously ritualistic fashion. The ritualistic character of 
these ceremonies transforms political events, military victories and defeats into religious events and 
creates a direct link between Politicised Messianism, state legitimacy, and individual morality as the 
foundations of national security. This symbolic representation of security provides a broader definition 
of the enemy. It does not solely address those who threaten the political or territorial security of the 
states. It also includes those who hinder the unification of religious and political identities of the states 
by their lack of commitment to religious laws. 
 
In addition to these political implications, the securitization of Revolutionary Messianism impacts on the 
social status of religious institutions. The first impact is that it undermines the traditional authority of 
the religious centres in society as the state gains ultimate authority in regulating and enforcing laws and 
becomes the sole agent for defining and articulating civil rights. The second impact is that theological 
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politicians replace the clergy as the agents who determine policies to safeguard religious laws such as 
dietary regulations and conversion in Israel and policies on the Hijab and other Shari’a moral laws in 
Iran. The theologian politicians are the ones who discuss and decide these policies in social and legal 
environments rather than in theological centres. The third impact is that the state becomes the exclusive 
political power that determines the objectives of the civil policies and is capable of negotiating civil 
rights in cases where civil rights contradict religious laws. This displacement of authority from clergy to 
the theologian politicians secularises messianism and gives the ultimate decision-making power to the 
state administrative and executive bodies. Political theologians and theological politicians are the main 
groups that attempt to appropriate the core values of politics and theology to state policies. 
 
The  emergence  of  political  theologians  and  theological  politicians  has  resulted  in  the  radical 
politicization of religion and by positioning theology at the centre of political debates it de-sacralises 
religion in Iran. As the state transformed messianism from a religious ideology to a security strategy, 
messianism inevitably became de-sacralised; a tool for the state to reaffirm its legitimacy and determine 
the relationship between citizens, the clergy, and Shi’a messianism. In Israel, securitization disassociated 
commitment to Halakhah from national loyalty. For instance, securitization challenged the Heredi 
religious ethics and involved them in deciding civil policies regarding gender equality, the laws of Sabbat, 
and the economy. Debates and decisions over these issues have become a threat to the isolation of the 
Heredim who saw themselves as a community that has moral superiority over others. The Heredim who 
were dominantly apolitical in the State-Building Phase began to publically express their opposition 
towards secular politics in public demonstrations in the State-Maintenance Phase.825 
 
The majority of religious groups in both states accept the central role of the state and have been active in 
networking with and participating in the formal processes of the state. At the same time they attempt to 
preserve  their  semi-autonomous  positions.  In  Israel,  Rabbis  still  have  authority  within  their 
communities, but are financially dependent on the state for educational funding and public services such 
as roads and transport. Thus, they are now involved in political competition with other Heredi 
communities, reform synagogues, and public schools over government budgets. In Iran, as the result of 
securitization, Ayatollahs shared their advantageous position with the martyrs of the war, and members 
of the Basij and Revolutionary Guards. In addition, due to the existence of a Jurisprudential Leader, 
their fatwas (religious creeds) lost credibility as they could not be contradictory to the rules of the 
Jurisprudential Leader. This factor reduced the role of both to that of state agents who provide 
theological explanations for contemporary political situations. They are no longer the sole interpreters 
of sacred texts and compete with theological politicians over this position. 
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These challenges that Rabbis face in Israel indicate how embedded revolutionary ideologies mediate the 
contradictions between the concept of citizenship and the religious understanding of a communal 
individual. In Iran, the unlimited power of the Jurisprudential Leadership in decision making translates 
the  state’s  political  failures  into  the  failure  of  religion.  Ayatollahs  affirm  the  central  role  of  the 
leadership  in  protecting  Shi’a  Islam  by  supporting  the  nationalisation  of  religious  rituals,  the 
militarization of the public sphere, and implementation of state policies by force. Two factors, however, 
destabilises the situation in Iran in the State-Maintenance Phase. The first is the spread of a modern and 
global understanding of citizenship that fundamentally challenged the model of the individual presented 
by and normalised in the Islamic Republic. The second factor is the rise of neo-fundamentalism that 
further encouraged a secular atmosphere by accusing the revolutionary elites of economic and political 
corruption. 
 
The development of individual identity, the growth of the technocratic Sephardi class, a well established 
professional bureaucratic culture, and conflict with Palestinians contributed to a better integration of 
neo-fundamentalists in state politics in Israel. The neo-fundamentalists united in the support of 
conservative  political  parties,  especially  those  that  advertise  conservative  family  values  and  fund 
religious education. They debate the settlement issues, ethnic relations and the autonomy of religious 
institutions within a democratic and pluralistic political system. The main political implication of the 
development of the concept of citizenship and individual rights is seen in the states’ national and 
international politics. Analyzing the policies of the neo-fundamentalists in both states requires a careful 
study of the interactions between political theologians and theological politicians. This analysis presents 
the question whether neo-fundamentalists are pragmatic or idealist and whether traditional definitions 
could comprehensively explain their policies. 
 
Pragmatism versus Idealism 
 
 
The dominant strand of scholarly literature on Iran and Israel contends that these states began as 
ideological and revolutionary states that were pragmatically realised over time. Although studying the 
development of pragmatic politics in these states sheds light on many of their political positions, it fails 
to explain the consequences of embedding the moral messianic responsibilities in politics that makes 
them different to secular states like France. It is through their national and international policies that the 
states describe these moral responsibilities and mediate political and religious tensions. The academic 
literature on Israeli and Iranian politics highlights that in both states, the ideological foundation of 
Politicised Messianism played a central role in their politics. They, however, do not explain why 
emphasizing the religious identity of the states is a political and existential necessity rather than a 
pragmatic policy. The lack of study on the development of new political and theological classes in these 
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societies is thus related to the lack of studies on the development of Revolutionary Messianism into 
 
Politicised Messianism and the political implications of securitization. 
 
 
The  embedding  of  messianic  themes  in  Israel  and  Iran  constrains  their  distinct  religious  and 
revolutionary identities in national and international politics. Neither of these states is an extreme 
ideological theocracy nor an exclusively pragmatic and secular state. Rather than an extreme religious 
or purely secular, it is the embedding of these ideologies in Politicised Messianism that has dictated the 
tenets of their policies. Therefore, in some cases the states’ policies may violate religious laws but they 
could not undermine Securitized Messianism. Their policies are both intentionally constructed based on 
the themes that attribute legitimacy to the state and are inevitable products of Securitized Messianism. 
One of the results of these embedding themes is that in Iran and Israel responses to security threats and 
implementation of state policies require theological legitimization. Moreover, both religious traditions 
consider some intrinsic value to be found in war and martyrdom that unifies people, safeguards the 
community, and intensifies religious commitments.826 Due to the fact that protecting national territory 
and religion have identical importance in their security doctrines, potentially each war could be the 
“Final War” and the beginning of the messianic age. While both share this theological position each state 
offers different perspectives on the issues that are threats to their national security and the adequate 
strategy for deterrence. 
 
Israel and Iran’s view on national security attributes a particular connotation to the meaning of political 
pragmatism and ideology. In political language, pragmatic policies are decided based on factual evidence 
and a calculation of their real consequences. The practicality of a policy determines whether it is 
pragmatic  or  ideological.  Pragmatic  policies  are  meaningful  when  they  are  decided  within  the 
framework  of  national  security.  Therefore,  Iran  and  Israel  decided  their  pragmatic  policies  in 
accordance with the embedding ideologies that form their national security doctrines. Due to its 
pluralistic structure, Israel’s national politics is pragmatic. Various religious and secular Jewish 
communities consider themselves citizens of the state regardless of their ideological differences, 
participating in politics, and coexisting. At the international level, Israel is less pragmatic, maintaining a 
stance on strategic issues such as peace with the Palestinians, the citizenship status of Arab Israelis, and 
the expansion of the settlements. While political groups are willing to cooperate and ally with each 
other in the national scene, they are less flexible in international politics and refuse to make a pragmatic 
decision about peace or the settlements. Their stance on international policies may in time affect their 
relationship with the international community, particularly with the United States of Amercia, but the 
embedded messianic ideologies do not allow the state to make solely pragmatic and compromising 
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decisions about the future of settlements, peace with Palestinians, and Israel’s political ties with the 
 
United States of Amercia. 
 
 
In  contrast  to  the  situation  in  Israel,  Iran’s  international policies are  pragmatic.  Despite  its  anti- 
American slogans, Iran continues to seek dialogue with the Americans since the reformist government 
in the 1990s. Khatami and Rafsanjani both attempted to re-establish political ties with America. 
Ahmadinejad, who is the neo-fundamentalist president in Iran, has travelled to the United States of 
Amercia more than any other president in the history of the Islamic Republic and written letters to ex- 
President George W. Bush and President Barak Obama. However, re-establishing political ties with the 
United States of Amercia is problematic for the Islamic Republic because of their extreme national 
ideological stance. Although the Islamic Republic is well aware of the disadvantages it suffers from the 
lack of political ties with the United States of Amercia, its pragmatism in international politics is 
complicated by its ideological position on national policies. Specifically, in the State-Maintenance Phase 
as the state re-defined its national security doctrine, it presented any independent political or civil 
activities as a potential security threat sponsored, designed or implemented by the United States of 
Amercia. Through this connection they untied the hands of their intelligence services, and militias to 
suppress any civil activity with full force. 
 
Monitoring information Technology 
 
 
Voting and political participation is the way for citizens to express their political opinions and contribute 
to the political development in their country. Political participation is a significant aspect of citizenship 
that allows citizens to shape the structure of national politics and contribute to its progress. In liberal 
democracies various political parties have the opportunity to express, share, and negotiate their political 
doctrines and goals and practice respect, coexistence and tolerance. A free public space in which various 
groups participate in political and social debates and decisions is a necessity for the development of civil 
society and to create a balance between state control and individual freedom. However, prior to the 
development of any public space within a civil society, the people must be aware of the necessity of such 
a pluralistic public space. 
 
Since the last decades of the twentieth century globalization has introduced new opportunities for the 
development of public awareness about civil rights by facilitating easier access to information, a more 
active global market, and the spread of electronic communication technology. These factors have had 
different impacts on Israel and Iran and instigated different responses in each state. The responses of 
religious and non-religious groups in each state towards the spread of these technologies in the public 
sphere crystallises the ideological themes that form the states’ policies. In general, the development of 
communication  technologies  presents  two  challenges  to  religious  groups  in  these  states.  The 
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development of a “global village” through new communication technologies has resulted in the 
enhancement of an autonomous individual identity which is a potential threat to religious communal 
identity. For example, the isolation techniques and coercive policies could neither stop the spread of 
public   awareness   nor   communication   between   religious   and   non-religious   individuals.      The 
development of an individual identity has posed challenges for religious groups in Israel but posed an 
existential security threat to the state in Iran. 
 
During the State-Building Phase in Israel and Iran prominent religious nationalist leaders -  Rabbi Kook 
and Khomeini -  believed that there was an inherent value in technological advancement, not only as a 
sign of progress but also as a path to the messianic age.827 They never reconciled their admiration for 
technological products with their rejection of the secular scientific culture which made the production 
of technology possible. Israel adopted a relatively liberal approach towards information technology, but 
this progressive policy was not effective in Hasidic suburbs. In Iran, Khomeini attempted to strengthen 
his supervisory role over Iran’s technological progress but also supported training in areas of human 
resources and secular education. These paradoxical stances towards technology are echoed in the 
attitudes of religious groups to new information technologies. 
 
The state of Israel does not filter or censor information, but as a consequence the religious communities 
refuse to have access to information technology, specifically cyberspace. Having access to cyberspace is 
associated with the risk of exposure of their members to non-religious ideas and their assimilation into 
the secular culture. These communities believe that access to cyberspace may encourage the members 
to pursue secular education or politics, undermine attempts to eradicate boundaries between religion 
and politics, and introduce new challenges to theology. While the state encourages investment in 
private television channels and other information technology, the majority of Heredim refuse to watch 
TV and attack public offices in their neighbourhoods that install TV screens.828 
Prior to the introduction of the internet and cable TV to Iran during the late 1990s, the controlling of 
social relations and the spread of information had been manageable. This was because all broadcasting 
activities were under the control of the National Broadcasting Institution, a state institution under the 
direct control of the Jurisprudential Leader.829 More than any other state institution, it has served the 
Islamic Republic by the production of programmes intended to propagate the state’s vision of the ideal 
Islamic and revolutionary citizen. However, both the IRIB and the Ministry of Islamic Guidance have 
 
 
 
827 For Khomeini’s view on technology see: B. Moin, op. cit., p. 76, For Kook’s view on technology see: D. Schwartz, Faith 
at the Crossroads: a Theological Profile of Religious Zionism (London: BRILL, 2002), 271. 
828 “Jerusalem: Haredim Attack Post Office Guards over 'TV Screens',” Israel News, July 18, 2010, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3921259,00.html, accessed on 14/11/2011. 
829 The name of the institution was changed to “Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcast.” According to the post-revolutionary 
Constitution, the leader directly appoints the head of the institution. 
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proved to be inefficient monitors of the internet and cable TV, and have been incapable of preventing 
the growth of a cyberspace civil community. Electronic information technology has reduced the social 
and  political  costs  of  political  participation  and  expressing  one’s  religious  views.  It  becomes  an 
existential threat to the state because it makes the securitized public space and the implementation of 
coercive policies against the development of civil society inefficient. The development of information 
technology is a double-edged sword for the state. On the one hand, it provides the state with the 
opportunity to spread their message globally or to use these instruments for educational purposes. On 
the other hand, with the free flow of information and the possibility of sharing ideas anonymously 
coupled with the impossibility of controlling the content of the materials passed between individuals, 
state legitimacy is potentially threatened. 
 
In his 2002 study of Iran’s information technology and the related growth of civil society, Michael 
Rabasco noted that since the establishment of network connection in 1992, Iran has had the highest 
growth rates of internet usage in the region, reflected in the increase of internet cafes from 450 in 2000 
to  1,200  in  2001. 830  He  contends  that  Iran  offers  an  interesting  case  study  of  the  influence  of 
information technology on politics and the development of civil policies.831 The growth in internet 
usage and weblogs has been of significant concern to the Islamic Republic, particularly fundamentalists 
and neo-fundamentalists. During the time of the reformists, state control of the internet and its content 
were relatively relaxed but the situation changed in 2002 and the end of the reformist government. 
Cyberspace provided a relatively secure space for civil rights activists to express their opinions about 
state policies, raise awareness about the violation of human rights in Iran, and form campaigns. The 
danger of cyberspace is so dominant at present to the Islamic Republic that it has called the increasing 
number of weblogs and secular website as the West’s “soft war” against the state.832 The state hopes that 
by connecting the growth of use of cyberspace to the ‘dangerous’ West it could create a theological 
justification for suppressing the cyber social network. It has set aside funding for religious institutions 
and encouraged the Basijs (who are involved in cyberspace, trolling internet forums and social networks) 
to identify the users.   The more civil society opposes the state’s totalitarianism, the harsher these 
policies become. 
 
 
830 Michael J. Rabasco, ‘Civil Society in Iran’, in Information Technology and World Politics, ed. Michael J. Mazarr (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 116- 130. 
831 According to the data presented by the World Bank Development in 2008, the number of internet users as percentage of 
population (per 100 inhabitants) in Iran has grown from 0.997% in 2000 to 32% in 2008. Iran is amongst the first five 
countries with 20% rate of growth in internet usage.http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb- 
wdi&met=it_net_user_p2&idim=country:IRN&q=internet+usage+in+iran, accessed on 14/11/2011. "Telecoms And 
Technology Forecast for Iran", Telecoms and technology, Economist Intelligence Unit, 18 June 2008, and Grey Burkhart ed. 
"Iran, National Security and the Internet in the Persian Gulf Region”, (Washington: Georgetown University,1998) 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070703041209/http://www.georgetown.edu/research/arabtech/pgi98-4.html, accessed 
on 15/07/2009. 
832 S. C. Poulson, Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks (NY: Lexington Books, 
2006), 301-6. 
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In response to the development of this space the neo-fundamentalists filtered internet social networks, 
imprisoned bloggers, and formed a “Cyber-Army” which is responsible for fighting against the cyber- 
civil society. It has not however been successful in preventing the growing number of users accessing 
information. Iran’s fundamentalists, reformists, and neo-fundamentalists are well aware of the 
possibilities and challenges that information technology presents to the legitimacy of the regime. While 
the official political sphere is relatively free of secular debates, Iranian weblogs and internet sites have 
become the scene of political and religious debates, many of which breach the restrictions on civic 
discussions enforced by the Islamic Republic.833 
 
Cyberspace and mobile phones provide individuals with the opportunity to experience freedom in 
communicating their religious views and debating politics. The globalization of information technology 
has provided individuals with the opportunity to express themselves in divergent ways and offered them 
creative avenues for articulating their civil demands. It has had a significant political impact on the 
formation of a global civil society that could raise awareness about civil rights and effectively limit the 
power of the state. Its spread has made the control of the education system a vital issue for religious 
groups in both states because it is through education that states and religious communities can transfer 
their political cultures and values to the next generation. 
 
Religious communities in Israel strongly support their isolation from the non-religious and react in a 
hostile manner towards any policies that appear to encourage individualism. The religious communities 
regulate their interaction with others. They are semi-independent in managing the affairs of their 
Yeshivot and in choosing educational materials for their curriculum. 834  They view education as an 
exclusively religious issue and, as such, do not consider the state to be a legitimate source in making 
decisions  concerning  the  education  of  religious  communities.  Nonetheless,  they  consider  the 
government responsible for the funding of Heredi schools, (such as the construction of additional 
classrooms).835   Avraham Ravitz, in his study on citizenship in Israel, argues that the Heredi community 
believes that the government serves all “brethren from Israel, no matter if they are Hasidic, Lithuanian 
or secular”.836 For instance, he notes that Degel Hatorah has an inclusivist view about the public services 
that the government should provide for Israeli citizens but an exclusive view about the responsibilities of 
 
 
 
 
833 There are no statistics on the number of atheists in Iran. However, the internet has provided them with an opportunity to 
express their views in weblogs. 
834 The 1952 Education Act in Israel states the state’s dual funded secular (Tali) and religious (Dati) school systems. In 
addition to these systems the Heredi community have their own education system that they insist to be funded by the 
government at the same rate of the two other education systems. See: B. Reich, Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East 
and North Africa: a Biographical Dictionary (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990), 103. 
835 Peggy Cidor, “We say loud and clear: 'Hands off our lifestyle,” Jerusalem Post- Jerusalem, May 21, 2009, 
http://www.jpost.com/LocalIsrael/InJerusalem/Article.aspx?id=143056, accessed on 14/11/2011. 
836 Roger Friedland and Richard Hecht, To Rule Jerusalem (Fresno: University of California Press, 2000), 89. 
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their communities towards the state.837 Protecting their religious identity motivates their criticism of 
secularism and the development of individual identity, which they consider to be the root of the 
community destruction. Their rejection of secular education and directing students to solely focus on 
studying religious texts is aimed at preserving their theological, ritualistic, scholarly, and ethnic heritage 
and specify their identity in the state. 
 
The neo-fundamentalists in Iran disagree with the relatively liberal educational policies of the reformists 
and have either closed some of the university programmes or replaced liberal lecturers with neo- 
fundamentalists.  For them, educational policies are an essential vehicle of identity making and include 
religious education as a mandatory subject in school curriculums and all university programmes. By 
implementing coercive educational policies that are overtly explained in the school texts the state 
indirectly teaches students about appropriate social behaviour. Particularly, in Iran and Israel, religious 
education is concerned with teaching the “appropriate” roles and responsibilities of women in a social 
environment. In educational environment, they attempt to shape their behaviour by insisting on a 
religious style of dressing which primarily eradicates differences and undermines individual identity. 
 
Gender Politics and Religious Identity838 
 
 
 
Securitized Messianism cultivates theological and political debates over gender equality in Israel and Iran. 
Gender equality is a complex issue with many social and political implications in both states. In the 
Revolutionary  Phase  women  actively  participated  in  mobilizing,  campaigning,  and  advocating 
revolutionary ideals on equality and on egalitarian society. The image of an ideal revolutionary woman 
was no longer limited to the performance of religious rituals and her revolutionary identity extended 
her responsibilities to the fulfilling of the goals of Revolutionary Messianism. In Israel, early secular 
Zionism had a strong tradition of gender equality supported by leftwing communists, secular European 
Jews and the culture of communal production in Labor Kibbutzim which is reflected in the state’s 
secular policies on  gender equality. In the State-Maintenance Phase, the neo-fundamentalists have 
forcefully opposed the passing of progressive civil laws such as civil unions and secular marriages, 
predominantly in order to uphold their full control over the legal and ritualistic aspects of marriage and 
family laws. 
 
 
 
 
837 Itzhak Pindrus is the Mayor of Betar Illit, a Lithuanian Hassid and a member of the Degel Hatorah part of the United 
Torah Judaism party. Ibid. 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1242212435248&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull, accessed on 
14/11/2011. 
838 Mottahedeh believes that changes in the social and political life of the people in the post-revolutionary context are 
represented in the Iranian cinema, which reflects a drastic shift from the pre-revolutionary modes. N. Mottahedeh, 
Representing the Unpresentable: Historical Images of National  Reform from the Qajars to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Gender, Culture, 
and Politics in the Middle East, (US: Syracuse University Press, 2008), 189. 
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A marriage in Israel can proceed only after compulsory sessions with a state Rabbi, the performance of 
compulsory  Mikvah  (religious  bath) rituals,  and  the  affirmation  of  religious marriage  rituals  by a 
Rabbi.839 In her study of the Mikvah ritual Esther Fuchs argues that the compulsory performing of 
Mikvah laws associates the body of women with sets of religious icons, discourses of purity, and 
ultimately, politicizes it.840 She notes that legislating these rituals and customs connects women to 
particular sets of cultural values and symbols that have disciplinary functions.841 The politicizing of the 
body of women and limiting their role to providing domestic services are propagated by religious 
parties as well as communities. Religious communities discourage the political participation of women 
and  define  their  roles  in  relation  to  their  maternal  responsibilities  and  as  the  backbone  of  their 
families. 842     In spite of the lack of any official law on the code of clothing for women, religious 
communities apply strict norms for clothing in their suburbs. Hasidic communities discourage secular 
education for women and only a few of their educational centres accept female students. These policies 
have significantly influenced the policies of neo-fundamentalists.843 Menachem Freidman, in his study of 
women’s rights in Israel, argues that for both Heredi and Hasidic women the issues of employment and 
maintaining a traditional family structure have been a challenge since the formation of the state.844 The 
Heredi community urges women to permit their husbands to devote as much time to their religious 
studies as possible, while the state encourages the women to take jobs and participate in the workforce. 
 
In Iran, it is the integration of Shari’a with civil law in the Constitution that has resulted in many 
discriminatory laws, such as marriage and custody laws, and created a similar situation to the Heredi 
communities in Israel, but the development of civil laws in Iran can not be compared with Israel. The 
Islamic Republic is a non-democratic state and excludes any voice that does not submit to the power of 
Jurisprudential Leadership or requests any form of equality. In addition to its non-democratic laws, the 
power of the Jurisprudential Leader, who appoints the head of the judiciary system and the members of 
the Guardian Council, Constitutionally limits any attempts to involve other voices in legal debates. The 
legal system thus becomes an ineffective institution with no executive power over the leadership and its 
associated militia and institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
839 Yair Ettinger, “Justice Minister Bill Enhances Rabbinic Court Powers,” Ha’aretz, June 21, 2009, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1087095.html, accessed on 30/05/2009. 
840 E. Fuchs, Israeli Women's Studies: A Reader (London: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 150-55. H. Sedghi, Women and Politics 
in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 202-214. 
841E. Fuchs, Ibid, 153. 
842 Y. Yishai, Between the Flag and the Banner: Women in Israeli Politics (NY: SUNY Press, 1997), 177-183. 
843 David Rudge, Itim, “Separate Sexes on Ascent to Mt. Meron,” Jerusalem Post – Jerusalem, May 8, 2001, 5. 
844 M. Freidman, The Position of Haredi Women in Israel, in Shimon Shetreet, Women in Law (NY: Kluwer Law International, 
1998), 335. 
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This section uses the compulsory rule of Hijab in Iran as an example of the social and political 
implications and the nature of such discriminatory laws.845 The rule of compulsory Hijab is not solely 
discriminatory for Muslim women, rather it affects people in all groups, classes, faiths, and ethnicities in 
Iran. The state’s implementation of compulsory Hijab politically affirms the legitimacy of Shi’a religious 
groups as the ultimate authority in the legal system and as the agent for the Islamization of Iran.846 
Because in the State-Building Phase the issue of Hijab became a security issue the state treats any 
theological or political debate on the legitimacy of the law as a threat. During wartime a common piece 
of state propaganda on Hijab was taken from the will of a “martyr”, Abulfadhl Sangtarashan who said: 
“You, my sister ... your Hijab is mightier than my red blood”.847 The slogan covered many walls in 
Iranian streets in order to emphasize the importance of submission to the law of compulsory Hijab to 
protect Iran’s national security. 
 
The Islamic Republic considered the securitization of Hijab to be a political as well as a religious priority. 
 
848 The Revolutionary Guards and the Basij were the two forces who accepted the responsibility of 
monitoring the implementation of the law, punishing those who defied it.849 By this decision the state 
gave executive power to these forces and gradually built a parallel police force in the country. The 
significance of this shift was that both the Basij and Revolutionary Guards were loyal to the 
Jurisprudential Leadership and not to the Constitution. Both forces developed into well trained armed 
forces during the Iran/Iraq war with close economic and political ties with the state. As religious 
military forces, they are also connected with religious schools and mosques. Neither the Revolutionary 
Guards nor the Basij report to parliament or have any obligation to be transparent or to obey legal 
procedures. Members of the Basij consider their mission to be the safeguard of religion and stop the 
development of civil society. 
 
For the fundamentalists and neo-fundamentalists, compulsory Hijab remained a security priority in the 
State-Building Phase and State-Maintenance Phase. It paved the way for the strengthening of the power 
of the two forces over legislative, administrative, and legal systems. They attacked universities and 
dormitories to show the reformists their power of obstructing the implementation of any of the 
Constitutional laws that would limit the power of the Jurisprudential Leader by increasing the power of 
citizens. Their responsibility to control Hijab has provided them with the opportunity to police citizens. 
Although their policing policies violate the civil rights stipulated in Articles 23, 24, 27, and 29 of Iran’s 
 
 
 
845 Homosexuals have no rights in Iran. “Ahmadinejad: No homosexuals in Iran,” AFP – Sep 24, 2007 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hATGOzv6YSmgeMY1zdYbdpyrG2cw 
846 F. Milani, Veils and Words: the Emerging Voices of Iranian  Women Writers (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 4. 
847 M. Kar, Women, the Victims of the Iranian  Revolution, personal website, March 5, 2010, 
http://www.mehrangizkar.net/english/archives/000520.php , accessed 08/03/2010. 
848 H. Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 199. 
849 Ibid, 214. 
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Constitution, they have not been held responsible for their actions.850    The ideological position of the 
Jurisprudential Leadership obligates Khameneii to unconditionally support and fund their control of 
Hijab. Monitoring, controlling, and administering Hijab has reinforced the strategic alliance between 
the fundamentalist Ayatollahs, the traditional bazaar, and those who view compulsory Hijab as a 
precondition for a Shi’a utopia.851 
 
In addition to the Revolutionary Guards and Basij, the leadership encourages the faithful to participate 
in the monitoring of women’s Hijab in the street, religious seminaries, national media, and mosques.852 
The majority of propaganda claims that forcing women to wear Hijab expresses the devotion of the 
Iranian people to Islam and secures the ideals of the Islamic Republic.853 The faithful encourage the 
government to enforce the rule with coercion, to prove their devotion to the Jurisprudential Leader and 
the state’s messianic ideals. However, while nearly all legal political factions agree on the enforcement 
of compulsory Hijab they disagree over strategies. The hardliners propagate coercion as the best social 
strategy while reformists see coercion as an inept strategy that could trigger public dissatisfaction with 
government policies, and notably, alienate the public from religion. 
 
Since Khatami’s presidency, the reformists have questioned the effectiveness of policing of the Hijab in 
Iran.854 They argue that decades of coercion and the use of violence and enforcement have not led to the 
successful implementation of compulsory Hijab.855 Fundamentalists and neo-fundamentalists relate the 
inefficiency of the system of enforcing the law relating to Hijab to the state’s compromises. In order to 
resolve the problem, they suggest, the government should use measures that are more forceful than 
previously used. 856  Iranian fundamentalists refuse to sign the International Convention for Gender 
Equality and support the law of polygamy. Most of the participants in the civil campaign “One-million 
Signatures for Ending Discrimination against Women” have been imprisoned while women’s political 
rights have been severely violated.857 Women are poorly represented in Iran’s judicial system; they 
cannot become Ayatollahs, a Jurisprudential Leader, the president, or even a judge. Iranian women’s 
rights groups have been struggling for decades to change the radically sexist laws of the Islamic Republic 
but the integration of Shari’a into national laws has left them stigmatized and classed as threats to 
 
 
 
 
850 Article 23 of the Constitution:  http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html , accessed on 24/03/2010. 
851 H. Sedghi, op. cit., 214. 
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854 In 1998, Abdullah Nouri, Khatami’s former Interior Minister publically announced the inefficiency of enforcing 
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855 Ibid. 
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857 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2008: The State of the World's Human Rights (Ottawa, ON: Amnesty 
International Publications, 2007), 139-141. 
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national security. Women are obliged to marry and divorce based on religious laws and do not have the 
right to travel or work without their father’s or husband’s permission. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In the State-Building Phase, this chapter has argued, the securitization of messianism enabled the states 
to reconcile the tensions between non-religious and religious citizens through coercive and intentional 
laws. In this phase, security issues were the main rationale for determining any policy regarding civil 
rights. The State-Maintenance Phase not only reshaped the direction of the states’ politics, it also 
demanded a redefinition of the role of the armed forces in society. 
 
In both cases, the de-securitization of the State-Maintenance Phase weakened the power of the 
revolutionary elite and strengthened the position of the emerging political groups. It further politicised 
messianism in the social context in order to reconcile the tension between the political and collective 
religious identities of individual citizens. Globalization challenged this strategy with new information 
technologies. The development of information technology has enabled individuals to develop an 
autonomous individual identity, free from the coercion of the state or their ethnic and/or religious 
communities. The combination of these factors provides an environment in which individuals can form 
new and autonomous civil groups and become influential social forces. The emerging neo- 
fundamentalist groups encourage religious citizens themselves to monitor societies’ moral norms in 
order to fulfil the ideals of Revolutionary Messianism. The central role of individual political 
participation in the initial, highly idealistic, revolutionary vision of citizenship, transforms in the State- 
Building Phase to a submissive role. Their participation in politics is to express their support for the 
states in defending their geographical territory. In the State-Maintenance Phase the rise of neo- 
fundamentalist political groups, the de-securitization of Revolutionary Messianism, and the spread of 
communication technology again transformed the role of the citizen in the state. 
 
Although in both societies, Securitized Messianism defines the role of citizens in the State-Building 
Phase, there are several factors that make the transformation in the State-Maintenance Phase less 
problematic in Israeli society. The first factor is the existence of an immediate security threat that 
unifies the society. The second factor is the self-imposed isolation of the influential Israeli religious 
communities, which although temporary, has eased the tensions between religious and non-religious 
groups. The third factor is the political structure of the state that eliminates the possibility of silencing 
any group’s political voice. Furthermore, the democratic approach of the state towards the exchange of 
information,  the  press,  fair  and  regular  elections,  and  political  competition  further  reduce  social 
tensions. While in legal terms, Arab citizens of the state enjoy similar rights to Jewish citizens, in the 
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areas of education, marriage laws, and employment in civil services there is a large gap between the two 
groups.858 
 
None of the abovementioned factors could be applied to Iran’s case. The last conventional war in Iran 
finished over two decades ago and there has been no immediate threat to its border since. There is no 
physical separation between people with different faiths or ethnicity. In Iran, religious and non-religious 
citizens live together in neighbourhoods. They are neither able to nor are supportive of forming isolated 
communities.  The  superior  position  of  the  conservative  religious  social  groups  in  the  state’s 
securitization project, thus, created an exclusive social ideology in which the non-religious citizens and 
those citizens who have another faith have been banned from political participation and become the 
subject of discriminatory policies. The end of the war intensified the domestic internalization of the 
state’s militarily orientated policies. For example, the state silences and discriminates against Iran’s 
dissenting ethnic and religious groups while the Guardian Council engineers and manipulates elections 
in its favour. The continuation of the coercive policies in the State-Maintenance Phase has delegitimized 
the ideological foundations of the revolution. 
 
The Jurisprudential Leader, fundamentalists, and neo-fundamentalists view any factor that facilitates the 
development of an individual identity as evidence of the West’s cultural invasion of the Islamic Republic 
and a security threat to the state. To them, the development of civil society increases the risk of 
secularisation and liberalism. Through the spread of electronic communication technology, the state’s 
security system has become incapable of controlling the citizens’ political activities or their private lives. 
Therefore, Securitized Messianism, which acted as a deterrent strategy in the State-Building Phase, loses 
its function in the State-Maintenance Phase and fails to ensure the legitimacy of the Jurisprudential 
Leader in the new security environment. The 2009 post presidential election uprising in Iran confirmed 
that the continued enforcement of coercive policies can unify opposition from various groups. Access to 
communication technologies enabled the opposition groups to create a front that targeted the 
Jurisprudential Leadership as the cause of social and political unrest. 
In the social context securitization limits the utopian vision of a messianic state and produces coercive 
policies that aim to form a singular portrait of theology and national collective identity. Within the 
discourse of Politicised Messianism the criticism of state policies could be a threat to religious 
communities. In Iran, after the war, the state failed to re-define the boundary between religion and 
 
 
 
858 Yoav Stern, “Olmert Decries 'Deliberate and Insufferable' Discrimination against Arabs,” Ha’aretz, November 12, 2008, 
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208  
politics. Consequently, the assimilation of individual identity in theology and politics has presented the 
greatest challenge to the state, its religious institutions, and inevitably religion, in the social context. 
This shift in  the understanding of  religion and politics and  the resultant subordinate authority of 
religious leaders and institutions has limited the power of clergy in both societies. The Iranian and Israeli 
states respond to critiques or demands for civil rights with reference to an enemy that has a flexible 
reference in theological language but a unifying function in society. This combination creates the 
situation in which religious institutions lose their autonomy and develop a mutual dependency on the 
conservative political group; the existence of one is conditional upon the existence of the other. Thus, 
religious institutions not only theologically explain the political decisions of the state, they also adopt a 
secular language to define messianism. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has argued that in the Revolutionary Phase in Israel and Iran the incorporation of messianic 
theology in revolutionary ideology resulted in an increase in the role of religious institutions in politics 
and society. The revolutionary narratives of messianism were politically inclusive and theologically 
exclusive. They eliminated the possibility of the development of passive and apolitical messianism and 
radically limited theology to a political theory. Revolutionary Messianism linked their idealised image of 
a state with messianic features to modern political thought. Analysing their differences in this phase 
allows us to explain the relationship between religion and politics in the post-revolutionary states. 
Iranians and Jewry had different encounters with secularism and these affected the process of 
urbanization, industrialization, and institutionalization in each case. Revolutionary Messianism also gave 
rise in each case to a unique relationship between politics and religion. Revolutionary Messianism  did 
not originate in isolation, and contextual factors such as technology and economy played a central role 
in shaping them. These contextual factors have encouraged their unique ideological and political 
definitions regardless of their similar messianic theology. Iran’s 1978-1979 revolution was the 
continuation of the Constitutional Revolution and a response to the failure of the monarchy in 
implementing political and social justice. Khomeini’s Jurisprudential Leadership theory incorporated 
secular nationalism in Shi’a messianic discourse, but this could be merely functional in a modern 
bureaucratic state. In Israel, the Zionist revolution understood the establishment of a state to be the 
only solution to the liberation of Jews from genocide, anti-Semitism, and political oppression. While in 
Iran,  religious  groups  dominated  revolutionary  discourse,  in  Israel  European  Jewish  intellectuals 
became the revolutionary elites. 
 
In both cases, the revolution idealised an economic utopia that resonated with some Marxist ideas, but 
this vision was closely connected with nationalism and messianic theology. Revolutionists understood 
the ending of political oppression as the advent of the redemption of individuals. Political redemption 
would inspire state policies and one’s commitment to revolutionary goals could guarantee their 
fulfilment. Revolutionary Messianism united the two distinct pre-state legalist and esoteric messianic 
traditions. Both called their revolutions blessings and substituted political activism for the mystical 
dimension of redemption. The Revolutionary Phase transformed the concept of a redeeming “Time” 
from an apocalyptic event to a progressive political process for an ideal vision of unity within a 
bureaucratic state. 
 
In Israel, the revolutionaries changed their theological approach from an agent-based to an institutional 
system through changing the reference of authority from an individual Messiah to a messianic age. The 
Knesset  and  judiciary  systems  were  in  the  service  of  the  state  for  the  success  of  Revolutionary 
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Messianism  fulfilling  spiritual  redemption.  Zionism  connected  the  traditional  Jewish  notion  of  a 
messianic utopia and legitimised the incorporation of messianic theology into pragmatic policies. This 
shifting of the reference of authority to revolutionary agents made Revolutionary Messianism an 
exclusively revolutionary ideology and because Ashkenazi secular groups were the main revolutionaries 
they became the political, and by proxy, the religious agents for the fulfilment of messianic goals. In 
Iran, partly due to the lack of a strong civil society or political party, Khomeini’s theory of 
Jurisprudential Leadership gained momentum. It remained faithful to an agent-based messianic tradition 
and while it resolved the traditional theological debates over the existence of the state in the time of 
occultation it linked the success of the revolutionary ideals to submission to the rule of a Jurisprudential 
Leader. This theological difference is the reason for the establishment of a democratic political system in 
Israel and a totalitarian state in Iran. Their different interpretations of a similar theology shaped the 
theological and political structure of the revolutionary states with utopian economic and political ideals. 
 
In the State-Building Phase, in both states, securitization united various revolutionary hermeneutics, 
producing a messianic narrative centred on the sacredness of land. It contextualised security threats, 
combining the religious and political identities as the source of state legitimacy.  In both cases it made 
the legitimacy of these states, inescapably, security orientated. In these post-revolutionary states 
securitization could not be an exclusively political project as both heavily rely on religious legitimation. 
It united different legal theological views by further relating the hermeneutics of the sacred texts to 
Revolutionary Messianism with a strong nationalist tone. This dependency was not uni-directional. 
Securitization gives these states absolute legitimacy for identifying political and religious threats, making 
religious figures and institutions dependant on the state. Securitized Messianism , also, dominated 
political factionalism and politically and theologically limited messianic theology to the states’ security 
projects. Both used religious symbols to affirm their stand on territorial sovereignty and emphasized 
safeguarding  religion  in  their  securitization  projects,  thus,  securitization  institutionalised 
fundamentalism. 
 
In Israel the stronger bond between messianism and state legitimacy motivated the spread of Kookism. 
Notions of autonomy and independence that had united Zionists for a revolution, united them in a war 
against the neighbouring Arab states. Their victory characterised the state nationalism of Israel. 
Securitization transferred the responsibility of protecting Jewish communities from religious leaders to 
the state and the state’s Defence Forces. It reshaped traditional party politics in Israel and by further 
connecting the political and religious identities of the state, gave rise to new politically active religious 
groups. These gradually ended the dominance of traditional Labor secular Zionism over Israeli politics. 
Religious Zionism effectively paved the way for the transition of Revolutionary Messianism to a political 
ideology which presented a comprehensive picture of the nation in history and generated a sense of 
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political continuity that required state protection. As a result, it united the culturally diverse society in 
 
Israel, affirmed their right to establish a sovereign state, and ultimately re-enforced the state legitimacy. 
 
 
In Iran, Revolutionary Messianism positioned the protection of the legitimacy of Khomeini’s 
Jurisprudential Leadership as the core issue of the state’s security policy. Khomeini used the war against 
Iraq and Iran’s economic isolation as a means for the success of his securitization project. These factors 
enabled him to re-read Revolutionary Messianism and create a new ideological structure for the state’s 
security policies. His rule and definition of Iran’s security goals combined religion and politics and 
changed revolutionary idealism into a totalitarian ideology. This shift produced a closed political system 
which became unavoidably fragile. Failure in establishing a pluralistic and open political system resulted 
in the impotence of the state in absorbing new political ideas and parties. The rise of any political group 
became a potential security threat. Because of the agent-based interpretation of messianism, 
securitization justified the implementation of coercive policies and the establishment of a one party 
political system. 
 
The institutionalization of Securitized Messianism in states’ legal systems results in the de-privatization 
of religion. Securitization reconciles the inconsistencies between legal bureaucracy and theology because 
it allows the states to resolve these issues in a security context. It makes defining clear boundaries 
between legal and religious laws an ambiguous security discourse, but this ambiguity is the key to its 
efficiency. In I&I this relationship between political and religious sources of state legitimacy transforms 
traditional religious trust relations. In these states, the legal system is in need of ideological and 
pragmatic religious legitimacy which would succeed only if the boundaries between law and religion are 
ambivalent. Both states, link the ethics of their legal systems to Revolutionary Messianism  and through 
this  association  revolutionary  elites  and  religious  leaders  establish their  authority  within  the  legal 
systems. 
 
The de-privatization of religion takes different forms in Israel and Iran due to their different political 
structures. Israel is a democratic state with a pluralistic parliamentary politics and free media. This 
structure has produced various public spaces for negotiating legal matters. Israel still faces sporadic 
conflict with Palestianins which functions as a unifying force and facilitates negotiating domestic issues. 
The development of neo-fundamentalist parties in Israel, like Shas, could not be possible without the 
de-securitization of the Cold War bipartisan regional security environment. The post Cold War 
environment broke down the traditional arrangement of religion and politics and gave rise to new 
policies that addressed security issues in the new settlements moving Israel from one securitization 
project to another. The neo-fundamentalists considered the implementation of Halakhah to be the 
necessary factor for the success of the state in its securitization projects. Consequently, Israel has been 
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successful in the institutionalization of Securitized Messianism in its legal system. The political 
participation of the Sephardim and de-securitization intensified political and social tensions between the 
non-religious and religious groups over national laws and security issues, such as territorial concessions 
and peace with the Palestinians. The state’s support of an idealist approach towards progressive 
messianism rather than an agent-based messianism and the focus of religious Zionists on the messianic 
age have been the grounds for Israel’s pluralistic party politics. 
 
In Iran, Khomeini’s death and the transition of political power form Khomeini to Khamenei limited the 
goals of the state’s securitization projects to the protection of the Jurisprudential Leadership position. 
This transition fragmented the political system, in the late 1990s, during the presidency of Khatami, 
who insisted on the normalization of Iran’s political ties with the United States of Amercia and the de- 
securitization of the relationship by changing the reference to ‘enemy’. Khamenei vehemently opposed 
Khatami’s attempts at institutionalization, as this could have resulted in limiting Khamenei’s power by 
the Constitution. The lack of a charismatic authority had two political consequences for Khamenei. First, 
it  closely  connected  Khamenei  to  the  neo-fundamentalists  who  argued  that  the  authority  of  a 
Jurisprudential Leader is  identical to  the authority of  the  twelfth Imam,  and secondly, it  further 
positioned Jurisprudential Leadership at the centre of political problems ultimately weakening the 
Islamic Republic. This situation demonstrates the failure of the state in both the beginning of a new 
securitization project and the politicization of messianism. 
 
Similarly in Israel and Iran, neo-fundamentalists demand radical changes in the political culture of the 
state. Although they support security-orientated policies, and the states’ ideological position on the 
fulfilment of Revolutionary Messianism, they strongly disagree with the elitist culture of the State- 
Building  Phase. In  both  cases  they  use  foreign  policy,  and  by  criticizing  the  effectiveness of  the 
revolutionary elites’ security policies, they oppose revolutionary elitism. They view these policies as an 
obstacle to the fulfilment of the states’ messianic goals. They are strongly anti-liberal and understand the 
messianic  goals  of  the  states  to  be  predominantly  political.  Specifically  they  stress  the  states’ 
responsibilities in establishing a just political and economic system that aims to implement religious laws. 
They perceive the success of the states to be dependent on the strengthening of religious identity, and 
their failure in implementing economic justice to be the result of political and economic elitism. They 
are populist parties and use messianic symbols to legitimize their political positions. Their flexible use of 
these symbols has limited theology to a political instrument for rejecting secularism, instigating the 
development of multiple discourses on messianism within the states’ political sphere. 
 
In  Israel  the  Shas  party  criticizes  the  secular  parties  for  the  Oslo  Accord  negotiations,  the 
 
Disengagement Plan, and for settlement issues, attributing to Ashkenazi non-religious statist parties the 
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failure of ensuring Israel’s security. It was the Shas’ position on security issues and their stress on the 
sacredness of the land that have resulted in their growing power in Israeli politics. Shas views political 
participation and competition as a means for the fulfilment of the messianic goals of the state. Contrary 
to  the  traditional  non-statist  religious  parties,  Shas  not  only  support  the  development  of  state 
institutions but they also fervently participate in party politics and elections, and consider the state as a 
pragmatic and effective instrument for messianism. Shas associates the fulfilment of the messianic goals 
with the development of a progressive theocracy and egalitarian governing system. 
 
In Iran, the neo-fundamentalists have denounced the policies of the revolutionary elites and blamed 
them for Iran’s failure in resolving the challenges to the country’s nuclear programmes. They argue that 
the progress of the Islamic Republic to an ideal messianic state should be the goal of the state’s politics 
and a messianic utopia could only materialize when the messianic goals of the Shi’a tradition become the 
blueprint for the state’s security policies; the state’s elitism deflects the revolution from its genuine 
goals  of  implementing  economic  and  political  justice.  The  study  of  party  politics  in  Iran’s  last 
presidential election demonstrates that although all parties have remained loyal to Khomeini, they 
disagree over the ultimate source of state legitimacy. The reformists considered the Constitution to be 
the source of legitimacy; the neo-fundamentalists positioned the Jurisprudential Leader as the decisive 
source for state legitimacy. The position of the neo-fundamentalists ultimately undermines the absolute 
rule of the Jurisprudential Leadership. 
 
In Israel and Iran, the states acknowledge the rights of monotheistic religious communities. They have, 
however, adopted an official religion with a specific narrow interpretation of their civil laws. In its 
totalitarian manifestation in Iran, the state laws become discriminatory against the majority of Iranians; 
in its democratic manifestation in Israel, laws are ineffective in addressing discriminatory attitudes in the 
religious suburbs. The politicization of messianism within the state’s institutions brings the clergy under 
the control of the state, limiting their autonomy. Their dependence on the state undermines their 
traditionally elitist status in society. Instead of clergy, political theologians and theological politicians 
grow to be the main groups who manage the appropriation of the core values of Securitized Messianism 
to state policies. For both, a symbolic representation of security in messianic theology elicits a broader 
definition of security threat that goes beyond political issues and enables the state to target any specific 
group as a threat to its security, and by proxy, the security of religion. In both cases the politicization of 
messianism instigates disparity between religious and non-religious citizens by giving the first group an 
advantageous moral position in society. 
 
Examining their gender politics and the spread of new communication technologies highlights the 
challenges that the construction of a collective identity poses to the states in I&I, and explains the 
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methods that each adopts for resolving these. In Israel these challenges are visible in their understanding 
of the responsibilities of the state to religious and non-religious groups. While religious groups see the 
crucial duty of the state to be protecting religion from any violations, including the secular and non- 
religious public, the secularists understand the main responsibility of the state to be the development of 
an independent, nationalist, and wealthy environment. The secularists reject the creation of a theocracy 
by legal coercion. Israel is a signatory of the UNCDW, and has adopted progressive gender politics at 
the  state level. In  the religious communities, however, traditional sexist laws are  dominant.  The 
growing power of the religious parties in the state has created inconsistencies between gender equality 
on the ground in real politics and in state policies.   With gender politics, although women are not 
limited in their social and political activities by the state, they have to perform religious rituals and 
adhere to religious laws. The same situation is valid for the state policies regarding the spread of 
communication technologies in religious suburbs. While the state heavily invests in the growth of 
industry, religious communities are reluctant to use new communication technologies. 
 
Applying the analytical model of this thesis allows us to see how Rabbi Kook embraced secular Zionism 
in his theology, and established religious settlements. The inclusivism of his theology gave rise to three 
different political groups. The first is the secular Zionists whose understanding of the state and its 
messianic responsibilities resonate Benjamin’s view on theology, becoming the mainstream dominant 
Labor party in the State-Building Phase. The second are supporters of the National Religious party who 
subscribes to the formation and development of the state but are predominantly religious. They 
cooperated with the secular Labor party having similar views on the significance of the political and 
economic developments. The third is the non-statist religious parties of the State-Building Phase, such 
as Agudat Yisrael, who had fundamentally different views on the state’s messianic responsibilities and its 
theological importance. By applying this analytical model we can see how these radically different 
political views have given rise to the birth and development of a new form of religious political party, 
like Shas, that is nationalist and religious. 
 
In Iran, this model clarifies in which areas the system fragments and why. It also demonstrates that 
because of the integration of religion and politics, the fragmentation of the political system results in the 
fragmentation of religion. This analytical model clearly explains why such fragmentation happens and 
what would be its long-term consequences. The Islamic Republic deems the religious responsibilities of 
citizens to be an indispensable part of their civil duties. As a totalitarian state they coerce adherence to 
Shari’a and view these policies a solution to the increasing tension in society that directly or indirectly 
targets the state’s legitimacy. Two factors contribute to political fragmentation and de-sacralise 
messianism: the spread of a global notion of citizenship and the rise of neo-fundamentalism that has 
further encouraged the incorporation of messianism in everyday politics. The spread of communication 
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technologies poses new challenges to religious groups by developing a virtual autonomous identity which 
could neither be stopped by isolation techniques nor be undermined by coercive policies. The state uses 
the flexibility of religious language to stigmatize civil groups and activities as security threats and thus has 
internalized its securitization project. The social implications of the transition of Securitized Messianism 
to Politicised Messianism create a wide gap between religious and non-religious groups. These 
implications not only separate religious from non-religious citizens but also instigate growing political 
problems between the fundamentalists and the neo-fundamentalists and between the latter and the 
Jurisprudential Leader. 
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